Periodic Reporting for period 4 - PROGRESS (The Enemy of the Good: Towards a Theory of Moral Progress)
Période du rapport: 2024-05-01 au 2024-10-31
What is moral progress? What does it mean for societies to improve? Do they ever undergo moral improvement, and if so, what does it consist in? The main objective of the project has been to develop an empirically informed and normatively satisfying theory of moral progress. It has made major advances in understanding the criteria necessary for assessing episodes of moral change as progressive, the role of education in transmitting moral improvements, the intimate connection between moral progress and economic growth, the social-epistemological foundations of philosophical progress and the institutional requirements needed to stabilize progressive sociomoral developments in the future.
Modern societies change rapidly. But we do not want them to change randomly, to end up in stagnation, or to deteriorate. Rather, the hope is that societies will change in a positive direction. Such changes have happened in the past, and it would be desirable for further improvements to happen in the future. In order to make this possible, we need to know what the mechanisms are that drive moral progress, what the institutional infrastructure is required to sustain it, and whether there are threats to progress that can be identified and neutralized.
Modern societies change rapidly. But we do not want them to change randomly, to end up in stagnation, or to deteriorate. Rather, the hope is that societies will change in a positive direction. Such changes have happened in the past, and it would be desirable for further improvements to happen in the future. In order to make this possible, we need to know what the mechanisms are that drive moral progress, what the institutional infrastructure is required to sustain it, and whether there are threats to progress that can be identified and neutralized.
The project has established itself as one of the main centers of research on the topic of moral progress. It has brought together researchers from all over the world, thus significantly promoting and consolidating existing efforts to understand the nature of moral change, the criteria enabling the normative evaluation of such changes, and the institutional conditions required to sustain them. The project has already resulted in numerous publications by all its members, there are numerous scientific papers currently under review, incl. two book manuscripts (one scholarly monograph and one popular trade book that both address the nature of moral change).
The project succeeded in its aim to develop theoretical advances in our understanding of social change and moral progress. Its main goals were to develop an account of the mechanisms, institutions and psychological constraints for moral progress, adn the project has delivered numerous new ways in which philosophers should conceive of the normative and metaethical implications of moral progress. There has ben a burgeoning literature on the subject of moral progress ever since the inception of the project which PROGRESS has made a significant contribution to.
On the psychological constraints that bear on moral progress, the subject wanted to investigate the validity of evolutionary conservatism. Does our evolved mind impose limits on moral change? Here, the project has developed novel analyses of this question and proposed new solutions. On the one hand, there is a second underappreciated challenge from cumulative cultural evolution which seems to entail that moral progress is difficult to achieve because we don’t really understand how cultural practices work and what makes them function. The project has emphasized the role that social institutions can play in bypassing the limits of our evolved psychology. Secondly, there is a question whether moral reasoning and/or moral education plays a significant role in bringing about moral progress. Here, the project has developed an innovative and slightly skeptical answer.
On the metaethics of moral progress, the project has contributed innovative perspectives on the relationship between moral knowledge, moral understanding, moral agreement and moral progress. Publications:
Bodlović, P., and K. Kudlek. “Knowledge Versus Understanding: What Drives Moral Progress?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. [open access]
Rehren, Paul, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. “How Stable Are Moral Judgments?” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14: 1377–1403. [open access]
Blunden, Charlie, Paul Rehren, and Hanno Sauer. “Implicit Cognition, Dual Process Theory, and Moral Judgment.” In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition, edited by J. Robert Thompson, 105–14. Routledge. [here]
On philosophical methodology and progress in the discipline of philosophy, the project has produced a series of highly visible papers on the relevance of historiography for philosophy. Publications:
Sauer, Hanno. (2022) “The End of History.” Inquiry, September, 1–25. [open access]
———. (2023)“The ends of history. A reply to Sauer.” Inquiry, March, 1–11. [open access]
Rehren, P., & Armbruster, T. (2025). Has philosophy become more ‘Scientific’? A citation analysis. Synthese, 205(1), 1-19.
On the problem of moral universalism, the project has made significant contributions to developing a novel perspective on moral disagreement:
Blunden, Charlie, and Benedict Lane. “Vindicating universalism: Pragmatic genealogy and moral progress.” European Journal of Philosophy, July, 1-20. [open access]
On the problem of norms and conventions:
Blunden, C. (2025). It's Only Natural! Moral Progress Through Denaturalization. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 29(2).
The project has pioneered an institutional turn in thinking about moral progress. Publications:
Sauer, Hanno (2023) Moral Teleology. A Theory of Progress. Routledge. [open access]
The project has also produced novel innovations in bringing into dialogue theories of moral progress and economic growth. Publications:
Blunden, Ch (manuscript). Moral Prosperity. Currently in preparation for publication.
