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Passenger station and terminal design for safety, security
and resilience to terrorist attack

Final Report Summary - SECURESTATION (Passenger station and terminal design for safety, security<br/> and resilience to terrorist attack)

Executive Summary:
Public transport in Europe, and in particular mass passenger transport, faces a range of threats to its security including a serious and sustained threat from international terrorism.
Terrorism has a history of targeting public transport systems both worldwide, for example in Mumbai (2006) and Moscow (2010), and in a number of EU Member States, including the UK (2005), France (1996) and Spain (2004).
Terrorist attacks against public transport networks are linked to a number of factors, such as political, religious, economic causes, national claims, etc. The persistence of such underlying factors suggests that this threat will remain for a long-time in the European Union.
The primary aim of these terrorist attacks is to i) cause a large number of casualties, when the passengers are the immediate target and/or ii) disrupt the public transport system, cause economic damage, create public panic, attract publicity for terrorists ‘causes, etc. The large media impact of such actions makes public transportation an extremely attractive target for terrorism.
The potential for these actions to cause great loss of life was made clear in 2004 in Madrid, when bombs exploded in commuter trains causing many fatalities . After this terrorist attack, the European Council adopted a Declaration on combating terrorism of 29 March 2004 (Document 07906/04) [1] and in particular to enhance the level of security in all modes of transport, followed up by numerous European initiatives (e.g. COM(2011) 790 final “First Annual Report on the implementation of the EU Internal Security Strategy”,etc.
In the current worldwide context, where public transport networks have been seen to provide attractive targets for terrorism and attacks, the consideration of security is a major concern in the design of passenger stations and terminals. Each station, with its idiosyncrasies, poses different challenges in relation to security, requiring an individually tailored response. The requirements of passenger stations and the complexities of future emerging threats and possible attacks are continually changing and it is necessary for the understanding of security design to respond and evolve in parallel.
SECURESTATION aims at providing an approach to improving station and terminal security through design. In order to be able to understand the nature of the threat, and to develop a cost efficiency security solution, SECURESTATION has developed a comprehensive quantitative risk assessment methodology and analyzed the effects of security incidents with the use of advanced predictive tools. This, as well as the pedestrian movement and behavior simulations conducted in emergency situations, have been brought together in the form of a constructive design handbook; offering an effective decision making tool for the design and operation of passenger stations and terminals.

Project Context and Objectives:
Project Context
Public transportation systems are open systems by nature, which are easy to access/ exit, thus enabling a high concentration of large crowds in closed environments (e.g. busy passenger stations). In general, public transport infrastructures are less protected by law enforcement due to the large number of embarking and disembarking points and their vast size. Therefore, they provide attractive targets for a wide range of potential attacks and have been the target of terrorist attacks around the world over a long period.
The dramatic consequences of these attacks demonstrate the need for increased focus on the security of these systems by implementing reasonable security measures (e.g. equipment, design engineering and operational procedures) that interfere to the less extent with the overall safety and operational related activities of the urban transport systems.
Although it is not possible to plan for absolute and full security protection, an improvement in the actual prevention, response and recovery capabilities could notably reduce both the probability of these threats to occur and their consequences in the public transport system domain.
To address these issues the SECURESTATION project has combined public, security expert and rail businesses input from six countries with engineering, security and architectural analysis to develop guidance on designing security into the station building. In addition, an extensive group of end-users (PTOs/IMs, transport authorities, etc.) have continuously supported the project by providing their inputs and feedback.
An attractive station environment usually includes none transport businesses such as retail spaces, bars, etc. and the guidance is also relevant to these important parts of a station which greatly affect the public experience of travel.
SECURESTATION is a design based, rather than a product based, approach to improving station and terminal safety and security through design. The SECURESTATION constructive design handbook brings together engineering and architectural aspects of station building design, complementing guidance already existing within individual countries.

Project Objectives:

WP2: Design strategies and user requirements
The objective of this work package was to underpin and support the overall objectives of the project.
The following objectives were achieved:
• Critical inventory of threats, design strategies and risk assessment procedures in transport systems.
• Compilation of user requirements for improvements to current systems.
• Review of technologies for designing for safety and security.
• Analysis of presentation methods for design guidance.

WP3: Risk assessment methodologies for passenger stations/terminals and critical scenarios selection
The objectives of this work package included the following:
• Evaluation of existing risk assessment methodologies, selection of one or more risk assessment methodologies and definition of scenarios.
• Development of Risk Assessment Methodology and safeguards allocation for risk mitigation.
• Implementation of predictive tools for the assessment of consequences of risks, within the Risk Assessment Methodology.

