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CORDIS

The Political Organization of Corruption: State Restructuring and Its Consequences

Project description

How government restructuring shapes corruption and inequality

It is well known that corruption undermines public trust, distorts economic incentives, and comes with a high cost for businesses and citizens. However, little is known about how large-scale institutional reform affects corruption dynamics. Supported by the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions programme, the POC project will explore Vietnam’s 2025 administrative overhaul, which reduced the number of provinces, abolished district tiers, and merged ministries. It will use this case to assess how changes in bureaucratic structure influence bribery, access to services, and economic outcomes. The project’s goal is to shed light on how consolidation reshapes corruption patterns, bargaining power, and inequality across different social and economic groups. Overall, the project aims to provide rare causal evidence about who benefits from state reform.

Objective

Corruption distorts incentives, weakens public investment, and imposes heavy costs on firms and citizens. While sometimes seen as “greasing the wheels,” such effects are rare and short-lived; more often, officials create red tape to extract rents, sustaining self-reinforcing “bad equilibria.” Theory predicts that fragmented bureaucracies multiply bribes and uncertainty, while consolidation centralizes rents but can lower burdens on firms. Yet systematic evidence on how large-scale restructuring affects corruption remains scarce.

Vietnam’s 2025 administrative overhaul provides an unprecedented natural experiment. The government is cutting provinces from 63 to 34, abolishing the district tier, and merging ministries from 30 to 22, eliminating nearly 80,000 positions. These reforms reshape veto points across sectors and alter citizens’ access costs, enabling causal identification via difference-in-differences. Two unique national surveys provide rich data: the Provincial Competitiveness Index of 8,000 domestic and 2,000 foreign firms, and the Public Administration Performance Index of 13,000–14,000 citizens annually, with more than a decade of pre-reform waves.

This project leverages these conditions to assess both efficiency and equity. One paper examines how ministry mergers affect bribery burdens and firm outcomes; another studies how provincial consolidation shifts citizens’ bribe-paying, bargaining power, and reliance on intermediaries. Both also test heterogeneous effects across firm size, gender, and minority status. By combining quasi-experimental variation with high-quality microdata, the project will generate rigorous evidence on how centralization reshapes corruption and who gains from reform.

Fields of science (EuroSciVoc)

Keywords

Programme(s)

Topic(s)

Funding Scheme

HORIZON-TMA-MSCA-PF-EF - HORIZON TMA MSCA Postdoctoral Fellowships - European Fellowships

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Call for proposal

(opens in new window) HORIZON-MSCA-2025-PF

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Coordinator

DUBLIN CITY UNIVERSITY
Net EU contribution
€ 268 568,64
Address
Glasnevin
9 Dublin
Ireland
Region
Ireland Eastern and Midland Dublin
Activity type
Higher or Secondary Education Establishments
Links
Total cost
No data