Objective Research objectives and content Agents in a hierarchy, due to their expertise, are commonly delegated authority to take decision and report information. While delegation reduces the burden of communication and information processing on the principal, it also introduces additional incentives problems. Corruption arises when a member of the organization uses the discretion confered on her to help another agent at the expense of the organization. This research raises the general question whether and how a principal (the owner of the organization, say) would want to regulate these "non-desirable" side-exchanges taking into account that this may hurt the realization of "desirable" side-exchanges (like mutual cooperation). The research seeks also to explain the detrimental effects of corruption as well as its extent and persistence in a dynamic perspective. The main novelty of this research is that we shift the emphasis to the organization design and the transactions costs of side-contracting. Training content (objective, benefit and expected impact) See the note on the description of the host institution and the group which will host the candidate. Fields of science social sciencessociologysocial issuescorruptionnatural sciencescomputer and information sciencesdata sciencedata processing Programme(s) FP4-TMR - Specific research and technological development programme in the field of the training and mobility of researchers, 1994-1998 Topic(s) 0302 - Post-doctoral research training grants TS15 - Microeconomics Call for proposal Data not available Funding Scheme RGI - Research grants (individual fellowships) Coordinator University of Essex Address Wivenhoe park CO4 3SQ Colchester United Kingdom See on map EU contribution € 0,00 Participants (1) Sort alphabetically Sort by EU Contribution Expand all Collapse all Not available Belgium EU contribution € 0,00 Address See on map