WP4: Constructive design handbook
The main objectives of WP4 were the following:
• Creation of an outline for the handbook indicating presentation format, layout and structure
• Chapters based on WP2 and WP3, with End User group review & subsequent update
• Chapters based on WP5 and WP6, with End User group review & subsequent update
• Chapters integrating the SECURESTATIONs findings across work packages, with End User group review & subsequent update.

WP5: Advanced predictive tools for physical and functional resilience in critical scenarios
The main objective of WP5 was to define and make available a coherent framework of methodologies to provide stakeholders with advanced modelling capabilities and means of analysis of critical security scenarios for passenger stations and terminals. Furthermore, these simulation models were integrated into the risk assessment methodology developed in WP3.
The objectives of this WP covered the following aspects:
• Analysis of physical resilience during an incident (i.e. building structure)
• Analysis of functional resilience during an incident (i.e. effects on operation)
• Design strategies to improve the safety and security of passenger stations and terminals from both the physical and functional perspective.

WP6: Simulation of pedestrian behavior and movements in emergencies for safe evacuations
The aim of this WP was to evaluate and identify improvements in both emergency procedures and fire/smoke resilient design solutions, to make actual and future passenger stations/terminals safer and more comfortable for passengers.
The specific sub-objectives of this WP covered the following aspects:
• Simulation of smoke spread in the event of a firebomb or fire-setting attack.
• Simulation of passengers’ behaviour and movement in emergency situations.
• Full scale fire/smoke test in a selected station/terminal (Avenida de América interchange, Madrid) to validate the parameters identified in previous task associated to emergency situations.

WP7: Maximizing the impact of SECURESTATION results
The aim of this WP was to assess and facilitate the implementation of SECURESTATION results assessing the following aspects:
• Socio-economic potential impact.
• Research into the acceptability of security options recommended by SECURESTATION.
• Anticipating possible acceptance, gaps and limitations.
• Implementation Roadmap: Facilitating implementation, standardisation and harmonisation.

WP8: Dissemination and Exploitation
The aim of this WP was to disseminate and enable exploitation of the knowledge generated by the SECURESTATION project.
The objectives of this WP included the following activities:
• Definition of the exploitation and dissemination strategies to create awareness and uptake of results by stakeholders working in the SECURESTATION remit of station/terminal security.
• Dissemination activities through technical articles and papers
• Creation of public website, including private document sharing facilities.
• Organization of two Workshops and dissemination groups for general dissemination and exploitation of the SECURESTATION benefits and results among the user community and the scientific community. This includes facilitating exchanges with these external groups to get feedback on the work of the project.
• Contribution to rail security seminars and meetings
• Defining future development needs: the research roadmap.


Project Results:
WP2: Design strategies and user requirements

The work carried out in SECURESTATION during the first reporting period was focused on WP2 (`Design strategies and user requirements’) which largely comprised of collecting existing best practices on security in public transport networks, in particular in stations and identifying the actual needs of public transport operators (PTOs), infrastructure managers (IMs) and key security/ transport organizations. The main goal was to gather user requirements for improvements to current security arrangements. The WP2 goals have been achieved thanks to the participation of a large number of end-users attending the first WS of the project and also the high rate of end-users participating in both a questionnaire and/or interviews carried out after the WS.
The WP2 planned activities were achieved by the launch of four major sub-tasks which have been successfully completed and served to define the baseline for the other activities in the WPs.

The results of this WP were included in 4 deliverables: D2.1: Critical inventory of threats, design strategies and risk assessment procedures in transport systems, D2.2: Scenario definition and compilation of user requirements for improvements to current systems, D2.3: Compendium of technologies for designing for safety and security and D2.4: Analysis of presentation methods for design guidance.
WP2 produced the background information for the project, with D2.1 results: an inventory of threats and the work of other projects and D2.3 the review of technologies together with the list of end-users requirements from D2.2 have guided the direction of the project and served as relevant input for WP7’s gap analysis. D2.4 produced conclusions as to the most appropriate format and structure of the constructive design handbook developed in WP4.


WP3: Risk assessment methodologies for passenger stations/terminals and critical scenarios selection

Work package 3 (`Risk assessment methodologies for passenger stations/terminals and critical scenario
selection’), started as planned in the DoW and the focus of activity during the first reporting period has been on the analysis of existing risk assessment methodologies and the selection of candidate methodologies (Task 3.1) which served as a benchmark for the risk assessment methodology that was developed during the second reporting period.
The main objective of the WP was the development of a risk assessment methodology (SEST-RAM) and the implementation of predictive tools for the assessment of consequences of risks, within SEST-RAM. The quantitative risk assessment methodology developed has the following main components:
• A risk assessment process, which describes the risk assessment in the context of risk management, the process and the required inputs and outputs of each phase.
• SEST-RAM is focused on passenger stations and is based on a two-step approach - risk & safeguards identification; and risk quantification by threat, vulnerability and consequences.
• It integrates supporting tools for a consequences analysis (blast, poisonous by inhalation (PIH) hazards, chemical agents and toxic industrial materials (TIM) and fire & smoke).
• It includes an assessment of the residual risk following the implementation of risk mitigation.
• A supporting tool (Excel) to implement SEST-RAM has been also developed.

