Our work has progressed across all three interaction themes, on track or exceeding the planned output.
For the interaction energy efficiency – transition to renewables, we have showed that there is potential for conflict between the two areas, not in technical but in political terms. The key to decarbonising energy is that all energy is entirely carbon neutral: this is the only way in which energy-related CO2 emissions can reach zero. Hence, reducing energy demand is only important for decarbonisation to the extent that it makes zero-carbon energy easier or cheaper. Our findings suggest that there may be political competition between efficiency and renewable energy policies, and that countries struggle to progress equally on both. For full decarbonisation, focusing on zero-carbon energy supply is essential.
For the interaction liberalisation – renewables, we identified several conflicts. First, if Europe cancels renewable power support as technologies become economically competitive, coordination across countries is important to avoid undesired cross-border effects. Cancelling auction schemes may slow down renewable deployment. As different investors manage market risks differently, abandoning support would likely trigger a shift from small-scale decentralised to large-scale investment. As the most expensive technologies will leave support schemes last, an uncoordinated support phase-out could lead to higher costs and skew the deployment to the presently cheapest technology.
Second, we show that carbon pricing seems unsuited to trigger a system transformation to a renewables-based future. Because renewables tend to get cheaper over time as they are deployed, they need high initial support and lower support over time. This is the opposite of carbon pricing, which starts low and increases over time. Further, the main barrier to renewables expansion today is not cost but the infrastructure and institutions, and this is not addressed by a carbon price. Indeed, our reviews of the empirical literature on effects of carbon pricing show that existing carbon pricing schemes have triggered small emission reductions, but they have not triggered investments in the necessary zero-carbon technologies, questioning the usefulness of this tool as the lead, or only, instrument for the transition to renewables.
Regarding the interaction europeanisation – renewables, we found mainly political synergies. We show that Europe has the potential to supply its entire electricity demand with only renewables on all geographic scales, from the continental to the regional scale, and often even the municipal scale. We also show that solar/wind power fluctuations can be handled on all geographical scales, at similar costs across scales. The key question for 100% renewable power is not cost, but where to build which assets. Europe has many options for designing a renewable power system, but must choose one. Further, we show that energy and climate policy has been europeanised, which has often benefitted renewables as the policy initiative have shifted towards the oftentimes more ambitious European level. The economic crises – both the financial crisis and the Corona crisis – have accelerated this europeanisation, and largely supported faster deployment of renewables, both through recovery packages and policies to “build back better” after the crises.
