Periodic Reporting for period 3 - LABFER (Globalisation- and Technology-Driven Labour Market Change and Fertility)
Période du rapport: 2023-10-01 au 2025-03-31
Résumé du contexte et des objectifs généraux du projet
The objective of the project is to examine how the labour market change, caused by technological transformations and globalization, affects fertility in developed economies. This topic is extremely timely as the labour market change, caused by digitalization and globalization, has been taking place for the last two decades and has intensified in the last decade due to the rapid development of the information and communication technologies and technologies replacing and/or complementing human labour. These changes are reflected in larger labour market dynamics (more rapid job creation and job disruption), spread of new work arrangements (more unstable and fragmented work contracts), larger employment and income uncertainty as well as occupational deprivation (if technologies are replacing human labour), growing job demands (due to expansion of the knowledge economy and the need to constantly adapt to the ongoing changes in work guidelines and work content) or growing work autonomy in terms of where, when and how we work. These changes may affect fertility decisions as they substantially alter the conditions of earning income and combining paid work and care.
The project is also highly socially relevant as numerous studies have demonstrated that individuals are not fulfilling their fertility desires and intentions and on average have fewer children by the end of their reproductive life than they wanted and planned to have. These unmet fertility desires may have important negative consequences for individuals’ quality of life and psychological well-being. Below-replacement fertility, which is a feature of many developed countries, will also have repercussions for the future economic, social and cultural potential of these economies. To date, however, the fertility effects of globalization- and technology-driven labour market changes have not been studied in a comprehensive way. In particular many nuances of these changes have not been addressed in fertility studies (i.e. spread of the possibilities to work form home, changing demand for labour, exposure to labour replacing technologies, growing job demands, spreading work autonomy, etc.
This project fills this research gap. It aims at at a comprehensive description and evaluation of evaluate fertility consequences of the dramatic labour market transformations, caused by globalisation and technological change. It does it by drawing on theoretical approaches and measures developed in labour economics (routine-biased technical change, task content of occupations framework), organizational psychology (job demands/ resources framework, effort-biased technical change) or sociological research on gender and workplace norms.
The research questions are:
RQ1. What are the fertility effects of the ongoing labour market transformations (macro-level)? How do these labour market changes contribute to the most recent fertility declines in the most advanced post-industrial societies?
RQ2. What are the individual-level mechanisms behind the observed macro-level fertility effects of the labour market change? Are these relationships gender- and parity-specific? What are the interactive processes behind partners’ labour market situations and their childbearing behaviours?
RQ3. How do the growing inequalities in labour market prospects between the low-and-medium and the highly skilled translate into the relative fertility patterns of the two groups?
RQ4. What is the role of family and employment policies in moderating the consequences of the labour market change on fertility?
The project is also highly socially relevant as numerous studies have demonstrated that individuals are not fulfilling their fertility desires and intentions and on average have fewer children by the end of their reproductive life than they wanted and planned to have. These unmet fertility desires may have important negative consequences for individuals’ quality of life and psychological well-being. Below-replacement fertility, which is a feature of many developed countries, will also have repercussions for the future economic, social and cultural potential of these economies. To date, however, the fertility effects of globalization- and technology-driven labour market changes have not been studied in a comprehensive way. In particular many nuances of these changes have not been addressed in fertility studies (i.e. spread of the possibilities to work form home, changing demand for labour, exposure to labour replacing technologies, growing job demands, spreading work autonomy, etc.
This project fills this research gap. It aims at at a comprehensive description and evaluation of evaluate fertility consequences of the dramatic labour market transformations, caused by globalisation and technological change. It does it by drawing on theoretical approaches and measures developed in labour economics (routine-biased technical change, task content of occupations framework), organizational psychology (job demands/ resources framework, effort-biased technical change) or sociological research on gender and workplace norms.
The research questions are:
RQ1. What are the fertility effects of the ongoing labour market transformations (macro-level)? How do these labour market changes contribute to the most recent fertility declines in the most advanced post-industrial societies?