The results of this WP were included in three deliverables: D3.1: Evaluation of existing risk assessment methodologies, selection of one or more risk assessment methodologies and definition of scenarios, D3.2: Development of risk assessment methodology and safeguards allocation for risk mitigation; and D3.3: Implementation of predictive tools for the assessment of consequences of risks, within the Risk Assessment Methodology.
D3.1 includes a definition of threat scenarios, an analysis of leading risk assessment methodologies – qualitative, semi quantitative and quantitative – and a proposal for a benchmark methodology to serve as the SECURESTATION risk assessment methodology (SEST-RAM). The deliverable also relates to a cost-benefit analysis of terror threats targeting structures/buildings. D3.2 includes the development of SEST-RAM and D3.3 contains a full detailed description of the methodology, with descriptions of procedures, theoretical explanations and practical hints to the users. Several improvements and refinements were introduced in this last version with special reference to: the selection of “representative scenarios” to compute total relative risk and absolute risk for a station; the assessment of risks for HPLC (high probability low consequences) scenarios, definition of additional indicators to assess risk reduction and the MS-Excel example implementation of the SEST-RAM methodology.

WP4: Constructive design handbook

The production of the Constructive Design Handbook has been one of the major outputs of the project. The work carried out during the first reporting period was focused on two activities scheduled for that period: T2.4: “Analysis of presentation methods for design guidance” and T4.1: “Creation of an outline for the handbook indicating presentation format, layout and structure”. The analysis carried out in T2.4 in collaboration with end-users enabled SECURESTATION project team to identify the most appropriate format, structure, design criteria and themes for the handbook. The results of this analysis served as input for the T4.1 where the structure for the constructive design handbook content was completed including a detailed analysis of four major European passenger stations to enable comparisons and draw conclusions as ‘best practices’, gaps and recommendations in security, which were included in an updated version of the Handbook (Deliverable 4.2 in the second reporting period).

The purpose of this WP was to create a Constructive Design Handbook in the form of guidelines to equip PTOs/IMs, designers, security experts, architects and relevant stakeholders with comprehensive guidelines on station design regarding active and passive security measures. It also includes risk assessment methodologies, practical design guidance and functional resilience aspects. The Design Guidelines for station security refer to the construction of new stations as well as to the refurbishment and retro-fit of existing infrastructure.

The results of this WP were included in four deliverables: D4.1: Creation of an outline for the handbook indicating presentation format, layout and structure. D4.2: Constructive Design Handbook based on WP2 and WP3 results, D4.3: Constructive Design Handbook based on WP5 and WP6 results and D4.4: Final, End-User reviewed Constructive Design Handbook.

D4.1 includes practical design aspects that are addressed in the handbook with specifications on the structure content, layout, styles and formats. This deliverables also covers a case study analysis section where four main European passenger stations: King’s Cross (UK), Avenida de América interchange (ES), Cadorna station (IT) and Amsterdam Central station (NL), have been analyzed in detail in terms of passenger flows, size, development stage and other factors such as the political, social and economic climates. D4.2: Constructive Design Handbook based on WP2 and WP3 results, which explains risk from the SECURESTATION point of view, as well as it lists the most probable attacks that the guidelines are prepared to help design against. D4.3 contains the main results and conclusions of the simulations of blast, toxic agents’ dispersion, fire/smoke, passenger flows in emergency situations and attack station resilience in order to provide design guidance to increase functional and structural resilience of stations.
D4.4 is the final version of the handbook which includes all the comments and feedback received internally and from target audience of the handbook comprising PTOs/IMs, designers, representatives from the academia in the area of transport planning, etc).

WP5: Advanced predictive tools for physical and functional resilience in critical scenarios

