Periodic Reporting for period 1 - MVG (Moral Vagueness in a Mind-Independent World)
Période du rapport: 2022-05-01 au 2024-04-30
Suppose that one is watching one’s seven-year-old son play in the city park. This claim seems to be clearly true: it is morally permissible to divert one’s attention from him for one second. At the same time, this principle also seems to be clearly true: if it is morally permissible to divert one’s attention from him for n number of seconds, then it is morally permissible to divert one’s attention for n + 1 second. By modus ponens and continuous application of the principle, we can generate a sorites paradox to the apparently absurd conclusion that it is morally permissible to divert one’s attention for, say, six hundred seconds (ten minutes).
The ease with which we can generate sorites paradoxes for ‘morally permissible’ and other moral terms is strong evidence that there is moral vagueness. The existence of moral vagueness raises the question of what its source is—the source question. Extending theories of vagueness in general to the moral domain, two leading answers emerge. According to one, moral vagueness has its source in a kind of uncertainty: when it is vague whether it is morally permissible to perform a certain act, there is a fact of the matter about whether performing it is morally permissible but it is unknowable. This is moral epistemicism. According to another, moral vagueness has its source in a kind of indeterminacy: when it is vague whether it is morally permissible to perform a certain act, there is no fact of the matter about whether performing it is morally permissible. This is moral indeterminism. Which of moral epistemicism and moral indeterminism (if any) provides the right answer to the source question?
The overall objective of this project was to show that, at least conditional on robust moral realism being true, moral epistemicism and moral indeterminism have distinct and significant practical implications—that is, distinct and significant implications for what one ought to do when one is acting under moral vagueness. If confirmed, this hypothesis would show that it matters from a practical perspective—as opposed to a merely theoretical one—which (if any) of those theories of moral vagueness is true.
The ease with which we can generate sorites paradoxes for ‘morally permissible’ and other moral terms is strong evidence that there is moral vagueness. The existence of moral vagueness raises the question of what its source is—the source question. Extending theories of vagueness in general to the moral domain, two leading answers emerge. According to one, moral vagueness has its source in a kind of uncertainty: when it is vague whether it is morally permissible to perform a certain act, there is a fact of the matter about whether performing it is morally permissible but it is unknowable. This is moral epistemicism. According to another, moral vagueness has its source in a kind of indeterminacy: when it is vague whether it is morally permissible to perform a certain act, there is no fact of the matter about whether performing it is morally permissible. This is moral indeterminism. Which of moral epistemicism and moral indeterminism (if any) provides the right answer to the source question?
The overall objective of this project was to show that, at least conditional on robust moral realism being true, moral epistemicism and moral indeterminism have distinct and significant practical implications—that is, distinct and significant implications for what one ought to do when one is acting under moral vagueness. If confirmed, this hypothesis would show that it matters from a practical perspective—as opposed to a merely theoretical one—which (if any) of those theories of moral vagueness is true.
The work performed during the project attempted to confirm that hypothesis in a series of three papers. The first of these asked whether the two leading interpretations of indeterminism, semantic and metaphysical indeterminism, have themselves distinct and significant practical implications. The answer to this question, it was concluded, is not an unqualified ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, but a more surprising one: that it depends on whether the best interpretation of semantic indeterminism and the best interpretation of metaphysical indeterminism differ in their alethic (i.e. truth-related) commitments. Building on this, the second paper developed a novel account of decision-making under moral indeterminacy, namely, an account on which moral indeterminacy (be it semantic or metaphysical) entails truth-value gaps. Building on both of these papers, a third paper tested the working hypothesis of the project head on, confirming it: epistemicism and indeterminism do deliver distinct verdicts about what one ought to do in the zone of vagueness of certain moral sorites series, and these distinct verdicts have significant implications for practical ethics.
These results were presented both at the Department of Philosophy at Uppsala University (the host institution) and elsewhere (e.g. at the 2nd Nordic Epistemology Network Workshop in Norway), and they will soon be disseminated to journals in philosophy. In addition to these results, the project also yielded results on vagueness and indeterminacy beyond ethics, namely, on the overlooked connection between those two phenomena and the social realm. These results were disseminated in two papers in leading philosophy journals, one in Philosophical Quarterly and another in Thought.
These results were presented both at the Department of Philosophy at Uppsala University (the host institution) and elsewhere (e.g. at the 2nd Nordic Epistemology Network Workshop in Norway), and they will soon be disseminated to journals in philosophy. In addition to these results, the project also yielded results on vagueness and indeterminacy beyond ethics, namely, on the overlooked connection between those two phenomena and the social realm. These results were disseminated in two papers in leading philosophy journals, one in Philosophical Quarterly and another in Thought.
Overall, the results of the project are expected to move the research on moral (and, more generally, normative) vagueness and indeterminacy forward in that they show that it matters from a practical perspective—and not merely a theoretical one—which (if any) of the two leading theories of moral vagueness is true.