Periodic Reporting for period 3 - GROUNDS (GRoup thinking: new fOUNDationS)
Reporting period: 2022-03-01 to 2023-08-31
The United States wants to get a man on the moon before the decade is out. The jury believes the defendant is guilty. The School of Physics plans a series of groundbreaking experiments. These sorts of statements are common, apparently true, and peculiar. They are peculiar because, taken at face value, they ascribe mental states (desires, beliefs, plans) not to individual human beings, but to groups.
What does the world have to be like, in order for these claims to be true? And are they true at all, or just loose talk? The hypothesis of this project is that they can be true, and true in exactly the same sense that you or I have beliefs or desires. Further: that they are true in virtue of groups acting in ways that, so-interpreted, are most rational. That’s significant, because it means that groups like corporations, committees or states can in principle meet the conditions for ethical responsibility. But the project also argues that the conditions under which we ascribe mental states to groups are often inadequate. It’s not enough that a majority or supermajority of voters support a proposition, for example, for that to be the will of the population. The group must have the right structure, and must manifest its alleged beliefs and desires in action over time, in order for it to truly have mental states.
The overall objectives of this project are, first, to construct a unified account of belief and desire that covers both the case of individual human beings, and groups. It will do this by looking at what patterns of belief/desires would fit with (make most rational sense of) the choices and evidence of the human or group. Accordingly, the second objective is to examine the notion of “group action” and “group evidence” and relate them to the individual case. A third objective is to spell out what “making most rational sense” means. The fourth objective is to use this machinery to lay down conditions under which ascribing groups beliefs and desires is literally true, and conditions under which it really is just a kind of dramatic metaphor---but also to spell out why even when metaphorical, it can be useful.
What does the world have to be like, in order for these claims to be true? And are they true at all, or just loose talk? The hypothesis of this project is that they can be true, and true in exactly the same sense that you or I have beliefs or desires. Further: that they are true in virtue of groups acting in ways that, so-interpreted, are most rational. That’s significant, because it means that groups like corporations, committees or states can in principle meet the conditions for ethical responsibility. But the project also argues that the conditions under which we ascribe mental states to groups are often inadequate. It’s not enough that a majority or supermajority of voters support a proposition, for example, for that to be the will of the population. The group must have the right structure, and must manifest its alleged beliefs and desires in action over time, in order for it to truly have mental states.
The overall objectives of this project are, first, to construct a unified account of belief and desire that covers both the case of individual human beings, and groups. It will do this by looking at what patterns of belief/desires would fit with (make most rational sense of) the choices and evidence of the human or group. Accordingly, the second objective is to examine the notion of “group action” and “group evidence” and relate them to the individual case. A third objective is to spell out what “making most rational sense” means. The fourth objective is to use this machinery to lay down conditions under which ascribing groups beliefs and desires is literally true, and conditions under which it really is just a kind of dramatic metaphor---but also to spell out why even when metaphorical, it can be useful.
The first task was to find examples of group attitudes that do serious explanatory work. We focused in on appeals to group preferences and beliefs in psychology, in the areas known as "social identity theory". This is connected to work on team-reasoning, which is picked up as an explanatory resource later in the project.
The second task was to look in detail at a notion that is appealed to time and again in theory: that of “information that is public”. Here, the project has developed a new account of what publicity consists in.
The third task was to say what it is for a group’s belief would be justified. Here, the project proposes to adopt a conception of justification that applies equally to individuals and groups. It has also proposed a new criterion of what evidence is, relative to a description of a cognitive system.
The fourth task was to say what it is for a group to make a choice or act. The basic picture here is that a certain pattern of acts among the members of the group counts as a group-action, when that pattern of acts is based on group-preferences—the sorts of things discussed in the first task.
The fifth task was to look at the interaction between (i) a human being’s beliefs and desires; (ii) what it takes for a human being to survive over time. The conclusion here is that interpretationism is incompatible with widespread psychological accounts of personal identity/what matters in survival.
