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Welfare, Incentives, Dynamics, and Equilibrium

Project description

Applying dynamic incentive theory to welfare allocations and policies

Information asymmetry causes inefficient allocations and lowers welfare. To mitigate these inefficiencies, appropriate incentive schemes must be designed. While the design of such schemes raises complex theoretical problems, the EU-funded WIDE project will develop new frameworks to enhance the applicability of dynamic incentive theory. It will analyse the equilibrium of financial markets and corporate investment dynamics under incentive constraints, to obtain implications for firm management and welfare-maximising policies. It will investigate whether levying financial transaction taxes can help raising public funds while limiting fiscal distortions. Finally, it will explore how contracts and regulations can be set to better align market participants’ incentives and thus improve risk-sharing.

Objective

Informational frictions lead to inefficient allocations, reducing welfare. Dynamic incentive theory offers a powerful conceptual framework to analyse the optimal design of contracts and mechanisms mitigating these inefficiencies. Its technical difficulty and abstractness, however, have limited its applications. The objective of this project is to develop new frameworks to enhance the applicability of dynamic incentive theory and address important unanswered applied questions:

1) In corporate finance, I will evaluate the quantitative relevance of dynamic contract theory. To do so, I will develop a new structural econometric framework and estimate the magnitude of dynamic incentive problems and their consequences for corporate investment and bankruptcy risk.

2) In organization theory, I will study if equilibrium choices lead to excessive complexity. I will model the link between complexity and incentives. Then, in contrast with standard dynamic contract theory, which takes the tasks of agents as given, I will endogenize agents tasks and their complexity. Finally I will confront this theory to new data on complexity.

3) In asset pricing, I will build a novel equilibrium framework to study the consequences of dynamic incentive constraints for relative prices and the cross section of expected returns. In addition to this positive analysis, I will delineate the normative implications of the theory for financial markets regulation.

4) In public finance, I will study whether financial transactions should be taxed. To do so, I will extend the dynamic mechanism design paradigm of new public finance to financial transaction taxes and compare the distortions induced by these taxes with those induced by taxes on capital or labour income.

By delivering useful results on four important issues, this project will demonstrate the applicability of dynamic incentive theory. To do so it will develop novel tools by combining dynamic incentive theory with other methodologies.

Fields of science (EuroSciVoc)

Keywords

Programme(s)

Topic(s)

Funding Scheme

ERC-ADG - Advanced Grant

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Call for proposal

(opens in new window) ERC-2019-ADG

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Host institution

ETABLISSEMENT D'ENSEIGNEMENT SUPERIEUR CONSULAIRE HAUTES ETUDES COMMERCIALES DE PARIS
Net EU contribution
€ 1 240 922,00
Address
RUE DE LA LIBERATION 1
78350 Jouy-En-Josas
France
Region
Ile-de-France Ile-de-France Yvelines
Activity type
Higher or Secondary Education Establishments
Links
Total cost
€ 1 240 922,00

Beneficiaries (1)