Wargames as Experiments: Strategy and Unintended Escalation (WESUE)

Projektinformationen

WESUE

ID Finanzhilfevereinbarung: 101109871

DOI

10.3030/101109871

Projekt abgeschlossen

EK-Unterschriftsdatum 24 April 2023

Startdatum 1 September 2023

Enddatum 30 April 2026

Finanziert unter

• Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (MSCA)

Gesamtkosten

Keine Daten

EU-Beitrag

€ 230 774,40

Koordiniert durch

SYDDANSK UNIVERSITET
Denmark

Periodic Reporting for period 1 - WESUE (Wargames as Experiments: Strategy and Unintended Escalation (WESUE))

Berichtszeitraum: 2023-09-01 bis 2026-04-30

Zusammenfassung vom Kontext und den Gesamtzielen des Projekts

Wargames as Experiments: Strategy and Unintended Escalation (WESUE) is designed to understand the causes of nuclear escalation and failure of restraint and alleviate the lack of data, either due to non-events or the fact nuclear data is often classified. Previous scholarship is lacking because it is 1) on correlations, large-n studies designed to offer probabilistic models, 2) prospective, offering conjectures from possible scenarios as educated predictions, or 3) products of the Cold War where the main driver of competition was power parity. WESUE generates previously unavailable data through a simulation software to offer causal explanations of nuclear escalation in relevant crisis settings, informing more accurately theory and policymaking. WESUE’s research question is pertinent: What are the causes under which nuclear escalation becomes more likely?

As such, the objective of WESUE was to understand the dynamics of crisis escalation, especially in cases where technology may have a role to play, and to determine how military strategies can have an impact on crisis dynamics.

Arbeit, die ab Beginn des Projekts bis zum Ende des durch den Bericht erfassten Berichtszeitraums geleistet wurde, und die wichtigsten bis dahin erzielten Ergebnisse

Under WESUE, the research developed a simulation software to generate synthetic data for rare events. It allowed to test cases of escalation dynamics where no such case exists, for example in the context of the integration of the air forces in Scandinavia. Moreover, the usage of simulation and wargames to understand the dynamism of conflict and innovation discussed in the project became a book under contract at Bloomsbury Press under the title Virtual Battlegrounds: Forecasting Modern Conflicts. Moreover, the military strategy aspect of the project became a book contract with Cambridge University Press under the title Asymmetric Deterrence: Explaining the Coercive Power of North Korea.

The results of the project have been presented in workshopped in many venues, including at Cornell University Press, the NATO Defence College, EWIS in Poland, the University of Southern Denmark, and the Royal Danish Defence College.

Fortschritte, die über den aktuellen Stand der Technik hinausgehen und voraussichtliche potenzielle Auswirkungen (einschließlich der bis dato erzielten sozioökonomischen Auswirkungen und weiter gefassten gesellschaftlichen Auswirkungen des Projekts)

WESUE’s scientific impact is threefold. First, the simulation platform it created provides a new methodology to create synthetic data for cases or events where there is none, leveraging artificial intelligence to generate thousands of simulations to validate hypotheses or research questions. Moreover, by also using wargames with actual participants, it allows to validate externally the results of the simulations. The security studies impact relates to the second work package. My work on military strategy and domestic constraints allowed me to develop a theory of asymmetrical deterrence to explain how the weaker powers are able to deter stronger power, something that the current literature under theorizes. For international relations, the project allowed me to look at questions of escalation in different theatres including Scandinavia, the Mediterranean, the Korean Peninsula, and the Middle-East while demonstrating that wargaming can actually deliver relevant data for real life issues