The research project pursued was an examination of the institutions of political instruction in the Soviet military in the interwar period. It was carried out at the Centre for War Studies (CWS), based at the School of History of University College Dublin (UCD), under the supervision of Professor Robert Gerwarth, the Director of CWS. The primary research objectives of the proposed project were: (1) to develop a detailed account of political instruction in the Soviet military as a unique form of civil-military relations and (2) relate this to the growing literature on the social and cultural underpinnings of armed conflict in 20th century Europe. The approach was highly interdisciplinary, relying heavily on the civil-military relations (CMR) subfield of political science and military sociology.
This project was timely because of the significant challenges posed to the EU and its member states by the conflict in Ukraine. As the war is waged to a large extent by politicised paramilitaries on both sides, this study of Russia’s political-military tradition will yield highly pertinent historical insights.
The scholarly motivation for this project was provided by two distinct historiographical departures within the field of Soviet military studies. The first reflects the growing interest of scholars in the institutional development of the USSR and has sought to trace the evolution of its military structures and their relationship with civilian authorities. This literature includes works that fit strictly within the discipline of military history, but also those more concerned with CMR. The second research trend on which this project is based is the growing interest in the motivations and experience of Soviet soldiers during war and peace-time service in the run-up to and during the Second World War. This reflects a broader development in the study of war in 20th century Europe, whereby the cultural dimensions of armed conflict, including the mentalities and values of combatants, are placed at the centre of investigation. The ubiquitous presence of the Communist Party in the armed forces was both an inextricable part of the USSR’s nexus of CMR and specifically intended to motivate soldiers and shape their understanding of their service. Without an account of political instruction we are thus left with an incomplete understanding of both Soviet CMR as such and of the ways in which they approximated or differed from those of contemporary states. This is both a gap in the Soviet field and a barrier to its integration in transnational research. Objectives (1) and (2) outlined above address these issues. On the basis of the key research questions to be examined, the project can be further divided into four main components:
(a) The impact of the system of political instruction on combat-readiness and performance: did the institutional pluralism of the Soviet armed forces complicate order fulfilment? Did political instruction result in any appreciable positive impact on morale?
(b) Relations between military and political organs and within the political organs themselves: to what extent did the two chains of command compete for influence? Did the presence of cross-rank party organisations alleviate the tension or complicate things further?
(c) The effectiveness of the system in terms of the Communist Party’s own political objectives: To what extent did the system of political instruction protect the civilian authorities from a military challenge? How effective was the system as a means of transmitting the Party’s political outlook to the millions of enlisted men and women?
(d) Related developments across Europe: Can we identify any innovations to the institutional framework of civil-military relations across the continent that may be traced to similar origins as the Soviet system of political instruction? If yes, why was it only in the USSR that civilian control over the military assumed such extensive institutional forms?
