Robust Mechanism Design and Robust Prediction in Games

Publications

Other (5)

Optimal public information disclosure by mechanism designer

Author(s): Takuro Yamashita
Published in: TSE Working Paper, 18-936, 2018
Publisher: TSE

Revenue guarantee in auction with a (correlated) common prior and additional information

Author(s): Takuro Yamashita
Published in: TSE Working Paper, 18-937, 2018
Publisher: TSE

On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms

Author(s): Takuro Yamashita et Shuguang Zhu
Published in: TSE Working paper, 18-938, 2018
Publisher: TSE

Divergent Interpretation and Divergent Prediction in Communication

Author(s): Shintaro Miura et Takuro Yamashita
Published in: TSE Working Paper, 18-939, 2018
Publisher: TSE

Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure

Author(s): Fumitoshi Moriya et Takuro Yamashita
Published in: TSE Working Paper, 18-941, 2018
Publisher: TSE

Non-peer reviewed articles (2)

Revenue-Capped Efficient Auctions

Author(s): Nozomu Muto, Yasuhiro Shirata, Takuro Yamashita
Published in: Journal of the European Economic Association, 18/3, 2019, Page(s) 1284-1320, ISSN 1542-4766
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvz015

Order on types based on monotone comparative statics

Author(s): Takashi Kunimoto, Takuro Yamashita
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory, 189, 2020, Page(s) 105082, ISSN 0022-0531
Publisher: Academic Press
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105082

Peer reviewed articles (2)

Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure

Author(s): Fumitoshi Moriya, Takuro Yamashita
Published in: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 29/1, 2019, Page(s) 173-186, ISSN 1058-6407
Publisher: Blackwell Publishing Inc.
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12329

Maximal miscommunication

Author(s): Shintaro Miura, Takuro Yamashita
Published in: Economics Letters, 188, 2020, Page(s) 108962, ISSN 0165-1765
Publisher: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108962