RQ2. What are the individual-level mechanisms behind the observed macro-level fertility effects of the labour market change? Are these relationships gender- and parity-specific? What are the interactive processes behind partners’ labour market situations and their childbearing behaviours?
RQ3. How do the growing inequalities in labour market prospects between the low-and-medium and the highly skilled translate into the relative fertility patterns of the two groups?
RQ4. What is the role of family and employment policies in moderating the consequences of the labour market change on fertility?
Travail effectué depuis le début du projet jusqu’à la fin de la période considérée dans le rapport et principaux résultats atteints jusqu’à présent
Research on workers’ exposure to job displacement due to labour displacing technologies and its impact on fertility constitutes an important part of the project. In a study published in European Journal of Population (A. Matysiak, D. Bellani and H. Bogusz), we found negative effects of robot adoption on regional fertility in Germany (country most advanced in the adoption of industrial robots) and Italy. The negative effects were most pronounced in regions with relatively low educated populations but also regions which are least advanced in pursuing technological change (as they are possibly not able to benefit from the technological developments). We also found negative effects on family formation in another study in which we used micro-level data from Sweden (A. Matysiak, W. Hardy, L. Andersson). This study indicated clear educational differences in how workers’ family-related behaviours are affected by automation. Namely, we found high educated workers to display higher risks of marriage and entry to parenthood and lower risks of divorce in response to an increase in robotization in the sector in which they work. We also found the low educated male workers and medium educated female workers to be less likely to marry and enter parenthood and to be more likely to divorce with an increase in robotization in the sector of their employment.
We also investigated the role of the changing demand for labour due to digitalization and globalization (H. Bogusz, A. Matysiak, M. Kreyenfeld, under review). These two processes increase the demand for cognitive labour and lower the demand for non-cognitive workers, in particular those conducting routine tasks. In a study conducted in Germany we found that first birth risks have increased among women and men conducting cognitive tasks at work and declined among men performing non-cognitive tasks. We also found that currently women and men who perform highly cognitive work are least likely to remain childless if compared to those doing work of low cognitive task intensity. These findings are very much consistent with an expectation that the growing demand for cognitive workers offers them good conditions for family formation while the opposite is true for non-cognitive workers. These developments may with the time lead to a change in the educational gradient in fertility reflected in higher fertility rates among highly skilled workers and lower fertility rates among the less skilled. We continue working on the topic. The team has proposed their own measures of cognitive, routine and manual task intensity of jobs, adjusted to the European context (a study by A. Matysiak, W. Hardy and L. van der Velde, under review) and has been applying them for studying fertility effects in the context of Norway (work in progress).
The spread of information and communication technologies has led to the expansion of telework. It is now increasingly possible to work from home. We investigated how this possibility is related to fertility (a study by B. Osiewalska, A. Matysiak and A. Kurowska forthcoming in Population Studies). We conducted an empirical study in the United Kingdom, covering the period before the Covid-19 pandemic. We found that women who regularly worked from home were likely to postpone motherhood. We found only weakly significant positive relationship between the possibility to work from home regularly and second-birth risks. We also conducted another study, located in Poland during the Covid-19 pandemic, in which we investigated the role of telework on fertility intentions during the pandemic (published by A. Kurowska, A. Matysiak and B. Osiewalska in European Journal of Population). This study confirms that working from home does not necessarily impact fertility positively. In this particular case, we found it was negatively related to fertility intentions during the pandemic in Poland apart from some specific social groups, e.g. couples with poor financial situation or fairly traditional division of labour.
Workplace flexibility (the possibility to decide where one works) is only one of the several dimensions of work autonomy. The other two are flexible working hours and job autonomy. Flexible working hours allow workers to adjust the working time to family needs. Job autonomy should give this possibility as well, but it may also make working time more unpredictable and may result in long working hours. Using British data, B. Osiewalska and A. Matysiak found that flexible working schedules are positively related to second birth risks but not the first (a finding similar to what was found for workplace flexibility). We also found this positive links to hold only for highly educated workers but not for the lower educated. Consistently with our expectations we found that job autonomy leads to delayed entry to motherhood and discourages subsequent childbearing, likely because it goes hand in hand with larger responsibility for the work outcomes and thus higher work demands.
