Assessment of the results of task 1.1 regarding pending safety issues
(s’ouvre dans une nouvelle fenêtre)
Assessment of the results of T1.1 regarding pending safety issues, M32, TÜV, IRSN, FRA-SAS, TRACTEBEL
Data management plan
(s’ouvre dans une nouvelle fenêtre)
Data management plan M3 FRASAS LGI HTR SAS PU
Scoping study on the stability of B4C as a burnable poison
(s’ouvre dans une nouvelle fenêtre)
Scoping study on the stability of B4C as a burnable poison, M24, JRC, TÜV
Common European basis for licensing of an HTR at European level
(s’ouvre dans une nouvelle fenêtre)
Common European basis for licensing of an HTR at European level, M24, TRACTEBEL, IRSN, JRC, NCBJ, FRA-SAS
HTR fuel back-end : Graphite management, spent TRISO fuel reprocessing and recycling alternatives
(s’ouvre dans une nouvelle fenêtre)
HTR fuel back-end : Graphite management, spent TRISO fuel reprocessing and recycling alternatives, M30, VTT, IChTJ, JRC, NNL, FRA-GmbH
Path and conditions for pre-licensing of a HTR in a European country
(s’ouvre dans une nouvelle fenêtre)
Path and conditions for pre-licensing of a HTR in an European country, M32, IRSN, TÜV, NCBJ, FRASAS
CFD simulations of a detonation of a hydrogen/air mixture in a hydrogen production facility coupled with a nuclear reactor
(s’ouvre dans une nouvelle fenêtre)
The report presents a safety study performed with the CFD tool CALIF3S, developedat IRSN, to evaluate the consequences of a potential accident of hydrogen release on the combined plant. The selectedscenario is the detonation of a stoichiometric hydrogen/air cloud.The explosive cloud is determined with the Multi Energy Method (MEM), reconstructed for hydrogen/air mixtures.The volume of the cloud is obtained, assuming that the reactor buildings are designed to withstand a 100 mbar overpressure wave (same value as for recent PWRs).Several numerical computations of detonation are performed and the impact of the blast waves on the reactor building is studied.A safety distance for the reactor building is also evaluated: the reactor should be located at around 470m from the leak to prevent damagesto its structure. Finally, the impact of the addition of a wall in front of the reactor building as safety barrier is carried out.
Identification of gaps in European Codes and Standards for the design of the GEMINI system
(s’ouvre dans une nouvelle fenêtre)
Identification of gaps in European Codes and Standards for the design of the GEMINI system, M35, FRA-SAS, NNL, NCBJ, JRC, CVR
