Periodic Reporting for period 1 - RUSNAT (Russian Nationalism and the Ukraine Crisis: The Impact of Nationalist Actors on Russian Foreign Policy)
Période du rapport: 2017-09-01 au 2019-08-31
The 2014 war in Ukraine was a major watershed in Russia’s domestic politics. RUSNAT addresses the striking gap in existing research on how grassroots nationalist organisations can influence foreign policy in Russia. The project’s main objectives are to define a representative research sample of grassroots Russian nationalism and to assess the extent to which, and the ways in which, the events in Ukraine have transformed public activities of grassroots Russian nationalists. Most importantly, it analyses whether, and through which ways, organized grassroots nationalists have influenced the country’s foreign policy narratives or agenda-setting towards Ukraine. This project is, thus, important for society as it contributes to a more nuanced understanding of Russia’s relations with its neighbours. As the 2022 war between Russia and Ukraine shows, understanding the interplay between Russia’s domestic politics and foreign policy is both significant and urgent. More broadly, my project studies the implications that contemporary Russian nationalism can have on Russia’s relations with Europe and the future of European security and economic stability. Moving beyond Russia, RUSNAT contributes to the better understanding of the role of nationalist non-state actors in conflicts initiated by authoritarian governments. This remains an under-researched question, particularly in relation to far-right movements.
Through RUSNAT, I developed a new theoretical framework to study the potential influence of grassroots nationalist non-state actors on foreign policy and undertook rigorous methodological training, intensive Russian language training and policy briefing training. The data I gathered on the ideologies of Russian nationalists and the position of the Russian government on the events in Ukraine shows that the imperialist branch of grassroots Russian nationalism (Eurasia Party, Other Russia, Novorossiya movement) was hailing the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass right from its onset. Civic and ethnic nationalists, however, whose main demand is the establishment of a nation-state, were divided in two blocks: “Russian Spring” supporters (Russian National Democratic Party, National Socialist Initiative) agreed with the Kremlin’s moves, while “Russian Spring” opponents (Party of Nationalists) were critical of Putin’s strategy towards Ukraine.
RUSNAT’s main findings are that Russian grassroots nationalists exercised a significant impact on the agenda-setting process with regard to the issue of Novorossiya — the political ideal of a land that Russian-backed insurgents in Eastern Ukraine were fighting for — and how the Kremlin presented Russian foreign policy to the public. They have also become a tool of foreign policy, as they were allowed to stage public events in favour of Novorossiya, also in alliance with pro-governmental organizations, and to send paramilitary troops to Donbass. Evidence on influence on actual policy, however, is weak. Comparing this case to the influence that nationalists have exercised on governmental discourse and — probably — agenda-setting in the field of immigration in the 2000s, we can draw some conclusions about the conditions that might account for the nationalists’ more limited impact than on other occasions. First, the internal division among grassroots nationalists on the subject of which policy Russia should follow towards Ukraine has weakened nationalists. Second, the collaboration of grassroots nationalists with pro-governmental organizations has further polarized the nationalist camp and has helped the government co-opt their frames. Third, increased state pressure on those nationalists critical of the Kremlin’s policies has further weakened the grassroots nationalist opposition as a whole.
I disseminated RUSNAT’s findings at my host institution (through three seminars and and the organisation of a workshop) and internationally (through fifteen conferences and workshops and six invited lectures). I published four refereed journal articles in English and Spanish and signed a contract for my first monograph with Manchester University Press. I am editing a special issue on the comparative study of far-right non-state actors and foreign policy within Western and post-communist countries (accepted by leading peer-review journal Geopolitics). My outreach activities include articles and podcasts in the UK outlet for disseminating scholarly research to the broader public The Conversation and the podcast series of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism.
RUSNAT’s main findings are that Russian grassroots nationalists exercised a significant impact on the agenda-setting process with regard to the issue of Novorossiya — the political ideal of a land that Russian-backed insurgents in Eastern Ukraine were fighting for — and how the Kremlin presented Russian foreign policy to the public. They have also become a tool of foreign policy, as they were allowed to stage public events in favour of Novorossiya, also in alliance with pro-governmental organizations, and to send paramilitary troops to Donbass. Evidence on influence on actual policy, however, is weak. Comparing this case to the influence that nationalists have exercised on governmental discourse and — probably — agenda-setting in the field of immigration in the 2000s, we can draw some conclusions about the conditions that might account for the nationalists’ more limited impact than on other occasions. First, the internal division among grassroots nationalists on the subject of which policy Russia should follow towards Ukraine has weakened nationalists. Second, the collaboration of grassroots nationalists with pro-governmental organizations has further polarized the nationalist camp and has helped the government co-opt their frames. Third, increased state pressure on those nationalists critical of the Kremlin’s policies has further weakened the grassroots nationalist opposition as a whole.
