1.2.1 Work Package 1: Interpretation: Aristotle’s originally intended scope of formal causation
Objective: Investigate Aristotle’s originally intended scope of the formal cause and its relation to the other causes.
This WP resulted in one forthcoming paper, “The Formal Cause among the four Aitiai: Is it Redundant?”, co-authored with Ludger Jansen, which was first presented as “Die Formursache unter den vier aitiai” at a conference in Marburg (06.10.2022) and will be published in a conference proceeding. The paper explores the relation between the formal cause and Aristotle’s other three causes, discusses the relevant suggestions in the literature, and defends the view that the formal cause is not made redundant by any of the other causes.
1.2.2 Work package 2: Formal causation and occurrents (processes and events)
Objective: Apply formal causation to occurrent entities like processes.
This WP resulted in one draft paper, which will be ready for submission later this year. The paper, “Crossing Impassable Boundaries – Aristotle on the Essential Limits of Processes”, was presented (online) at a conference in Verbania, Italy (08.06.2023) and an earlier draft was presented for an internal seminar at the Philosophy Department at Reading (10.02.2022). I show that occurrents are central to Aristotle’s discussion in Posterior Analytics II, e.g. lunar eclipses, thunder, and leaf shedding. I develop a model of formal causes for occurrents. This model gives a way of identifying the real definition of occurrents.
1.2.3 Work package 3: Mereology: Formal Causation and mereological accounts of forms
Objective: Investigate whether hylomorphic compounds can be thought of as mereological compounds of different parts, and the implication of this view for formal causation.
This WP resulted in one draft paper, which will be ready for submission later this year. Parts of the paper (under the title “Lowe and Aristotle on Matter”) was presented (online) at the open session of the 96th Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind association, at St. Andrews (10.07.2022). I defend a position inspired by Jonathan Lowe, where matter is understood as a substance’s material parts. The position is distinct from both traditional accounts of hylomorphism (e.g. as defended by David Oderberg), and from mereological accounts (e.g. Kit Fine, Kathrin Koslicki). I make use of the distinction, which I argue is found in Aristotle, between dependent and independent parts, and suggest a solution to elemental transformation.
1.2.4 Work package 4: New Mechanists’: Mechanisms, formal causation and downward causation
Objective: Investigate whether formal causation is a type of downward causation, and whether ‘new mechanists’ need an account of formal causation.
This WP resulted in a draft paper, entitled “The New Mechanists Need Kinds as Explanantia”, and is planned to submit for publication during first half of 2024. The paper was accepted for presentation at ECAP 11, Vienna 21-25.08.23 however I was unable to travel to Vienna as it intervened with my move to Norway to take up my new position (from 01.09.23). As part of this WP, I supervised an undergraduate student as part of the Undergraduate Research Opportunity at Reading (UROP for short) in summer 2022. The student participated in our meetings on this WP, read the assigned literature, and prepared a poster on the topic. I argue that the New Mechanists need to explicitly (most already do so implicitly) allow for kinds as explanantia, and further to accept a type of defeasible laws of nature. I suggest that formal causation can provide a framework for doing so, and that this framework is consistent with the New Mechanist’s tenets.
1.2.5 Work package 5: Metaphysical Explanation: Formal Causation and metaphysical explanations
Objective: Show that formal causation is a type of metaphysical explanation.
A draft paper was the result of this WP, and it was presented 26.10.2022 at the Grounding and Metaphysical Explanation work-in-progress group at University of Southampton. The paper is planned to submit for publication during first half of 2024. Making use of a criterion devloped by Alastair Wilson, I develop an account where essences can be explanantia in metaphysical explanations directly, while also being explanantia in causal explanation indirectly.