We also examined how high work demands (pressure, job complexity, long working hours) affect fertility behaviours and whether work autonomy allows for alleviating the negative effects of work demands (A. Matysiak, B. Osiewalska and E. Weychert). Using panel data from Australia (HILDA) we found that high work demands are indeed negatively related to the transition to the second child. Moderate working time autonomy can alleviate these negative negative effects, but high working time autonomy only exacerbates the work-related demands and leads to a further reduction in fertility. In another study we examined the role of work demands and work resources for the risk of miscarriage (E. Jarosz and A. Matysiak). Our preliminary findings suggest that contract uncertainty and irregular shifts increase the risk of a miscarriage while high job satisfaction, good pay and good climate at work are negatively related to the risk of a miscarriage.
Finally, we also conducted two additional studies in which we investigated how other care obligations interact with labour force participation in affecting the transition to second child (E. Jarosz, A. Matysiak and B. Osiewalska). In particular, we looked at the role of intensive parenting practices and lack of leisure on second birth risks. We indeed found that intense parenting practices are clearly negatively related to second birth risks, particularly among working and highly educated women. We also found negative effects of lack of leisure on second birth risks, though these effects are strongest among the low and middle educated women who likely have fewer resources to outsource childcare obligations and who receive less support in childcare and housework from their partners (a study published in Population and Development Review).
We also investigated the role of the changing demand for labour due to digitalization and globalization (H. Bogusz, A. Matysiak, M. Kreyenfeld, under review). These two processes increase the demand for cognitive labour and lower the demand for non-cognitive workers, in particular those conducting routine tasks. In a study conducted in Germany we found that first birth risks have increased among women and men conducting cognitive tasks at work and declined among men performing non-cognitive tasks. We also found that currently women and men who perform highly cognitive work are least likely to remain childless if compared to those doing work of low cognitive task intensity. These findings are very much consistent with an expectation that the growing demand for cognitive workers offers them good conditions for family formation while the opposite is true for non-cognitive workers. These developments may with the time lead to a change in the educational gradient in fertility reflected in higher fertility rates among highly skilled workers and lower fertility rates among the less skilled. We continue working on the topic. The team has proposed their own measures of cognitive, routine and manual task intensity of jobs, adjusted to the European context (a study by A. Matysiak, W. Hardy and L. van der Velde, under review) and has been applying them for studying fertility effects in the context of Norway (work in progress).
The spread of information and communication technologies has led to the expansion of telework. It is now increasingly possible to work from home. We investigated how this possibility is related to fertility (a study by B. Osiewalska, A. Matysiak and A. Kurowska forthcoming in Population Studies). We conducted an empirical study in the United Kingdom, covering the period before the Covid-19 pandemic. We found that women who regularly worked from home were likely to postpone motherhood. We found only weakly significant positive relationship between the possibility to work from home regularly and second-birth risks. We also conducted another study, located in Poland during the Covid-19 pandemic, in which we investigated the role of telework on fertility intentions during the pandemic (published by A. Kurowska, A. Matysiak and B. Osiewalska in European Journal of Population). This study confirms that working from home does not necessarily impact fertility positively. In this particular case, we found it was negatively related to fertility intentions during the pandemic in Poland apart from some specific social groups, e.g. couples with poor financial situation or fairly traditional division of labour.
Workplace flexibility (the possibility to decide where one works) is only one of the several dimensions of work autonomy. The other two are flexible working hours and job autonomy. Flexible working hours allow workers to adjust the working time to family needs. Job autonomy should give this possibility as well, but it may also make working time more unpredictable and may result in long working hours. Using British data, B. Osiewalska and A. Matysiak found that flexible working schedules are positively related to second birth risks but not the first (a finding similar to what was found for workplace flexibility). We also found this positive links to hold only for highly educated workers but not for the lower educated. Consistently with our expectations we found that job autonomy leads to delayed entry to motherhood and discourages subsequent childbearing, likely because it goes hand in hand with larger responsibility for the work outcomes and thus higher work demands.