Work package 5 was dedicated to the development and adaption of simplified methods (i.e. experimental and analytical models) and of numerical methodologies to predict the damaging effects of explosive and chemical attacks. In this view, using the critical scenarios defined through the risk assessment model (WP3) the effects induced by such attacks were predicted and analyzed. These studies enabled the identification of design recommendations for both the design as well as the retrofit of stations or terminals.
Concerning Task 5.1: Physical resilience methodological approaches, main attack scenarios identified in WP3 (explosives and chemical dispersion) were analyzed by different means. The approach taken within the blast modelling was to implement empirical models for the fast calculation of blast overpressures and the level of harm at different distances from the source of the explosion.
The blast modelling has demonstrated that the empirical model, BombBlast3D, developed by D'Appolonia, can be successfully used to predict harm at different distances away from the centre of the blast and have been used to generate numerical data for WP3. The Blast Calc Tool, has been designed to use the empirical relationships derived from BombBlast3D to enable the impact (person damage) of different types of explosives of different masses to be very easily and rapidly calculated at different distances away from the blast centre, allowing the rapid calculation of safe standoff distances.
The numerical chemical dispersion simulations performed within the SECURESTATION project were conducted using the ANSYS Fluent species solvers; combining the output concentration of harmful chemicals with toxicity data, in order to plot the level of harm caused to passengers as the chemicals disperse. The simulations were carried out for different materials, including releases from compressed gas cylinders for chlorine gas, ammonia gas, hydrogen cyanide, and vapourising pools of Sarin and VX agent. The impact has been evaluated for different locations of release and for alternative ventilation systems and building air flow characteristics. The release of toxic materials into the ventilation system of the model station has also been simulated. These simulations generated data which have fed into WP3 to evaluate the impact of different toxic chemical release scenarios, with different countermeasures in place and have been used to predict the different characteristics of ventilation and air flow systems and the impact of these on reducing the potential human harm from toxic chemical releases. The results from both simulations have been used to derive design recommendations which were included in the handbook.
Task 5.2: Analysis of functional resilience tool and decision support making. The main scope of this task was to define a tool consisting in a systematic framework to evaluate the vulnerability and availability of the station building’s equipment, when subject to a terrorist attack. An attack resilience assessment tool (SARA) has been developed to analyze the reliability and availability of key equipment (e.g. ventilation, communication, power supply, as well as structural components such as emergency escape routes). The process developed and demonstrated within the project identifies the physical and functional dependencies of key utilities, equipment and structures and can assign a scale of functionality to each item. Interdependencies between items then define the effect this has on dependent items of equipment. From this analysis different countermeasures have been defined, evaluated, and ranked by their ability to minimize the impact of a terror attacks. Ranking and selecting the countermeasures is performed based on constrains defined by the end user e.g. a limited budget under the ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) approach, or a determined level of enhancement of the system resilience to be achieved.
In the methodology developed the equipment considered is related to the functioning of the building and is not related to the operational of the transport service. Therefore the functional analysis and the definition of the missions of the station are oriented to be developed considering the station building.
Although many activities are hosted in modern complex stations, such as commerce, social interaction, recreation etc., in order to simplify the problem in this context, only the main functions related to the transport system have been taken into account.
Task 5.3: Design strategies to improve the safety and security of passenger stations and terminals from both the physical and functional perspective. The activities of this task were addressed to put forward design strategies to enhance the physical and functional resilience of a station in case of a terrorist attack. The recommended strategies are based on the conclusions drawn from the blast and chemical dispersion simulations and from the application of the methodology prescribed to identify the critical equipment in the station.
The results of this WP were included in three deliverables: D5.1: Physical resilience methodological approaches (Development of methodologies for modelling blast and chemical dispersion attacks), D5.2: Analysis of functional resilience tool and decision support making (Development of the SECURESTATION Attack Resilience Assessment tool- SARA) and D5.3: Design strategies to improve the safety and security of passenger stations and terminals from both the physical and functional perspective (Development of design recommendations for station geometry, building materials and ventilation system design to minimise the impact of blast and toxic material dispersion attacks).

WP6: Simulation of pedestrian behavior and movements in emergencies for safe evacuations

