Objective
This proposal presents three broad projects on information frictions in households' credit markets and on the
consequences of these frictions for durable good markets. Specifically, an influential theoretical literature in
information economics has shown that borrowing constraints can arise in equilibrium when borrowers and
lenders have asymmetric information about borrowers' risks. Hence, the first project aims to provide the first
empirical analyses of markets (i.e. demand and supply) with asymmetric information and nonexclusive
trades---i.e. markets in which households can purchase multiple insurance contracts, such as in life
insurance markets, or can open multiple credit lines, such as in credit card markets. The second project aims
to study recent regulations of fees and prices in markets for consumer financial products, such as mortgages,
that could have the unintended consequences of increasing households' cost of credit and, thus, of tightening
their borrowing constraints. Finally, the third project aims to study the role of borrowing constraints in
durable goods markets, with a special focus on car markets during the Great Recession.
All these projects aim to develop and estimate structural models using data from different markets. I further
plan to use the estimated structural parameters to perform counterfactual policy analyses in each of the
specific markets analyzed in these projects.
Fields of science (EuroSciVoc)
CORDIS classifies projects with EuroSciVoc, a multilingual taxonomy of fields of science, through a semi-automatic process based on NLP techniques.
CORDIS classifies projects with EuroSciVoc, a multilingual taxonomy of fields of science, through a semi-automatic process based on NLP techniques.
You need to log in or register to use this function
Programme(s)
Funding Scheme
ERC-COG - Consolidator GrantHost institution
WC2A 2AE London
United Kingdom