Democracy, Autocracy, and International Cooperation

Informations projet

DEMCOOP

N° de convention de subvention: 101097437

DOI

10.3030/101097437

Date de signature de la CE 12 Mai 2023

Date de début 1 Janvier 2024

Date de fin 31 Decembre 2028

Financé au titre de

• European Research Council (ERC)

Coût total

€ 2 499 939,00

Contribution de l’UE

€ 2 499 939,00

Coordonné par

STOCKHOLMS UNIVERSITET
Sweden

Periodic Reporting for period 1 - DEMCOOP (Democracy, Autocracy, and International Cooperation)

Période du rapport: 2024-01-01 au 2026-06-30

Résumé du contexte et des objectifs généraux du projet

For decades, research has shown that democracies are more likely than autocracies to cooperate internationally—by joining international organizations, supporting trade, committing to human rights treaties, and resolving disputes peacefully. Much of this work, however, was conducted during a period of optimism about the global spread of democracy. Today, democracy is in decline in many regions, while authoritarian governments are gaining influence. At the same time, some established democracies have reduced their support for international cooperation, whereas several autocracies have become more active in building new institutions and initiatives.

This project starts from the observation that the relationship between regime type and international cooperation is more complex than previously assumed. Its objective is to reassess how democracy and autocracy shape cooperation—and under what conditions. Rather than assuming a simple divide between “cooperative democracies” and “reluctant autocracies,” the project examines variation within regime types, across issue areas and world regions, and with a focus on the domestic political mechanisms that drive governments’ choices.

The project combines new theory with large-scale global data, in-depth case studies, and experimental research. It examines cooperation from the early 1800s to the present across a wide range of international organizations. By moving beyond the post–Cold War period, it provides a longer historical perspective on how regime type and cooperation interact. The project explores how democracy and autocracy shape whether states cooperate, how they design cooperation, and if they comply with the rules and norms arising from cooperation.

The project advances scientific understanding of how domestic political systems shape global collaboration and offers evidence relevant to policymakers confronting challenges such as climate change, pandemics, conflict, and economic instability. It clarifies when cooperation persists—and when it weakens—in an era of democratic decline.

Travail effectué depuis le début du projet jusqu’à la fin de la période considérée dans le rapport et principaux résultats atteints jusqu’à présent

During the first two years, we have carried out an ambitious research program that substantially advances knowledge about regime type and international cooperation.

A first major achievement is the creation of new global datasets. In collaboration with international partners, we have extended and refined leading data on international organizations and regime type. The updated dataset covers all international organizations and state memberships from 1816 to 2023 and includes new information about policy areas. Regime data have been updated through 2024 with a clearer democracy threshold. These resources provide a stronger empirical foundation for future research.

Second, we reassessed the established claim that democracies cooperate more. Our analyses show that this relationship is historically contingent. Democracy is strongly associated with higher cooperation during waves of democratization in the mid and late twentieth century, but not across all periods. Recent patterns reflect declining enthusiasm in some democracies and sustained engagement by many autocracies.

Third, we show that regime type shapes not only how much states cooperate, but also how international organizations are designed and governed. Effects on formal rules are strongest in broad, politically salient organizations. At the same time, autocratizing governments often rely on informal practices rather than formal rule changes, creating a gap between official rules and actual governance.

Fourth, we demonstrate that the mode of regime change matters. Democratization increases participation in organizations, especially those promoting democracy and human rights. Gradual backsliding often leaves memberships intact, whereas abrupt changes such as coups lead to significant withdrawals.

Finally, we show that public support is a key condition for cooperation. Citizens’ legitimacy beliefs influence governments’ willingness to delegate authority internationally. Together, these achievements provide a more nuanced and up-to-date understanding of cooperation in an era of democratic decline.

Progrès au-delà de l’état des connaissances et impact potentiel prévu (y compris l’impact socio-économique et les conséquences sociétales plus larges du projet jusqu’à présent)

The project generates several advances beyond existing research.

First, it revises the conventional view that democracies are always more cooperative than autocracies. Drawing on expanded historical data covering more than two centuries, we show that the democratic “cooperative advantage” is time bound rather than universal. It is strongest in specific historical periods and cannot be treated as a constant feature of world politics.

Second, the project rethinks how regime type shapes international institutions. Earlier studies found limited evidence that regime change affects institutional design. We demonstrate that such effects are conditional: they are most visible in broad, politically salient organizations and weaker in technical bodies. We also show that autocratizing governments often influence cooperation through informal practices rather than formal rule changes, revealing institutional consequences that previous approaches overlooked.

Third, we reposition public opinion at the center of explanations of international cooperation. Our research shows how legitimacy beliefs are formed and provides experimental evidence that higher public support increases governments’ willingness to delegate authority internationally. By linking citizen attitudes to institutional outcomes, the project establishes popular legitimacy as a core condition for the authorization and deepening of cooperation.

Together, these advances move the field toward a more dynamic, historically grounded understanding of how domestic political systems shape global cooperation.