VALIDATing SEcurity Safeguards in Binaries Compiled with Memory-Safe Languages Pre-Execution

Descripción del proyecto

Garantizar la seguridad en binarios con seguridad de memoria

Los lenguajes de programación seguros para la memoria, como «Rust», «Go» y «Swift», mejoran la seguridad al reducir las vulnerabilidades sin pérdidas significativas de rendimiento. Estos lenguajes permiten a los compiladores comprobar directamente la seguridad del código. Sin embargo, la falta de protección en tiempo de ejecución plantea riesgos, ya que los desarrolladores pueden introducir involuntariamente vulnerabilidades en binarios aparentemente seguros. Con el apoyo de las Acciones Marie Skłodowska-Curie, el equipo del proyecto VALIDATE creará un mecanismo de validación que garantice que los binarios compilados con lenguajes seguros para la memoria mantienen sus propiedades de seguridad antes de la ejecución. Al operar a nivel de ejecutable final, en el proyecto se garantiza que las medidas de seguridad establecidas en tiempo de compilación permanezcan intactas en tiempo de carga. Los resultados mejorarán la ciberseguridad y la confianza de los usuarios al confirmar que el «software» con memoria segura anunciado es realmente seguro antes de su ejecución.

Objetivo

The emergence of memory-safe programming languages like Rust, Go, and Swift has significantly enhanced security by mitigating common memory-related vulnerabilities with minimal performance loss. Traditionally, memory safety was enforced through run-time support (e.g. Java), which executes bytecode but incurs significant performance overhead. In contrast, Rust, Go, Swift, and similar languages provide memory safety without heavy run-time support, delivering fast, secure machine code instead of virtual bytecode assessed at run-time. The core idea is to let the compiler vet about the security of a program by rejecting insecure code and by injecting certain checks in the produced machine code. However, the lack of run-time protection introduces a new attack vector. Specifically, developers themselves can become attackers by subtly manipulating binaries compiled with memory-safe languages, introducing deliberate vulnerabilities. These compromised binaries, disguised as secure, can bypass app store screening processes and become malicious post-installation through remote exploitation. This underscores the need for a robust validation mechanism to complement existing screening processes. To address this, we introduce VALIDATE (VALIDATing SEcurity Safeguards in Binaries Compiled with Memory-Safe Languages Pre-Execution), a validation mechanism ensuring that binaries compiled with memory-safe languages retain their intended security properties before execution. VALIDATE operates at the final executable level, where no further code alterations can occur, providing accurate end-to-end security guarantees. By advancing static and dynamic analysis techniques beyond the state-of-the-art, VALIDATE ensures that security guarantees enforced at compile-time remain intact at load-time. Integrating VALIDATE with app store screening processes enhances cybersecurity and maintains user trust by ensuring that memory-safe advertised software is indeed safe before execution.