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Market Design and Participation: Comprehensive Design for Matching Markets

Project description

Enhancing the design of assignment markets

Various real-world market assignments involve limited or no monetary exchange, and often interact with external opportunities. Examples include the allocation of teachers to public schools, children to day care centres, kidneys to patients and social housing to low-income citizens. However, our understanding of how these multiple opportunities interact with the assignment procedure is limited. Using novel datasets from these four markets, the ERC-funded MADPART project aims to bridge this knowledge gap and refine the design of assignment markets in the presence of outside options. It will first examine how outside options discourage market participation and impede policy objectives, particularly the effect of participation-blind procedures. Then, it will develop comprehensive designs to improve how these markets function.

Objective

Market Design combines theoretical and empirical methods to design, analyze, and enhance real-world assignment markets. Many of these markets involve limited or no monetary transfers: civil servants (e.g. teachers), daycare placement for children, organ allocation for patients and so on. These markets often interact with external opportunities or themselves over time. For example, a patient in need of a kidney may have multiple treatment options, families must choose from various childcare alternatives, or public school teachers may request multiple transfers throughout their careers. However, we have a limited knowledge about how these multiple opportunities interact with the assignment procedure. Incorporating such options into the design of these markets is challenging due to data limitations as well as the complexity of the models.
The MADPART project aims to address these challenges by understanding and improving the design of assignment markets in the presence of outside options. It has two primary objectives: 1) Investigating how outside options discourage market participation and undermine policy objectives, specifically exploring how participation-blind procedures contribute to these losses. 2) Identifying novel and innovative designs that enhance the functioning of these markets. This will be achieved through the combination of advanced theoretical models and cutting-edge empirical methods. The project will leverage unique and novel datasets from four assignment markets: the allocation of public school teachers to schools, children to public daycares, kidneys to patients, and social housing allocation. These markets exhibit dynamic interactions with external options.
The outcomes of the project will give a more comprehensive and deeper understanding of assignment markets and potentially lead to significant policy innovations.

Fields of science (EuroSciVoc)

Keywords

Programme(s)

Topic(s)

Funding Scheme

HORIZON-ERC - HORIZON ERC Grants

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Call for proposal

(opens in new window) ERC-2024-STG

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Host institution

ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE
Net EU contribution
€ 1 479 414,00
Address
ROUTE DE SACLAY
91128 PALAISEAU CEDEX
France
Region
Ile-de-France Ile-de-France Paris
Activity type
Higher or Secondary Education Establishments
Links
Total cost
€ 1 479 414,00

Beneficiaries (1)