Wargames as Experiments: Strategy and Unintended Escalation (WESUE)

Informations projet

WESUE

N° de convention de subvention: 101109871

DOI

10.3030/101109871

Projet clôturé

Date de signature de la CE 24 Avril 2023

Date de début 1 Septembre 2023

Date de fin 30 Avril 2026

Financé au titre de

• Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA)

Coût total

Aucune donnée

Contribution de l’UE

€ 230 774,40

Coordonné par

SYDDANSK UNIVERSITET
Denmark

Periodic Reporting for period 1 - WESUE (Wargames as Experiments: Strategy and Unintended Escalation (WESUE))

Période du rapport: 2023-09-01 au 2026-04-30

Résumé du contexte et des objectifs généraux du projet

Wargames as Experiments: Strategy and Unintended Escalation (WESUE) is designed to understand the causes of nuclear escalation and failure of restraint and alleviate the lack of data, either due to non-events or the fact nuclear data is often classified. Previous scholarship is lacking because it is 1) on correlations, large-n studies designed to offer probabilistic models, 2) prospective, offering conjectures from possible scenarios as educated predictions, or 3) products of the Cold War where the main driver of competition was power parity. WESUE generates previously unavailable data through a simulation software to offer causal explanations of nuclear escalation in relevant crisis settings, informing more accurately theory and policymaking. WESUE’s research question is pertinent: What are the causes under which nuclear escalation becomes more likely?

As such, the objective of WESUE was to understand the dynamics of crisis escalation, especially in cases where technology may have a role to play, and to determine how military strategies can have an impact on crisis dynamics.

Travail effectué depuis le début du projet jusqu’à la fin de la période considérée dans le rapport et principaux résultats atteints jusqu’à présent

Under WESUE, the research developed a simulation software to generate synthetic data for rare events. It allowed to test cases of escalation dynamics where no such case exists, for example in the context of the integration of the air forces in Scandinavia. Moreover, the usage of simulation and wargames to understand the dynamism of conflict and innovation discussed in the project became a book under contract at Bloomsbury Press under the title Virtual Battlegrounds: Forecasting Modern Conflicts. Moreover, the military strategy aspect of the project became a book contract with Cambridge University Press under the title Asymmetric Deterrence: Explaining the Coercive Power of North Korea.

The results of the project have been presented in workshopped in many venues, including at Cornell University Press, the NATO Defence College, EWIS in Poland, the University of Southern Denmark, and the Royal Danish Defence College.

Progrès au-delà de l’état des connaissances et impact potentiel prévu (y compris l’impact socio-économique et les conséquences sociétales plus larges du projet jusqu’à présent)

WESUE’s scientific impact is threefold. First, the simulation platform it created provides a new methodology to create synthetic data for cases or events where there is none, leveraging artificial intelligence to generate thousands of simulations to validate hypotheses or research questions. Moreover, by also using wargames with actual participants, it allows to validate externally the results of the simulations. The security studies impact relates to the second work package. My work on military strategy and domestic constraints allowed me to develop a theory of asymmetrical deterrence to explain how the weaker powers are able to deter stronger power, something that the current literature under theorizes. For international relations, the project allowed me to look at questions of escalation in different theatres including Scandinavia, the Mediterranean, the Korean Peninsula, and the Middle-East while demonstrating that wargaming can actually deliver relevant data for real life issues