The sixth task was to look at the interaction between (i) a group's beliefs and desires; and (ii) what it takes for a group to survive over time. An account of group persistence in terms of group identity is developed, and shown to avoid circularity.
The seventh task was to look at the interaction between individual and group reasons. A main conclusion here is to see this as an instance of a more general problem: that of rational fragmented agency within an individual, connected to e.g. to hobbies, professional and social roles.
The eighth task was to look at the role of representation theorems that move from structural to substantive rationality. Here, the PI's research develops a model of "anchored" interpretation, showing a detailed equivalence between interpretationism and a certain presentation of simulationist mindreading.
The ninth task was to look at the possibility of fictionalist elements in group interpretation. In each of the instances above, if no adequate extension of the ingredients for individual level to group interpretationism is possible, then we may be fictionalist about that particular basis.
The second task was to look in detail at a notion that is appealed to time and again in theory: that of “information that is public”. Here, the project has developed a new account of what publicity consists in.
The third task was to say what it is for a group’s belief would be justified. Here, the project proposes to adopt a conception of justification that applies equally to individuals and groups. It has also proposed a new criterion of what evidence is, relative to a description of a cognitive system.
The fourth task was to say what it is for a group to make a choice or act. The basic picture here is that a certain pattern of acts among the members of the group counts as a group-action, when that pattern of acts is based on group-preferences—the sorts of things discussed in the first task.
The fifth task was to look at the interaction between (i) a human being’s beliefs and desires; (ii) what it takes for a human being to survive over time. The conclusion here is that interpretationism is incompatible with widespread psychological accounts of personal identity/what matters in survival.
The sixth task was to look at the interaction between (i) a group's beliefs and desires; and (ii) what it takes for a group to survive over time. An account of group persistence in terms of group identity is developed, and shown to avoid circularity.
The seventh task was to look at the interaction between individual and group reasons. A main conclusion here is to see this as an instance of a more general problem: that of rational fragmented agency within an individual, connected to e.g. to hobbies, professional and social roles.
The eighth task was to look at the role of representation theorems that move from structural to substantive rationality. Here, the PI's research develops a model of "anchored" interpretation, showing a detailed equivalence between interpretationism and a certain presentation of simulationist mindreading.
The ninth task was to look at the possibility of fictionalist elements in group interpretation. In each of the instances above, if no adequate extension of the ingredients for individual level to group interpretationism is possible, then we may be fictionalist about that particular basis.
Each task performed so far has advanced the state of the art—one good example is the new theory of public information. The overall story, successfully carried out, would give us a detailed “interpretationist” theory of group belief and desire (and a critique of previous theories that go in this direction). Furthermore, in an unexpected and welcome development, the project has been able to show connections between “simulationist” theories of how humans actually do interpret one another, and the kind of abstract metaphysical picture of the nature of human belief and desire that forms the backdrop to this project—using formal models to rigorously pinpoint the relationship. We call this “integrated interpretationism”. Implications of project research for several areas have been traced. This includes progress beyond the state of the art of social ontology (how to implement relativist theories of social facts), social epistemology (e.g. research on deep fakes) and formal epistemology (foundations for the formal evaluative notion of accuracy; foundations for means-end practical reasoning; foundations for commensurability of desire). In some cases these are the product of research carried in pursuit of the tasks above, in other cases, they are prerequisites for the main line of research uncovered in the course of the project.
With most of the primary research completed, the focus has turned to integrating the primary research into a monograph and disseminating further results through journal articles (where they do not fit into the monograph structure, or where this would maximize uptake). This process will also be an appropriate platform for reaching a verdict on the final question set at the outset of the project: how realistic are we entitled to be about group thought?
With most of the primary research completed, the focus has turned to integrating the primary research into a monograph and disseminating further results through journal articles (where they do not fit into the monograph structure, or where this would maximize uptake). This process will also be an appropriate platform for reaching a verdict on the final question set at the outset of the project: how realistic are we entitled to be about group thought?