The main focus of the activities of this work package was to evaluate and identify improvements in both/emergency procedures and fire/smoke resilient design solutions, to make actual and future passenger stations/terminals safer and more comfortable for passengers. In order to achieve this goal, the following activities were performed:
- Simulations of smoke spread in the event of a firebomb or fire-setting attack. (Task 6.1)
- Simulations of passengers’ behaviour and movement in emergency situations. (Task 6.2)
- A real fire/smoke test to validate the parameters identified in previous tasks associated to emergency situations. The full scale test took place at Avenida de América interchange (Madrid) as planned and described in the DoW.(Task 6.3)
- Identification of design strategies from the operational point of view to optimize evacuation procedures.
The fire and smoke spread simulations of Task 6.1 were carried out by means of two different computational fluid dynamics tools (Fluent and FDS). The first activity was the identification of the most critical scenarios followed by the identification of the most critical points and security solutions (e.g. sectorization in stairwells and connections between areas, etc)
Task 6.2 performed simulations of passengers’ behaviour and movement using microscopic simulation algorithms -Legion Studio Tool- in emergency situations. These simulations were used to calculate the required safe egress time from the SECURESTATION generic model station and compared it with the available safe egress time which was calculated in the fire and smoke simulations. In addition, best locations of emergency exits and key design elements were identified in the original design that would improve the evacuation conditions in case of emergencies.
A real fire/smoke test was carried out at Avenida de América (Task 6.3) in order to validate the results of the previous simulations and identify other key elements that were not included in the simulations. The purpose of test, which simulated a fire in a bus located in an underground bay area, was to: i) analyze the operation of the smoke exhaust, sectorization, detection and lighting & signaling systems installed in the area under the tested conditions and ii) validate inputs, variables and patterns that were used in the smoke (additional simulation were required).
The last activity of the WP was the production of the deliverable 6.4 that presents a set of recommendations to optimize the evacuation procedures in passenger stations during an emergency, taking into account design related aspects. In order to achieve this, current emergency procedures and systems were analyzed including results from previous simulations to evaluate the efficiency of such procedures and systems. The results obtained from this analysis has served to come up with recommendations and improvements which are presented as design guidelines for safe passenger evacuation in stations and a set of operational requirements to improve the evacuation procedures.
These design strategies will allow the PTO/IMs to improve the overall evacuation management during emergencies.
The results of this WP were included in four deliverables: D6.1: Simulation of smoke spread in the event of a firebomb or fire-setting attack, D6.2: Simulation of passengers behaviour and movement in emergency situations, D6.3: Real fire testing in a selected station/terminal to validate the parameters identified in previous tasks associated to emergency situations and D6.4: Design strategies from the operational point of view to optimize evacuation procedures in passenger stations/terminals.

WP7: Maximizing the impact of SECURESTATION results

Work package 7 had the objective of analysing the outcomes of the project in order to facilitate the adoption of main results by key stakeholders in transport security. To achieve this goal, the following analyses were performed:
- Socio-economic potential impact
- Research into the acceptability of security options recommend by the project
- Gap analysis: comparing current standards and guidelines to best practice
- Implementation roadmap

Several surveys were carried out for the three first tasks in order to obtain specific data and recommendations that were included in the Handbook.
Task 7.1 (Socio-economic impact) focused on analyzing the socio-economic impact of the proposed security measures to improve the overall resilience of stations. A set of indicators were defined to evaluate the cost-efficiency of security measures in terms of benefits (risk reduction) and implementation costs.
The methodology developed in this task is focused on:
• Analysis of different baseline scenarios (where the security measures have not been implemented)
• Analysis of the cost resulting from the implementation of security measures with respect to the baseline scenarios both in technology or process-related solution
• Evaluation of the risk reduction (previous risk versus residual risk)
• Cost comparison: reduction in risk/consequences of the attack versus the costs of implementing security measures.
Most relevant attack scenarios identified in previous work packages (2,3) have been analyzed in order to illustrate a cost benefit analysis focused on a particular security measure implementation. These analyses have been performed from the point of view of a public transport operator or infrastructure manager that is facing the decision of whether or not to implement a particular security measure. Although the scenarios analyzed are based on a reference model of a station, both costs and benefits will be dependent on the station itself, however the methodology developed provides a flexible and adaptable approach that can be easily applied to any type of station by altering some parameters such as the cost of implementation of the security measure analyzed or the probability of a successful attack.
Furthermore, an excel-based tool has been developed to facilitate these calculations.

In Task 7.2 (Research into acceptability of security options recommended by SECURESTATION) the work done can be summarised in the following activities:
• Review of literature and analysis of relevant studies related to the acceptability of the security measures
• Analysis of the passengers’ acceptance criteria and perceived effectiveness of security measures
The analysis has been performed by means of an on–line survey performed on a specific web page. This on-line survey was translated into four languages (English, Spanish, Italian and Rumanian) which allowed to reach a wide number of respondents (around 542).
• Analysis of the stakeholders’ acceptability. The analysis has been performed by means of a structured questionnaire directly addressed to a selected set of stakeholders. The following areas of interest have been investigated:
o the reasons for installing the security measures
o the most relevant aspects to assess before installing security measures are ranked
o for most of the security measures presented in the project the most relevant aspects considered to evaluate the acceptability of the measures before implementing them are investigated

The main significant result for Task 7.2 was the development of a wide dataset of information related to the acceptability of the security measures that has been analyzed in depth. Key factors related to the passenger and staff perception and acceptance of security measures have been identified and highlighted, an important issue when designing stations/terminals (new or retrofit cases). Main findings include:
• The perception of the security and the acceptance of the security measure is related to the place where the station/terminal is located, both in terms of cultural heritage and of memory of previous terroristic activities. These factors need to be considered in designing the security measures of a station and a terminal.
• From the passengers’ point of view the security perception seems not to be a factor of attractiveness or repulsion of the passengers from the public transport; the feeling of security seems to be deeply related to the ambiance and the appearance of the terminal/station.
• The visibility of the security measures, security staff, the presence of safety information and the broadcast of safety announcements seem to enhance the security feelings without frightening the passengers.
• On the other hand the security measures seem to be well accepted as long as they do not affect the transit time within the terminal/station. The limit of the loss of time related to the presence of security measures has been evaluated in terms of seconds.
• From the stakeholders point of view the most important aspect to be evaluated in the acceptance of the security measures are related to the increasing of: the safety level for users; the “real” effectiveness of the security measures.
• The acceptance of the security measures by the stakeholders are also related to considerations related to the budget of their implementation indeed, and to continuity of the business. This second aspect is strictly related to the acceptance of the security.

