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The positive and normative aspects of corruption

Objective



Research objectives and content
Agents in a hierarchy, due to their expertise, are commonly delegated authority to take decision and report information. While delegation reduces the burden of communication and information processing on the principal, it also introduces additional incentives problems. Corruption arises when a member of the organization uses the discretion confered on her to help another agent at the expense of the organization. This research raises the general question whether and how a principal (the owner of the organization, say) would want to regulate these "non-desirable" side-exchanges taking into account that this may hurt the realization of "desirable" side-exchanges (like mutual cooperation). The research seeks also to explain the detrimental effects of corruption as well as its extent and persistence in a dynamic perspective. The main novelty of this research is that we shift the emphasis to the organization design and the transactions costs of side-contracting.
Training content (objective, benefit and expected impact)
See the note on the description of the host institution and the group which will host the candidate.

Funding Scheme

RGI - Research grants (individual fellowships)
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Coordinator

University of Essex
Address
Wivenhoe Park
CO4 3SQ Colchester
United Kingdom

Participants (1)

Not available
Belgium