Objectif
The objective of this proposal is to bring together a local team of young researchers who will work closely with international collaborators to advance the state of the art of Algorithmic Game Theory and open new venues of research at the interface of Computer Science, Game Theory, and Economics. The proposal consists mainly of three intertwined research strands: algorithmic mechanism design, price of anarchy, and online algorithms.
Specifically, we will attempt to resolve some outstanding open problems in algorithmic mechanism design: characterizing the incentive compatible mechanisms for important domains, such as the domain of combinatorial auctions, and resolving the approximation ratio of mechanisms for scheduling unrelated machines. More generally, we will study centralized and distributed algorithms whose inputs are controlled by selfish agents that are interested in the outcome of the computation. We will investigate new notions of mechanisms with strong truthfulness and limited susceptibility to externalities that can facilitate modular design of mechanisms of complex domains.
We will expand the current research on the price of anarchy to time-dependent games where the players can select not only how to act but also when to act. We also plan to resolve outstanding questions on the price of stability and to build a robust approach to these questions, similar to smooth analysis. For repeated games, we will investigate convergence of simple strategies (e.g. fictitious play), online fairness, and strategic considerations (e.g. metagames). More generally, our aim is to find a productive formulation of playing unknown games by drawing on the fields of online algorithms and machine learning.
Champ scientifique
Appel à propositions
ERC-2012-ADG_20120216
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Régime de financement
ERC-AG - ERC Advanced GrantInstitution d’accueil
OX1 2JD Oxford
Royaume-Uni