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Regulation and information acquisition


Research objectives and content
The New Regulatory Economics focuses on the design of the optimal regulatory mechanism when the regulated firm has private information about the environment (e.g. exogenous cost and demand conditions) and her own characteristics (e.g. managerial effort). In this field of research the information structure has almost always been assumed exogenous, and beyond the control of the central planner.
My aim is to analyse: (i) how the regulator should design the optimal regulatory mechanism taking into account firms' incentive for information acquisition when perfect information acquisition is prohibitively costly (ii) how the optimal organisation of the industry is affected by the information acquisition problem, and (iii) when the acquisition of information should be delegated to the firm and when instead it should be centralised. To my knowledge these issues are almost unexplored. Training content (objective, benefit and expected impact)
In a fruitful environment like the one in ECARE I hope to improve my knowledge of contract theory and mechanism design and hence gain a better understanding of the reasons why in some circumstance the regulatory mechanisms delegate decisions to the firm (e.g. in terms of quality) and in some others they do not and how these choices are related to the information acquisition problem If I am able to get results on the ideas mentioned above, this should be interesting for firms in regulated industries, for policy makers who aim at promote efficiency in these industry and for consumers, whose preferences and attitudes are often the object of data collection from the firm's side. I hope that the results measured in amounts of literature will be 2 articles that are suitable for publication in international journals
Links with industry / industrial relevance (22)

Funding Scheme

RGI - Research grants (individual fellowships)


39,Avenue Rossevelt 50
1050 Bruxelles

Participants (1)

Not available