We also examined how high work demands (pressure, job complexity, long working hours) affect fertility behaviours and whether work autonomy allows for alleviating the negative effects of work demands (A. Matysiak, B. Osiewalska and E. Weychert). Using panel data from Australia (HILDA) we found that high work demands are indeed negatively related to the transition to the second child. Moderate working time autonomy can alleviate these negative negative effects, but high working time autonomy only exacerbates the work-related demands and leads to a further reduction in fertility. In another study we examined the role of work demands and work resources for the risk of miscarriage (E. Jarosz and A. Matysiak). Our preliminary findings suggest that contract uncertainty and irregular shifts increase the risk of a miscarriage while high job satisfaction, good pay and good climate at work are negatively related to the risk of a miscarriage.
Finally, we also conducted two additional studies in which we investigated how other care obligations interact with labour force participation in affecting the transition to second child (E. Jarosz, A. Matysiak and B. Osiewalska). In particular, we looked at the role of intensive parenting practices and lack of leisure on second birth risks. We indeed found that intense parenting practices are clearly negatively related to second birth risks, particularly among working and highly educated women. We also found negative effects of lack of leisure on second birth risks, though these effects are strongest among the low and middle educated women who likely have fewer resources to outsource childcare obligations and who receive less support in childcare and housework from their partners (a study published in Population and Development Review).
Progrès au-delà de l’état des connaissances et impact potentiel prévu (y compris l’impact socio-économique et les conséquences sociétales plus larges du projet jusqu’à présent)
The project clearly advances the research field beyond the state of the art. This advancement is made not through the single publication but rather by the series of research studies that we have done, presented at various conferences, which we will now stepwise publish. This series of studies provides a much more comprehensive and nuanced approach to the changes in the labour market and its links with fertility than it has been done in the past.
Previous studies have so far mainly concentrated on studying how the fact of having a job or losing a job affects fertility and more recently how having an unstable job (e.g. temporary contract) or a job which is more easily compatible with childbearing (usually captured by part-time work) affects fertility. Nonetheless, the labour market has undergone substantial changes: employment contracts and working conditions became more diverse. Work has become more knowledge intensive, but also more flexible in terms of working hours and working place and this flexibility may be sometimes serving the employee but sometimes mainly also the employer. Certain jobs and job skills became far more needed in the labour market than others, which led to an increase in the demand for some jobs and a decline for others. Some occupations or job tasks are even disappearing. There is also a clear social gradient in who has access to the newly emerging flexibilities and employment opportunities and who has not. These changes in working conditions, which result from structural changes in the labour market driven by globalization and technological change, clearly affect the opportunities for making income and combining paid work and care and thus possibly affect workers’ fertility decisions. They have hardly been considered in the past research on fertility, however.
LABFER advances the field by taking a comprehensive and much more nuanced approach to how recent changes in the conditions of labour force participation of women and men affect fertility. The series of studies we have conducted so far make a breakthrough by demonstrating the complexity and multidimensionality of the labour market change, theoretising its impact on fertility and proposing innovative ways of measuring the changing working conditions with the available data. They also indicate clear socio-economic differences in how the ongoing labour market changes affect workers’ family-related behaviours.
First, we have examined the role of automation and changing demand for labour (caused by development of technologies and globalization) for fertility. Here we drew on the literature in labour market economics in order to measure exposure to automation and changing demand for labour. We also proposed new measures which we consider as better suited to the European labour markets than those developed so far in the economic literature. We found that automation and changes in the structure of labour demand, caused by digitalisation and globalization, have positive influence on family formation of highly skilled workers, who clearly benefit from the ongoing change, and negative on family formation of low skilled workers who are most exposed to uncertainty and job loss from the ongoing changes. There have been hardly any studies in demography (apart from Annelli et al 2022 for the US) which would address this issues.
