Market Design and Participation: Comprehensive Design for Matching Markets

Descripción del proyecto

Mejora del diseño de los mercados de asignación

Diversas tareas de mercado del mundo real implican un intercambio monetario limitado o nulo, y con frecuencia interactúan con oportunidades externas. Algunos ejemplos son la asignación de profesores a escuelas públicas, alumnos a guarderías, riñones a pacientes y viviendas sociales a ciudadanos con rentas bajas. Sin embargo, nuestra comprensión de cómo interactúan estas múltiples oportunidades con el proceso de asignación es limitada. Utilizando nuevos conjuntos de datos de estos cuatro mercados, el proyecto MADPART, financiado por el Consejo Europeo de Investigación, pretende colmar esta laguna de conocimientos y perfeccionar el diseño de los mercados de asignación en presencia de opciones externas. En primer lugar, examinará cómo las opciones externas desincentivan la participación en el mercado y obstaculizan los objetivos políticos, especialmente el efecto de los procedimientos ciegos a la participación. A continuación, desarrollará diseños integrales para mejorar el funcionamiento de esos mercados.

Objetivo

Market Design combines theoretical and empirical methods to design, analyze, and enhance real-world assignment markets. Many of these markets involve limited or no monetary transfers: civil servants (e.g. teachers), daycare placement for children, organ allocation for patients and so on. These markets often interact with external opportunities or themselves over time. For example, a patient in need of a kidney may have multiple treatment options, families must choose from various childcare alternatives, or public school teachers may request multiple transfers throughout their careers. However, we have a limited knowledge about how these multiple opportunities interact with the assignment procedure. Incorporating such options into the design of these markets is challenging due to data limitations as well as the complexity of the models.
The MADPART project aims to address these challenges by understanding and improving the design of assignment markets in the presence of outside options. It has two primary objectives: 1) Investigating how outside options discourage market participation and undermine policy objectives, specifically exploring how participation-blind procedures contribute to these losses. 2) Identifying novel and innovative designs that enhance the functioning of these markets. This will be achieved through the combination of advanced theoretical models and cutting-edge empirical methods. The project will leverage unique and novel datasets from four assignment markets: the allocation of public school teachers to schools, children to public daycares, kidneys to patients, and social housing allocation. These markets exhibit dynamic interactions with external options.
The outcomes of the project will give a more comprehensive and deeper understanding of assignment markets and potentially lead to significant policy innovations.