Descripción del proyecto
Tecnología avanzada contra los intentos de secuestro de prefijos BGP
El protocolo de puerta de enlace de frontera (BGP, por sus siglas en inglés) contribuye al buen funcionamiento de Internet al facilitar el intercambio de información vinculada con el enrutamiento entre redes independientes. Sin embargo, el anticuado diseño de este protocolo lo vuelve vulnerable a los intentos de secuestro informático, ocasionando con ello la inaccesibilidad generalizada a la red correspondiente. Los métodos de defensa existentes no solo son caros, sino que ofrecen limitadas ventajas de tipo inmediato. Además, los mencionados métodos actuales se basan en mecanismos de detección imprecisos que acaban emitiendo numerosas alertas falsas, junto con lentos procesos de mitigación de índole manual. Con el fin de paliar estas desventajas, el equipo del proyecto PHILOS, financiado con fondos europeos, propone una estrategia innovadora centrada en la detección en tiempo real y la mitigación automatizada de este tipo de ataques. Su objetivo pasa por desarrollar una prueba de concepto que pueda implementarse en las redes de futuros clientes potenciales y por diseñar un plan de negocio destinado a conseguir sus primeros clientes.
Objetivo
The Internet, with its unprecedented success and global scale as a network of networks, depends heavily on few fundamental technologies. One of these technologies is the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), which glues together the independent networks of the Internet. BGP, based on a three-decade old design, is highly susceptible to BGP prefix hijacking attacks. These attacks, which have been repeatedly covered in the news due to their critical impact in several prominent cases, persistently pest network operators and users accessing their services, as they have the capability to render entire networks (and their services) unreachable. The resulting network outages, lasting from several hours to days, cost millions of dollars. BGP prefix hijacking events result usually from human error, but can also be malicious. Offenders can impersonate victim networks, steal sensitive information, or stealthily intercept and manipulate traffic destined to legitimate destinations.
Current approaches to defend against hijacking attacks (a) are poorly adopted, due to their high cost and low immediate benefit, or (b) rely on inaccurate detection mechanisms that generate numerous false alerts, while lacking automation. The latter results in manual and slow mitigation processes, which is presently the norm.
PHILOS is a new approach to defend against BGP prefix hijacking attacks. It focuses on real-time detection and automated mitigation, relies on novel detection algorithms, and employs new technologies in order to reduce the duration of the detection/mitigation cycle from hours and days, down to a few seconds. It therefore greatly reduces the cost of outages.
The goal of this project is twofold. First, it aims to create a Proof of Concept implementation of PHILOS that can be deployed within the network of potential future customers. Second, it will form a business plan aiming to establish the necessary environment for finding the first commercial customer of PHILOS.
Ámbito científico
Programa(s)
Régimen de financiación
ERC-POC - Proof of Concept GrantInstitución de acogida
70013 Irakleio
Grecia