Next, we examined fertility consequences of the rising work autonomy, brought about by the development of information and communication technologies as well as organizational changes introduced in response to globalization. We showed that the effects of job control, workplace autonomy and schedule control are complex and not necessarily result in higher birth transitions. Individuals who have access to these autonomies tend to postpone parenthood though seem to be more likely to have the second child. Nonetheless, these positive effects are displayed only among the high skilled workers. This findings suggest a clear socio-economic gradient in how flexibilities of working time and location affect family formation.
Finally, we also showed that work demands and lack of leisure also have a detrimental effect on family formation. Again, we observed that these negative effects of lack of leisure and high work demands are more pronounced among persons with low rather than high social status, likely because the former have fewer financial resources to deal with the negative consequences of work demands (e.g. fewer opportunities to outsource routine housework) or have poorer negotiation position than the high skilled employees who are strongly demanded in the labour market.
We will continue with our research to gather more evidence from larger number of countries in order to examine whether the patterns we found so far are universal or country specific. We will also pay more attention to examining the role of the social, including policy, context for moderating the effects of the structural labour market change on fertility.
Previous studies have so far mainly concentrated on studying how the fact of having a job or losing a job affects fertility and more recently how having an unstable job (e.g. temporary contract) or a job which is more easily compatible with childbearing (usually captured by part-time work) affects fertility. Nonetheless, the labour market has undergone substantial changes: employment contracts and working conditions became more diverse. Work has become more knowledge intensive, but also more flexible in terms of working hours and working place and this flexibility may be sometimes serving the employee but sometimes mainly also the employer. Certain jobs and job skills became far more needed in the labour market than others, which led to an increase in the demand for some jobs and a decline for others. Some occupations or job tasks are even disappearing. There is also a clear social gradient in who has access to the newly emerging flexibilities and employment opportunities and who has not. These changes in working conditions, which result from structural changes in the labour market driven by globalization and technological change, clearly affect the opportunities for making income and combining paid work and care and thus possibly affect workers’ fertility decisions. They have hardly been considered in the past research on fertility, however.
LABFER advances the field by taking a comprehensive and much more nuanced approach to how recent changes in the conditions of labour force participation of women and men affect fertility. The series of studies we have conducted so far make a breakthrough by demonstrating the complexity and multidimensionality of the labour market change, theoretising its impact on fertility and proposing innovative ways of measuring the changing working conditions with the available data. They also indicate clear socio-economic differences in how the ongoing labour market changes affect workers’ family-related behaviours.
First, we have examined the role of automation and changing demand for labour (caused by development of technologies and globalization) for fertility. Here we drew on the literature in labour market economics in order to measure exposure to automation and changing demand for labour. We also proposed new measures which we consider as better suited to the European labour markets than those developed so far in the economic literature. We found that automation and changes in the structure of labour demand, caused by digitalisation and globalization, have positive influence on family formation of highly skilled workers, who clearly benefit from the ongoing change, and negative on family formation of low skilled workers who are most exposed to uncertainty and job loss from the ongoing changes. There have been hardly any studies in demography (apart from Annelli et al 2022 for the US) which would address this issues.
Next, we examined fertility consequences of the rising work autonomy, brought about by the development of information and communication technologies as well as organizational changes introduced in response to globalization. We showed that the effects of job control, workplace autonomy and schedule control are complex and not necessarily result in higher birth transitions. Individuals who have access to these autonomies tend to postpone parenthood though seem to be more likely to have the second child. Nonetheless, these positive effects are displayed only among the high skilled workers. This findings suggest a clear socio-economic gradient in how flexibilities of working time and location affect family formation.
Finally, we also showed that work demands and lack of leisure also have a detrimental effect on family formation. Again, we observed that these negative effects of lack of leisure and high work demands are more pronounced among persons with low rather than high social status, likely because the former have fewer financial resources to deal with the negative consequences of work demands (e.g. fewer opportunities to outsource routine housework) or have poorer negotiation position than the high skilled employees who are strongly demanded in the labour market.
We will continue with our research to gather more evidence from larger number of countries in order to examine whether the patterns we found so far are universal or country specific. We will also pay more attention to examining the role of the social, including policy, context for moderating the effects of the structural labour market change on fertility.