According to the survey carried out for task 7.3 (Gap analysis: comparing current standards and guidelines to best practice), European PTOs and IMs use guidelines and standards to varying degrees for security related activities. There was a strong bias towards national guidelines and standards followed by international and European guidelines whereas very few use guidelines on risk assessment or design for security from the USA. The responses to the list of security related issues varied greatly between respondents. The total number of issues for which each respondent either welcomed more guidance or thought more guidance was probably necessary ranged between 5 and 27. Most importantly, for several of the security-related issues listed in the questionnaire that are being addressed within SECURESTATION, over half the respondents said that they would welcome more guidance.
There are two possible reasons why the available resources are not fully exploited: Firstly, a lot of the high quality public domain guidance studied for this report is produced by and for the UK or USA. Although much of the guidance is transferable to other European nations, there may be either a reluctance to use foreign national guidelines for such a sensitive area or simply a language barrier. Secondly, some of the guidance has an emphasis on specific contexts (such as high rise buildings in the case of the NYPD guidelines on building design) which are less relevant to rail infrastructure. Alternatively they may be more general (aimed at the broad context of ‘crowded places’ for example) and therefore contain less specific information relevant to stations etc. Therefore, for a PTO to gain all the necessary and relevant information would require a certain degree of research, sifting out what is applicable and what is not and applying some engineering guidance to contexts for which they were not intended. The gap analysis suggested that the SECURESTATION outputs (RAM and Constructive Design Handbook) are a useful contribution because they focus on issues relevant to the context of European rail passenger stations, terminals and interchanges. Also, there may be more confidence in using a RAM tool and Design handbook which has been produced by EU engineers, architects and PTOs.
Task 7.4 (Implementation roadmap: facilitating implementation, standardization and harmonization) was planned at the end of the project in order to identify best practices, gaps and recommendations based on the assessment of the current practices with respect to risk assessment methodologies, technologies, design solutions, etc. and as well as barriers, such as legal barriers, regulation and aspects of interoperability and harmonization. The analysis took into account stakeholders’ contributions gathered in the workshops and other consultation processes.
As a result of this analysis, D7.4 contains the implementation roadmap for the SECURESTATION project results in two key areas:

(1) Exchange of best practices:
• Risk assessment for passenger terminals;
• Guidelines for the design and assimilation of technological means, safeguards and architectural solutions for passenger terminals.

(2) Standardisation, harmonisation and regulation. Standardisation, harmonisation and regulation from the perspectives of physical and functional resilience, addressing the following attack scenarios:
• Use of explosives;
• Fire / arson;
• Dispersion of toxic materials belonging to the PIH (Poison Inhalation Hazard) category
The results of this WP were included in four deliverables: D7.1: Socio-economic potential impact, D7.2: Research into the acceptability of security options recommended by SECURESTATION and D7.3: Gap analysis: comparing current standards and guidelines to best practice and D7.4: Implementation Roadmap: Facilitating implementation, standardisation and harmonization.

Potential Impact:
SECURESTATION Potential Impact

The SECURESTATION project aimed to impact on the wider society through the guidelines produced at the end of the project. The project was framed in the aftermath of terrorist incidents on the European rail and public transport system in London on 7th July 2005 with the deaths of 52 innocent people and in Madrid on 11th March 2004 where 191 were killed and 1755 were wounded; in addition to these impacts wider economic and social implications were felt, with disruption to transport systems, and indirect impacts such as reductions in tourism, business and a feeling of fear within the communities affected.

The SECURESTATION project addresses these socio-economic impacts and wider societal implications through the provision of the design guidelines which have been built in consultation with, and disseminated to government transport ministries and railway and public transport undertakings. The aim of the SECURESTATION guidelines has been to reinforce rail transport security, whilst maintaining the attractiveness of the system to end users and promoting the most cost effective method to achieve the appropriate level of security for a particular station.

