Numbers in parentheses refer to the list in Section 1. 1.c).
Investigations of tax evasion and enforcement were carried out for Italy and Sweden. 15, 1 0).
The partial equilibrium study of enforcement in Sweden, estimated enforcement costs as dependent on the monitoring intensity and political party power. (9). The results show a positive, significant, correlation between monitoring and costs. Further, two political parties, Conservatives and Environmental Party, show relatively high positive impacts on enforcement costs. Analytical results from tax switch under tax evasion reveals a potential for a 'double dividend" environmental and welfare (excluding environmental benefits) improvements (10). The existence of this dividend is due to the changes in tax bases which occurs from changes in tax evasions. A crucial assumption is that tax evasion is positively, related to the tax rate. An increase in an environmental tax thus raises tax evasion and erodes the environmental tax. When the environmental tax increase is used to reduce labour taxes, evasion decreases, and, hence, there is an additional labour tax base increase. Results from the CGE simulations do not, however, show that such a double dividend exists, probably because of the large initial differences in environmental and labour tax bases.