Through RUSNAT, I developed a new theoretical framework to study the potential influence of grassroots nationalist non-state actors on foreign policy and undertook rigorous methodological training, intensive Russian language training and policy briefing training. The data I gathered on the ideologies of Russian nationalists and the position of the Russian government on the events in Ukraine shows that the imperialist branch of grassroots Russian nationalism (Eurasia Party, Other Russia, Novorossiya movement) was hailing the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass right from its onset. Civic and ethnic nationalists, however, whose main demand is the establishment of a nation-state, were divided in two blocks: “Russian Spring” supporters (Russian National Democratic Party, National Socialist Initiative) agreed with the Kremlin’s moves, while “Russian Spring” opponents (Party of Nationalists) were critical of Putin’s strategy towards Ukraine.
RUSNAT’s main findings are that Russian grassroots nationalists exercised a significant impact on the agenda-setting process with regard to the issue of Novorossiya — the political ideal of a land that Russian-backed insurgents in Eastern Ukraine were fighting for — and how the Kremlin presented Russian foreign policy to the public. They have also become a tool of foreign policy, as they were allowed to stage public events in favour of Novorossiya, also in alliance with pro-governmental organizations, and to send paramilitary troops to Donbass. Evidence on influence on actual policy, however, is weak. Comparing this case to the influence that nationalists have exercised on governmental discourse and — probably — agenda-setting in the field of immigration in the 2000s, we can draw some conclusions about the conditions that might account for the nationalists’ more limited impact than on other occasions. First, the internal division among grassroots nationalists on the subject of which policy Russia should follow towards Ukraine has weakened nationalists. Second, the collaboration of grassroots nationalists with pro-governmental organizations has further polarized the nationalist camp and has helped the government co-opt their frames. Third, increased state pressure on those nationalists critical of the Kremlin’s policies has further weakened the grassroots nationalist opposition as a whole.
I disseminated RUSNAT’s findings at my host institution (through three seminars and and the organisation of a workshop) and internationally (through fifteen conferences and workshops and six invited lectures). I published four refereed journal articles in English and Spanish and signed a contract for my first monograph with Manchester University Press. I am editing a special issue on the comparative study of far-right non-state actors and foreign policy within Western and post-communist countries (accepted by leading peer-review journal Geopolitics). My outreach activities include articles and podcasts in the UK outlet for disseminating scholarly research to the broader public The Conversation and the podcast series of the Association for the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism.