SECURESTATION Socio-economic impact and the wider societal implications

The main socio-economic benefits and wider societal impacts of the project are:

- Improved security and safety to passengers and staff
The SECURESTATION had the primary aim to provide passengers with improved security and safety, through the provision of the handbook to railway undertakings and to governmental transport and security departments security will be considered throughout the design process of new stations and the refurbishment of existing stations. The risk assessment methodology and its supporting tool will also enable these end-users to more precisely assess the risk to passengers & staff and to compare the suitability of different security countermeasures.

- Reduced cost to EU railway undertakings and governments
The SECURESTATION guidelines define the security considerations which should be reviewed at each stage in the design process. This ensures that security is considered at the earliest stages of design and allows for the integration of passive security measures into the station/terminal design; this will reduce operational costs and an overall reduction of the whole life cycle costs whilst reducing the level of risk. The cost reduction in railway undertakings and governments is supported by the life cycle cost assessment tool developed within the SECURESTATION project, the risk assessment tool and the design guidelines.

- Balance of security measures with station attractiveness and convenience
Work package 7 of the SECURESTATION project concentrated on the socio-economic impact of security measures in stations. Particular effort was taken to study the opinions of the general public and passengers through questionnaires. The feedback from these results and other surveys has shown security measures which will interfere with passenger journey time or which may affect their civil liberties regarding privacy can be contentious. So in addition to the reports within WP7 the impact of security on passenger journeys is reflected in the design guidelines.


- European added value
The SECURESTATION project supports EU growth and prosperity by contributing to wider economic benefits from improved security from the benefits mentioned above. A more resilient station is a less attractive target so reduces the likelihood of an attack being planned against the transport system and the resilience in design makes recovery from an incident quicker, these both improve the stability of European cities making them more attractive places for businesses to locate and for employees to live. Making rail travel attractive and safe encourages its use by commuters, leisure and business travellers allowing improved productivity and environmental benefits compared to car or air travel. Good well used rail networks contribute to wider economic benefits such as interurban agglomeration and wider supply of skilled labour to businesses.


Main dissemination activities

Work package 8 had the principle objectives of ensuring that the knowledge generated within the project is disseminated to the appropriate end-user audiences and that the project’s results are exploited in stations around Europe. A range of dissemination and exploitation activities were carried out within the project and these included:
- Definition of the exploitation and dissemination strategies;
- Dissemination through technical articles and papers;
- Creation of a public website frequently updated with the latest project news and public deliverables;
- Organization of end user workshops for disseminating the results of the project as well as gathering the end users requirements
- Contributions to conferences, rail security seminars and meetings;
- Collaboration with other research projects working in the area of transport security;
- Developing a roadmap of future research requirements;
- Project summaries on EU websites and publications.
Dissemination and exploitation plan
Task 8.1 developed dissemination and exploitation plans for the SECURESTATION project with initial plans created at the start of the project and then final plans presented at the end. These dissemination and exploitation plans were tailored to the content of the project and specifically identified the dissemination content and format appropriate for the different groups of end users.

Dissemination through technical articles and papers
The task of dissemination through technical articles and papers included presentation of papers at technical conference and the submission of articles in the technical press.

Project website
A project website was set up with a public and private area, the public area was as a means for communicating with the end-users and giving the public a method of contacting and following the progress of the project and the private area as a means for storing and working on shared internal documents.
Website design was updated several times to reflect the project branding and frequently updated with the latest project news and deliverables.

Project workshops
Project workshops were arranged for the end users at the beginning of the project, the first workshop was held in London, UK and the second workshop held in collaboration with UIC (International Union of Railways) at their headquarters in Paris, France. Both workshops attracted a good number of delegates from diverse range of organizations and roles. The first workshop disseminated the aims of the project and gathered the end user inputs to feed into the priorities of the project, whilst the last workshop disseminated the results developed within the project and gathered feedback on the final guidelines produced.

Contribution to Rail security seminars and meetings
During task 8.5 a range of activities were carried out, including producing three versions of project brochure, exchanging information and developing partnerships with other EU projects working on related topics and presenting and discussing the SECURESTATION project at relevant meeting and forums.

Exploitation of Results
Dissemination activities have been carried out from the beginning of the project (1st Workshop, articles, interaction and exchange of information with other R&D projects, etc.) and exploitation activities, based on more mature results, were planned for the last phase of the project and afterward to reach sustainability after the projects’ completion.
Based on the aforementioned, one of the key goals was to ensure that the main project results might be used as security design guidelines and also the basis for further R&D activities by: i) the SECURESTATION partners, ii) new R&D security/ rail projects and iii) R&D/security/rail communities in general and the Advisory Board of the project.

