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Modelling fishermen's behaviour under new regulatory regimes

Objective

The main objective in this project is to provide models for empirical specification of fishermen behaviour under regulatory systems based on Individual Vessel Quotas (IVQ). This is important because the fisher's incentives under these management systems are substantially different from what they are under traditional management systems. In particular, under these systems, quantity landed is not a choice variable for the fishermen. A cost function rather than a profit function approach should therefore be used. However, a number of measures of fishermen behaviour have been developed in relation to profit functions. We will derive similar measures in a cost function context. The approach will be used empirically to analyse and compare Danish, Icelandic, Norwegian and Swedish fisheries where IVQ, both transferable and non transferable, have been implemented.

The project will be organised in 7 workpackages (WP). In WP1 we review the use of profit functions to describe fisher's behaviour, and focus particularly on measures for rent collection, fleet size and over capacity. Data collection, WP2, is started as early as possible, as experience suggests that this is a point that takes time. In WP3 we investigate cost functions as a tool to describe fisher's based on WP1, and derive equivalents of the theoretical behaviour. This is measures outlined in WP1, as well as measures unique to cost functions. This is a key element in this project, as this is where the theoretical measures to describe fisher behaviour is outlined. In WP4 we discuss the choice of functional form. This is necessary before the empirical analysis, since the choice of functional form is essential for which measures we can derive analytically and therefore which functional forms should be used in the empirical analysis. In WP5, empirical analysis will be undertaken by each of the partners using the methods developed in earlier workpackages. The results from the empirical analysis will then be compared with focus on how well different versions of IVQ systems perform with respect to different economic measures. In this context it is of particular interest whether transferability or not of the quotas seems to make a difference. The results from all the workpackages will then be combined in the final report.

Funding Scheme

CSC - Cost-sharing contracts

Coordinator

Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration
Address
Breivikveien 40
5045 Bergen
Norway

Participants (4)

The Danish Institute of Agricultural and Fisheries Economics
Denmark
Address
Rolighedsvej 25
1958 Frederiksberg C
University of Akureyri
Iceland
Address
Nordurslod
600 Akureyri
University of Göteborg
Sweden
Address
Vasaparken
405 30 Göteborg
University of Portsmouth Higher Education Corporation
United Kingdom
Address
University House, Winston Churchill Avenue
PO1 2UP Portsmouth