The project was splitted into two separate experimental studies.
The first study used modified Ultimatum Games to examine how two forms of power affect bargaining behavior and fairness perceptions, and how meritocratic considerations are incorporated into the fairness perceptions of powerful and powerless individuals. We identified an asymmetric power effect: having increased decision power increased self-advantageous allocations and self-serving fairness perceptions, whereas the combined lack of both power forms led to self-disadvantageous allocations but had no influence on fairness perceptions (Figure 1; luck condition). The power effect on fairness perceptions became symmetric when power was obtained through a meritocratic process (procedural justice; Figure 1; effort condition). We provide causal evidence that the powerful, but not the powerless, strive to minimize cognitive dissonance between behavior and fairness perceptions by interpreting fairness in self-serving ways. Taken together, these findings suggest that disadvantaged individuals may recognize the unfairness of wealth distribution, but they tolerate unfair distributions given their powerless position.
This conclusion raised the next question that I tried to address in the second study: To what extent the lack of political power of disadvantaged individuals affects their reactions to growing inequality? Specifically, I examined two distinct explanations of the inequality paradox. The first and most prominent explanation for the inequality paradox posits that reduced support for redistribution stems from increased meritocratic beliefs and increased optimism about the prospects of upward mobility (POUM hypothesis). An alternative and yet unexplored explanation postulates that low political efficacy of disadvantaged individuals undermines collective demand for redistribution.
In two preregistered studies, I create a dynamic interactive environment (Figure 2) where low-income individuals can collectively reduce intergroup inequality by contributing to a public pool (redistribution strategy), compete with each other for a high-income group position (mobility strategy), or avoid risks and disengage from both strategies (inaction strategy). Low political efficacy gradually crowded out demand for redistribution, while exposure to high prospects of mobility had no significant impact on redistribution (Figure 3).
The design and the findings of both studies were presented in internal seminars at SBE such as the BEELab meetings and the Neuroeconomics meetings. Preliminary results of both studies were also presented in the Social Psychology of Inequality lab in the University of Granada and in the Social and Political Psychology lab of Panteion University in Athens. To reach the wider scientific community, my findings were also presented in international conferences such as the NeuroPsychoEconomics Conferences, the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP) and the Social Affective Neuroscience Society (SANS) meeting.
The published article (Scientific Reports) is and the submitted article (PNAS) will be open access, and data and materials are shared through the Open Science Framework platform. The design and the hypotheses of both studies were preregistered in the Open Science Framework platform.
Part of this work was also presented at the M-BEPS symposium (MBE) which facilitates a dialogue between academics, and decision-makers in firms and public institutions including the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission.