I disseminated RUSNAT’s findings at my host institution (through three seminars and and the organisation of a workshop) and internationally (through fifteen conferences and workshops and six invited lectures). I published four refereed journal articles in English and Spanish and signed a contract for my first monograph with Manchester University Press. I am editing a special issue on the comparative study of far-right non-state actors and foreign policy within Western and post-communist countries (accepted by leading peer-review journal Geopolitics). My outreach activities include articles and podcasts in the UK outlet for disseminating scholarly research to the broader public The Conversation and the podcast series of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism.
My research theorises the relationship between nationalism and populism in Russian foreign-policy discourse. My articles (with Philipp Casula) “Russian nationalism shifting. The selective use of populism and nationalism for a new pan-Russian identity after the Annexation of Crimea” in Demokratizatsiya (2018) and “Justificaciones populistas de la guerra? La intervención rusa en el este de Ucrania” in Revista CIDOB d’ Afers Internacionals (2019) were among the very first to suggest that populism could offer a better theoretical framework than nationalism for understanding the Kremlin’s discourse around the conflict in Ukraine. These articles have initiated a debate on the ways that authoritarian leaders make use of populist, as opposed to merely nationalist, tropes, in order to justify their foreign policies. As my work shows, the Russian leadership used populist discursive strategies to articulate a new vision of identity to residents of Crimea and nationalist narratives when addressing domestic audiences.
My work also introduces a framework that enables Russia to be compared to other political settings, including EU states in both domestic and international politics. This comparative perspective allows for a better understanding of the political strategies of both nationalist and populist political actors across different societies. RUSNAT’s findings can form the basis for a comparative study of non-state actors’ influence in authoritarian and democratic contexts. My article “Movement adaptability in dissimilar settings: The far right in Greece and Russia” published in European Societies (2018, with Katrin Uba) highlights the commonalities and differences between the ways that far-right movements adapt to their specific political environments in Russia and an EU democracy.
RUSNAT can help policy-makers identify grassroots anti-democratic actors and understand how non-state nationalist actors can have the Kremlin’s ear on some occasions. EU policy-makers can also anticipate what narratives the Russian government may use to justify its policies in the making of foreign policy on very sensitive areas. Finally, it can help policy-makers to better anticipate the influence of nationalist and far-right actors on interethnic relations with neighbouring countries and to assess more consistently whether EU’s policies towards its Eastern neighbours can be better adapted in light of a changing Russian foreign policy, especially when the official narrative borrows frames from grassroots nationalist actors. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, justified by Putin’s government with reference to distorted historical narratives, highlights particularly clear that, in order for the EU to coordinate an effective response to Russia’s actions, a thorough understanding of public discourses within Russia is essential, the topic to whose study RUSNAT has contributed.
My work also introduces a framework that enables Russia to be compared to other political settings, including EU states in both domestic and international politics. This comparative perspective allows for a better understanding of the political strategies of both nationalist and populist political actors across different societies. RUSNAT’s findings can form the basis for a comparative study of non-state actors’ influence in authoritarian and democratic contexts. My article “Movement adaptability in dissimilar settings: The far right in Greece and Russia” published in European Societies (2018, with Katrin Uba) highlights the commonalities and differences between the ways that far-right movements adapt to their specific political environments in Russia and an EU democracy.
RUSNAT can help policy-makers identify grassroots anti-democratic actors and understand how non-state nationalist actors can have the Kremlin’s ear on some occasions. EU policy-makers can also anticipate what narratives the Russian government may use to justify its policies in the making of foreign policy on very sensitive areas. Finally, it can help policy-makers to better anticipate the influence of nationalist and far-right actors on interethnic relations with neighbouring countries and to assess more consistently whether EU’s policies towards its Eastern neighbours can be better adapted in light of a changing Russian foreign policy, especially when the official narrative borrows frames from grassroots nationalist actors. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, justified by Putin’s government with reference to distorted historical narratives, highlights particularly clear that, in order for the EU to coordinate an effective response to Russia’s actions, a thorough understanding of public discourses within Russia is essential, the topic to whose study RUSNAT has contributed.