Periodic Reporting for period 4 - REDEFINE (Re-orienting development: the dynamics and effects of Chinese infrastructure investment in Europe)
Reporting period: 2025-05-01 to 2025-10-31
REDEFINE will examine what China’s rise means for how we understand global development and, specifically, Europe’s place in it. Following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, China made more assertive moves into developed economies, which were boosted in 2013 by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) whereby massive investments in infrastructure – estimated to have reached $1.3 trillion by 2025 – promised to link China to Europe. At the same time, many European economies stagnated following the Global and Eurozone financial crises with governments cutting back on infrastructure investment and looking for new sources of finance. As such, China viewed Europe as fertile ground for new investment: between 2015 and 2016 investment levels doubled but began to plateau and then decline from 2017. The first phase of China’s expansion, couched in terms of ‘South-South development cooperation’, has been analysed largely from the perspective of international Development Studies. It promised more equal relations between China and recipient countries, but the outcomes were uneven. The aim of REDEFINE is to use the insights from international development to interrogate Chinese engagement in the heart of Europe and by doing so re-orient the Eurocentric debates in the social sciences around how we define and delimit development, who drives these processes, and what it means for societies and communities affected by such investments. REDEFINE’s agenda is important for two reasons. First, China’s presence in Europe presents opportunities and risks which we do not fully comprehend. REDEFINE will undertake fine-grained empirical analysis to understand the rationales for Chinese investment into Europe, the geopolitical dynamics surrounding these financing streams, the structuring of specific projects, and the ways in which these investments interface with national and local development policy. Second, decision-makers are uncertain how to deal with a broadening range of public and private Chinese actors. By better understanding how investment deals operate, REDEFINE will connect Chinese and European governments and corporate actors in order to influence their strategies and practices. To meet these aims REDEFINE’s objectives are: Conceptual Objectives: 1. Create a conceptual framework that unpacks the multiple drivers and actors on both the Chinese and European sides in order to analyse the organisation and outcomes of complex, multi-scalar investment flows; 2. Advance debates across disciplines regarding (a) China’s changing global role, (b) Europe’s changing economic and political strategies towards China, (c) different countries’ multi-scalar approaches to infrastructure financing, (d) the dynamics of internationally funded investment projects, and (e) more heterodox approaches to assessing project costs and benefits; 3. Contribute new theory on redefining global development; Instrumental Objectives: 4. Produce new, globally accessible data sets that capture broad trends and case-specific dynamics based on innovative quantitative and qualitative research methods, which are comparative across cases; 5. Share best practice of policy engagement regarding Chinese investments across European countries; 6. Facilitate better integration and co-ordination between public and private actors regarding major infrastructure projects; Capacity-building Objectives: 7. Enhance the capacities of doctoral students and early career researchers.
The 5-year REDEFINE project broke down into the following phases:
0-10 months: Inception and recruitment. Ethics and data management protocols were put in place, administrative and research staff were recruited, and case studies started to be mapped. Overseas travel was limited due to COVID-19 restrictions. Advisory group inaugurated.
11-20 months: Case study mapping and scoping visits undertaken. Seminar series started and final recruitment achieved.
21-43 months: periods of fieldwork across four European countries. Theoretical papers developed and published. Presentations at several conferences.
44-53 months: data analysis and production of papers. Further conference presentations. Hosted methodology conference.
54-60 months: most research staff contracts ended. Publications in production. Data processed for open sharing. Final reporting process initiated.
In terms of results we:
(1) Developed a conceptual framework that unpacks the drivers and actors on both the Chinese and European sides.
(2) Nuanced debates on Global China and counteract the view that China’s internationalisation is ‘all-conquering’.
(3) Analysed Europe’s changing economic and political strategies towards China, particularly the emerging debate around ‘de-risking’ relationships with China. We showed that while European level policy was emphasising securitisation, which was echoed at national levels, at the local level where infrastructure investments take place actors were less concerned about security threats.
(4) Elaborated the multi-scalar dynamics of Chinese funded investment projects by examining the links between political institutions, actors and infrastructure projects. We also encouraged more heterodox approaches to assessing project costs and benefits, by focusing on the ways in which city diplomacy generates long and short-term benefits in the face of geopolitical tensions.
We continue to work on publications and have several conference presentations lined up for 2026.