The project succeeded in its aim to develop theoretical advances in our understanding of social change and moral progress. Its main goals were to develop an account of the mechanisms, institutions and psychological constraints for moral progress, adn the project has delivered numerous new ways in which philosophers should conceive of the normative and metaethical implications of moral progress. There has ben a burgeoning literature on the subject of moral progress ever since the inception of the project which PROGRESS has made a significant contribution to.
On the psychological constraints that bear on moral progress, the subject wanted to investigate the validity of evolutionary conservatism. Does our evolved mind impose limits on moral change? Here, the project has developed novel analyses of this question and proposed new solutions. On the one hand, there is a second underappreciated challenge from cumulative cultural evolution which seems to entail that moral progress is difficult to achieve because we don’t really understand how cultural practices work and what makes them function. The project has emphasized the role that social institutions can play in bypassing the limits of our evolved psychology. Secondly, there is a question whether moral reasoning and/or moral education plays a significant role in bringing about moral progress. Here, the project has developed an innovative and slightly skeptical answer.
On the metaethics of moral progress, the project has contributed innovative perspectives on the relationship between moral knowledge, moral understanding, moral agreement and moral progress. Publications:
Bodlović, P., and K. Kudlek. “Knowledge Versus Understanding: What Drives Moral Progress?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. [open access]
Rehren, Paul, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. “How Stable Are Moral Judgments?” Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14: 1377–1403. [open access]
Blunden, Charlie, Paul Rehren, and Hanno Sauer. “Implicit Cognition, Dual Process Theory, and Moral Judgment.” In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition, edited by J. Robert Thompson, 105–14. Routledge. [here]
On philosophical methodology and progress in the discipline of philosophy, the project has produced a series of highly visible papers on the relevance of historiography for philosophy. Publications:
Sauer, Hanno. (2022) “The End of History.” Inquiry, September, 1–25. [open access]
———. (2023)“The ends of history. A reply to Sauer.” Inquiry, March, 1–11. [open access]
Rehren, P., & Armbruster, T. (2025). Has philosophy become more ‘Scientific’? A citation analysis. Synthese, 205(1), 1-19.
On the problem of moral universalism, the project has made significant contributions to developing a novel perspective on moral disagreement:
Blunden, Charlie, and Benedict Lane. “Vindicating universalism: Pragmatic genealogy and moral progress.” European Journal of Philosophy, July, 1-20. [open access]
On the problem of norms and conventions:
Blunden, C. (2025). It's Only Natural! Moral Progress Through Denaturalization. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 29(2).
The project has pioneered an institutional turn in thinking about moral progress. Publications:
Sauer, Hanno (2023) Moral Teleology. A Theory of Progress. Routledge. [open access]
The project has also produced novel innovations in bringing into dialogue theories of moral progress and economic growth. Publications:
Blunden, Ch (manuscript). Moral Prosperity. Currently in preparation for publication.
The project has developed an account of moral progress that is based on the idea that moral progress consists in scaling up cooperation to make people better off on increasingly more egalitarian terms. This moves beyonfd the existing state of teh art in several ways, most notably in terms of advancing our understanding of what moral progress is in a way that moves beyond dominant "expanding circle" accounts of moral improvement and in terms of advancing our understanding of the mechanisms of moral progress beyond dominant "moral progress is caused by moral reasoning". This means that the project had to spell out a pluralistic notion of moral progress that goes beyond existing “expaning circle” accounts of social improvement, it had to develop a thorough understanding ot the social and economic institutions that render such scalinhg up possible, it had to reframe the psychological underpinnings of moral progress and come up with fresh perspectives on how norms change.
Receiving this ERC project has had an enormous impact on my career both within the university as well as nationally and internationally. Next to my promotion to Associate Professor, the project's activities and funding have allowed me to develop myself into one of the leading European philosophers in the empirically informed tradition, and it has put me on track to develop my career and reputation even further. Mostly, it has allowed be to think very long-term as a research, gain experience building a team of reseracher who jointl work on the same themes, greatly strengthen my international network and take the time to full flesh out and develop my own views on various matters.
Receiving this ERC project has had an enormous impact on my career both within the university as well as nationally and internationally. Next to my promotion to Associate Professor, the project's activities and funding have allowed me to develop myself into one of the leading European philosophers in the empirically informed tradition, and it has put me on track to develop my career and reputation even further. Mostly, it has allowed be to think very long-term as a research, gain experience building a team of reseracher who jointl work on the same themes, greatly strengthen my international network and take the time to full flesh out and develop my own views on various matters.