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Strategic Market Games and Oligopoly Theory in Exchange Models


Research objectives and content

The main research objective consists in providing a synthesis of two different approaches to the problem of non cooperative behaviour in the general equilibrium exchange model: the strategic market game approach proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1977), and the oligopoly equilibrium approach proposed by Gszewicz and Vial (1972). Our research objective consists in introducing, in each of the above theories, the elements, which appear in the first, and are not present in the second, and vice-versa.

More precisely, the following questions will be examined:
(i) What becomes the theory of strategic market games when it is extended to take into account oligopolies and competitive agents (see Gszewicz and Mertens (1971) for a similar approach applied to core theory );
(ii) How the model and concepts used in the Gszewicz-Vial approach (1972) should be amended if it is assumed that all the agents behave strategically?
(iii) Is it possible to extend the Shapley-Shubik model in view of taking into account the existence of a productive sector, as in Gszewicz-Vial?
(iv) How the solutions (non-cooperative allocations) differ from each other according to the pricing mechanism utilized in each of theories (a first study of this question has been already elaborated by Codognato (1995)

Training content (objective, benefit and expected impact)

Several members of the Alicante team work in the fields of General Equilibrium Theory (like A. Villar) and Imperfect Competition (like M . Peitz). I should interact with them at the occasion of this visit. I plan to present several seminars related to the topic.

Links with industry / industrial relevance (22)


S/n,crta. San Vicente Del Raspeig S/n
03071 Alicante