Skip to main content

Implementation of true orderings


Research objectives and content Our purpose is to study a class of problems where society wants to elicit the truth from the agents. Think on the problem of wine testing, gymnastic competition, or a group of students applying for a scholarship. All these situations have a common structure. There is a fact that occurs (a specific ranking of the alternatives that we will call the truth) and that it is observed by the people who decide the final outcome (members of a jury). This fact determine the preferences of the deciders over the alternatives. However, the preferences of each jury member may also depend on some external facts (for example. each decider may have a most (least) preferred alternative, and so he prefers this alternative as high (low) as possible in the final ranking, whatever the true is). The deciders send messages (score points, orderings, etc). These messages are translated, by means of an outcome function, in a final ranking. The messages together with the outcome function is what we call a mechanism. Our aim is to look for such successful mechanisms
Training content (objective, benefit and expected impact)
The question whether the truth can be implemented even if deciders have incentives to behave strategically is essential since in general, the members of the jury have friends and/or enemies among the set of alternatives that have to be ordered. The variety of situations in which the former model makes sense is enormous: From the problem of a group of scientists dividing a price,to gymnastics competitions.
Links with industry / industrial relevance (22)

Funding Scheme

RGI - Research grants (individual fellowships)


Facultés Universitaires Notre-Dame dela Paix de Namur
8,Rempart De La Vierge
5000 Namur

Participants (1)

Not available