Skip to main content
Go to the home page of the European Commission (opens in new window)
English en
CORDIS - EU research results
CORDIS
Content archived on 2024-06-11

Bargaining and the cost of corruption

Objective



The illegal nature of corruption makes it often impossible to have a market for corrupt transactions witH public knowledge and leads therefore bribes to be the outcome of bargaining between two parties.
The goal of the proposed research is to study how bribes are determined in equilibrium keeping into account that no enforceable contracts can be used in the bargaining process. Once reneging of a previous offer is allowed, the "seller" (public official) might have incentives to renege on previous offer that were accepted by the "buyer" (private agent) as his acceptance might signal his willingness to pay for a higher bribe.
The result expected is that sequential bargaining does not lead to information transmission and to an approximately efficient solution so that the basic intuition of the Coase Conjecture fails in this setting. Realistic situations will be studied, with the objective to provide normative suggestions to curb corruption and to minimize its economic consequences.

Fields of science (EuroSciVoc)

Programme(s)

Topic(s)

Call for proposal

Data not available

Funding Scheme

RGI - Research grants (individual fellowships)

Coordinator

Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II
EU contribution
No data
Address
Via Cinzia
80138 Napoli
Italy
Total cost
No data

Participants (1)