0-10 months: Inception and recruitment. Ethics and data management protocols were put in place, administrative and research staff were recruited, and case studies started to be mapped. Overseas travel was limited due to COVID-19 restrictions. Advisory group inaugurated.
11-20 months: Case study mapping and scoping visits undertaken. Seminar series started and final recruitment achieved.
21-43 months: periods of fieldwork across four European countries. Theoretical papers developed and published. Presentations at several conferences.
44-53 months: data analysis and production of papers. Further conference presentations. Hosted methodology conference.
54-60 months: most research staff contracts ended. Publications in production. Data processed for open sharing. Final reporting process initiated.
In terms of results we:
(1) Developed a conceptual framework that unpacks the drivers and actors on both the Chinese and European sides.
(2) Nuanced debates on Global China and counteract the view that China’s internationalisation is ‘all-conquering’.
(3) Analysed Europe’s changing economic and political strategies towards China, particularly the emerging debate around ‘de-risking’ relationships with China. We showed that while European level policy was emphasising securitisation, which was echoed at national levels, at the local level where infrastructure investments take place actors were less concerned about security threats.
(4) Elaborated the multi-scalar dynamics of Chinese funded investment projects by examining the links between political institutions, actors and infrastructure projects. We also encouraged more heterodox approaches to assessing project costs and benefits, by focusing on the ways in which city diplomacy generates long and short-term benefits in the face of geopolitical tensions.
We continue to work on publications and have several conference presentations lined up for 2026.
There are two key areas where REDEFINE progressed beyond the state of the art.
Disaggregating China/Europe relations: While more variegated and multi-actor approaches to China’s globalisation is not new, REDEFINE’s work has pulled apart the tensions between different actors and levels of the state. This extends beyond the state of the art because China-Europe relations have been framed in big picture terms around geopolitical rivalries, China and Europe as relatively homogenous actors, economic and security risks being ubiquitous etc. Our detailed empirical data across four European countries and eight infrastructure projects has shifted many of these discourses and the papers we have recently published or are working on all revolve around this more nuanced understanding of China-Europe relations. For example, the different perceptions of risk between central and local state levels in European countries is important and has not been analysed in detail because extant analysis treats polities as homogenous. Similarly, while we know social, economic and political power shapes investment processes our analysis reveals how complex these power relations are and it is not the case that China ‘gets its own way’ as many commentators suppose.
Hidden actors: Linked to the first breakthrough was our finding around hidden actors and what we call ‘mundane’ geopolitics. Geopolitics is seen to comprise inter-state rivalries leading to tectonic shifts in the global order. China’s rise disturbs the global order but our analysis reveals the diverse range of Chinese actors that link with European counterparts and how this politics is much quieter and poorly understood. Investment relations are built on a range of long-standing but poorly understood connections between China and host regions in Europe. This has major implications for policies of managing Chinese investment but also for unfolding diplomatic efforts to (re)build relationships with China, which is a global power that cannot be ignored.
Disaggregating China/Europe relations: While more variegated and multi-actor approaches to China’s globalisation is not new, REDEFINE’s work has pulled apart the tensions between different actors and levels of the state. This extends beyond the state of the art because China-Europe relations have been framed in big picture terms around geopolitical rivalries, China and Europe as relatively homogenous actors, economic and security risks being ubiquitous etc. Our detailed empirical data across four European countries and eight infrastructure projects has shifted many of these discourses and the papers we have recently published or are working on all revolve around this more nuanced understanding of China-Europe relations. For example, the different perceptions of risk between central and local state levels in European countries is important and has not been analysed in detail because extant analysis treats polities as homogenous. Similarly, while we know social, economic and political power shapes investment processes our analysis reveals how complex these power relations are and it is not the case that China ‘gets its own way’ as many commentators suppose.
Hidden actors: Linked to the first breakthrough was our finding around hidden actors and what we call ‘mundane’ geopolitics. Geopolitics is seen to comprise inter-state rivalries leading to tectonic shifts in the global order. China’s rise disturbs the global order but our analysis reveals the diverse range of Chinese actors that link with European counterparts and how this politics is much quieter and poorly understood. Investment relations are built on a range of long-standing but poorly understood connections between China and host regions in Europe. This has major implications for policies of managing Chinese investment but also for unfolding diplomatic efforts to (re)build relationships with China, which is a global power that cannot be ignored.