The partners of the SECURESTATION project are expected to be one of the most important group for a continuation and exploitation of the project results. Based on the different backgrounds of the partners, covering multiple areas, ranging from security experts/operators to transport architects, will permit a broad exploitation of the main findings. In addition, some partners are also part of broader rail communities, i.e: the International Association of Public Transport (UITP) that will facilitate the exploitation activities and ensure that the results will reach more specialists working on station/terminal construction and security throughout the EU.
The main exploitable outcomes of the project are described below in more detail:
- Advanced modelling tools and methodologies to analysis the effects of accidental and deliberate toxic particle dispersion and blast attacks. This also included the development of software tools for the calculations of both the damage caused by an explosion at different distances “BombBlast3D” and different types of explosives with different masses “Blast Calc Tool”.
- A methodology and a supporting specific tool “SARA: SECURESTATION Attack Resilience Assessment” to analyse and identify the vulnerability and availability of critical components/systems of passenger stations.
- A quantitative risk assessment methodology (SEST-RAM) that can be applied to all type of stations and additional infrastructure elements and its associated Excel spreadsheets that enable to rank terror risks very precisely including HPLC (High probability and low consequences) scenarios such as vandalism, graffiti, etc. which are very common. The methodology also allows the users to express the results in monetary terms.
- A Constructive Design Handbook in the form of guidelines on how to increase security in passenger stations/terminals to provide PTOs/IMs, security experts, architects, designers and relevant stakeholders with comprehensive guidelines on station design regarding active and passive security measures, practical station design guidance on security for each design stage, how to conduct risk assessments and functional resilience aspects. The Handbook for station security refers to the construction of new stations as well as to the refurbishment and retro-fit of existing infrastructure.

List of Websites:
SECURESTATION’s website was set up in the early stages of the project and constituted one of the main communication channels within the project’s dissemination and exploitation activities.
The web name www.securestation.eu was registered in August 2011 and links to the project website. The domain registration has been extended for a further 10 years after the end of the project and the intention is to maintain the website for this period as a resource for dissemination and exploitation of information into the future.
The website has been produced in an English language version.
The public area of the website had the purpose for active and timely presentation of the project results, notification of events and other news, provide a summary of the project and a method by which people could find out about the project and make contact. The public deliverables are also available to download in the public area of the website, there is a password protected area for end-users to download copies of the final public version of the Handbook, and the brochure and project newsletters may be downloaded.
In addition to the public area the project website also includes an internal part for the exchange of information like agendas of meetings, minutes, templates, working documents, action plans, reports, and data.

The website includes the following sections:
• Home: This page gives an instant indication of what the project is about, and funding scheme. It also includes the project logo for instant recognition against the project deliverables and other documents.
• Project: The project page gives a brief summary of the project and presents the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) of SECURESTATION. A diagram is included to help explain the approach being taken in the project.
• Partners: This section provides detailed information of the project partners’. Each partner organization is represented by its name and logo, including also web links with the partner’s own website.
• News: The news & events page is for information about current project news, including public meetings, major deliverables or reports issued, and milestones of public interest reached by the project.
• Documents: This section contains the links to the publications (e.g. downloads of the project flyer and newsletter) and public documentation produced by the project. Within this section there is a link to the private document management system for project partners.
• Contact us: This page provides two different ways for anyone to contact the project coordinator directly or send a message that the system converts it into an e-mail which is forwarded to the dissemination WPL and the project coordinator.
• Links: This section provides links to other projects and documents that are relevant for the project.

Contact Details

*ISDEFE-Ingeniería de Sistemas para la Defensa de España:
Marga Martín Sánchez;e-mail:mmsanchez@isdefe.es
*MTRS3 Ltd-MTRS3 Solutions and Services LTD:
Gilad Rafaeli;e-mail:giladr@mtrs3.com
*USFD-The University of Sheffield:
Jon Paragreen;e-mail:J.Paragreen@sheffield.ac.uk;David Fletcher; e-mail:D.I.Fletcher@sheffield.ac.uk
*InteCo-Integral Consulting R&D:
Gabriela Rodica Hrin;e-mail:rodica.hrin@integralconsulting.ro;Dan Caraman;e-mail:dan.caraman@integralconsulting.ro
*DAPP-D’Appolonia SPA:
Valerio Recagno:e-mail:valerio.recagno@dappolonia.it
*CRTM-Consorcio Regional de Transportes de Madrid:
Tomás Melero;e-mail:tomas.melero@crtm.es
*JMP-John McAslan & Partners Limited:
Hiro Aso;e-mail:h.aso@mcaslan.co.uk
*Heuristics-Heuristics SAGL:
Tony Lancia;e-mail: tony.lancia@heuristics.ch
*Tecnalia-Fundación Tecnalia Research & Innovation:
Nieves Murillo;e-mail:Nieves.murillo@tecnalia.com
*ATM-Azienda Trasporti Milanesi:
Stefano Milanesi;e-mail:Stefano.Milanesi@atm-mi.it