Periodic Reporting for period 2 - WE (Who are we? Self-identity, Social Cognition, and Collective Intentionality)
Período documentado: 2021-07-01 hasta 2022-12-31
What does it mean to feel, think, and act as part of a we? During the last few decades, the topic of collective intentionality or we-intentionality has been much debated. However, the following foundational issues continue to remain underexplored and unresolved:
• How is the we related to the self?
• What does the fact that one can adopt a we-perspective tell us about the fluid character of selfhood?
• What type of social cognition is required in order to identify with and share a perspective with others?
• What kinds of interpersonal relations are at play in different we-formations?
• What is the relation between a transient we and a persisting we, and between a we that connects particular individuals who are known to each other, and a we that involves identification with a more anonymous and impersonal group?
The working hypothesis of WE is that a systematic account of the we must be embedded in a more comprehensive investigation of selfhood and social cognition. This hypothesis draws inspiration from and will engage with seminal contributions by figures in classical phenomenology.
The project will combine systematic theorizing with historical scholarship, and will challenge existing disciplinary boundaries by interweaving work on self-identity, social cognition, and collective intentionality. It will break new theoretical ground by developing a systematically convincing, phenomenologically valid, and empirically relevant account of the complex interrelation between the we, the you, and the I. In doing so, it will offer a clarification of foundational issues in the humanities and social sciences, and facilitate a much-needed cross fertilization between philosophy and theoretical considerations in the social sciences.
Given the recent upsurge of ethno-nationalism and identity thinking, a renewed critical reflection on the ontological and epistemological status of the we is of urgent societal significance.
• How is the we related to the self?
• What does the fact that one can adopt a we-perspective tell us about the fluid character of selfhood?
• What type of social cognition is required in order to identify with and share a perspective with others?
• What kinds of interpersonal relations are at play in different we-formations?
• What is the relation between a transient we and a persisting we, and between a we that connects particular individuals who are known to each other, and a we that involves identification with a more anonymous and impersonal group?
The working hypothesis of WE is that a systematic account of the we must be embedded in a more comprehensive investigation of selfhood and social cognition. This hypothesis draws inspiration from and will engage with seminal contributions by figures in classical phenomenology.
The project will combine systematic theorizing with historical scholarship, and will challenge existing disciplinary boundaries by interweaving work on self-identity, social cognition, and collective intentionality. It will break new theoretical ground by developing a systematically convincing, phenomenologically valid, and empirically relevant account of the complex interrelation between the we, the you, and the I. In doing so, it will offer a clarification of foundational issues in the humanities and social sciences, and facilitate a much-needed cross fertilization between philosophy and theoretical considerations in the social sciences.
Given the recent upsurge of ethno-nationalism and identity thinking, a renewed critical reflection on the ontological and epistemological status of the we is of urgent societal significance.
Since the start of the project, one set of publications has focused on the relation of the I and we, the individual and the group. It has been argued that one conception of self that is rather widespread in the social sciences, a conception of the self as social through and through, is far too crude and that many authors by failing to distinguish different dimension of selfhood have unwittingly ended up advocating a form of radical social constructivism that is not only incapable of doing justice to the nature of subjective experience, but also incapable of capturing the plurality and heterogeneity of real communal life. To properly account for the second-person plural, a robust conception of the first-person singular is required.
Another set of publications have focused on different forms of social interaction and has explored the role of dyadic joint attention, communication and the I-you relation for the emergence of a we-perspective. It has been argued that second-personal relations are characterized by a distinctive form of communicative reciprocity, and that such communicative connectedness is crucial for a basic form of community building.
Both sets of publications have adopted and profited from an inclusive and pluralistic methodology, where ideas found in classical philosophical texts from the beginning of the 20th century have been brought into conversation with recent discussions in the social sciences (social psychology, anthropology, cultural psychology, sociology) and analytic philosophy. The publications have demonstrated the power and fruitfulness of this approach.
A final set of publications has focused on emotions and emotional sharing and their role in the constitution of social identities and group identifications. More specifically, work has been done on the affective character of joint improvisation; on ressentiment and group-based pride; and insights from these theoretical debates have been applied to empirical research on right-wing populism.
Another set of publications have focused on different forms of social interaction and has explored the role of dyadic joint attention, communication and the I-you relation for the emergence of a we-perspective. It has been argued that second-personal relations are characterized by a distinctive form of communicative reciprocity, and that such communicative connectedness is crucial for a basic form of community building.
Both sets of publications have adopted and profited from an inclusive and pluralistic methodology, where ideas found in classical philosophical texts from the beginning of the 20th century have been brought into conversation with recent discussions in the social sciences (social psychology, anthropology, cultural psychology, sociology) and analytic philosophy. The publications have demonstrated the power and fruitfulness of this approach.
A final set of publications has focused on emotions and emotional sharing and their role in the constitution of social identities and group identifications. More specifically, work has been done on the affective character of joint improvisation; on ressentiment and group-based pride; and insights from these theoretical debates have been applied to empirical research on right-wing populism.
Mainstream philosophical discussions of collective intentionality in the last 20-30 years have rarely engaged in closer investigations of selfhood or considered how different types of collective intentionality might be affected by different types of social cognition. Likewise, recent discussions of second-person engagement have primarily focused on how it affects social cognition, but not considered its impact on collective intentionality. Several of the publications emerging from the Who are We project have pushed the boundaries of the existing debates, have shown how insights from classical work in phenomenology, and in contemporary philosophy of mind and social cognition can illuminate core topics in the discussion of collective intentionality, and have started to establish a conversation between fields that in the past have been fairly separate. Whereas recent philosophical discussions of collective intentionality have tended to focus on action, a number of our publications have also highlighted the importance of affects and emotions. During the coming years, a systematic account of the interrelation between the first-person singular, the second-person singular, and the first-person plural will be developed. We also intend to investigate in a more thorough manner the relation between differen types of we, such as short-lived dyadic ones, persisting intimate groups, and more anonymous transgenerational ones. We will not only seek to identify constitutive features of these different types, but also explore the role that ostracism and outgroup demarcation play for the consolidation of group identity.