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Robust Mechanism Design and Robust Prediction in Games

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Publications

Optimal public information disclosure by mechanism designer

Author(s): Takuro Yamashita
Published in: TSE Working Paper, Issue 18-936, 2018

Revenue guarantee in auction with a (correlated) common prior and additional information

Author(s): Takuro Yamashita
Published in: TSE Working Paper, Issue 18-937, 2018

Revenue-capped efficient auctions

Author(s): Nozomu Muto, Yasuhiro Shirata et Takuro Yamashita
Published in: TSE Working Paper, Issue 18-940, 2018

On the foundations of ex post incentive compatible mechanisms

Author(s): Takuro Yamashita et Shuguang Zhu
Published in: TSE Working paper, Issue 18-938, 2018

Divergent Interpretation and Divergent Prediction in Communication

Author(s): Shintaro Miura et Takuro Yamashita
Published in: TSE Working Paper, Issue 18-939, 2018

Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure

Author(s): Fumitoshi Moriya et Takuro Yamashita
Published in: TSE Working Paper, Issue 18-941, 2018

Order on types based on monotone comparative statics

Author(s): Takashi Kunimoto et Takuro Yamashita
Published in: TSE Working Paper, Issue 18-942, 2018

Asymmetric‐information allocation to avoid coordination failure

Author(s): Fumitoshi Moriya, Takuro Yamashita
Published in: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Issue 29/1, 2019, Page(s) 173-186, ISSN 1058-6407
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12329

Maximal miscommunication

Author(s): Shintaro Miura, Takuro Yamashita
Published in: Economics Letters, Issue 188, 2020, Page(s) 108962, ISSN 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.108962