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Symmetric and asymmetric dynamic competition between jurisdictions

Objective



Research objectives and content
The objective is to study a differential game of public capital accumulation between two industrial jurisdictions. The idea is to compare the stationary centralized solution of the game with the stationary Nash equilibrium. The existence and the stability will be derived using classical tools of dynamic optimization. The efficiency of the equilibrium will be examined by comparing the non cooperative equilibrium (Nash) and the centralized solution. Once this is done, I intend to apply the same methodology to the study of asymmetric games. The same questions will be examined and the results will be expand with the result in the symmetric framework.
Training content (objective, benefit and expected impact)
My objective is to spend a year to work with researchers who are working on similar theoretical problems on a different local system then this French system. This allow a comparison between two different systems of local public finance.

Funding Scheme

RGI - Research grants (individual fellowships)

Coordinator

University of Essex
Address
Wivenhoe Park
CO4 3SQ Colchester
United Kingdom

Participants (1)

Not available
France