Periodic Reporting for period 1 - MEMOCAUSE (A Theory of Memory Causation)
Berichtszeitraum: 2022-10-01 bis 2025-09-30
On the causal theory of memory, remembering an event requires a causal connection to a past experience. I can remember my last birthday because I have experienced it before. On the simulation theory, in contrast, remembering a past event is very much like imagining a future one: in both cases, a causal connection to a first-hand experience of the event is not necessary. The debate between causalists and simulationists has been at center stage in the thriving new field of philosophy of memory. Despite this, there has been no systematic analysis of the notion of causation relevant to memory. As a result, the nature of memory causation has remained largely unexplored.
This project aimed to fill this significant lacuna. It aimed to develop the first comprehensive theory of memory causation, bringing together results from the philosophy of causation and the interdisciplinary study of memory. It will aim to clarify what it means to say that memories are caused by past experiences and to establish whether such causation is necessary. The project's core thesis is that claim about memory causation should be relativized to causal models — mathematical models that represent the functional relationships between variables in a system. A memory is caused by a past experience iff, relative to an appropriate model of the memory system, it
is counterfactually dependent on it, but only in precisely defined contexts. If all memories are so dependent, then causation is necessary for remembering. With a proper formulation, the causal necessity thesis can be assessed. The project established that the thesis, while facing substantial difficulties, has not been overturned by the available empirical evidence. This allows for the formulation of a new generation of naturalist causal theories of memory.
This project aimed to fill this significant lacuna. It aimed to develop the first comprehensive theory of memory causation, bringing together results from the philosophy of causation and the interdisciplinary study of memory. It will aim to clarify what it means to say that memories are caused by past experiences and to establish whether such causation is necessary. The project's core thesis is that claim about memory causation should be relativized to causal models — mathematical models that represent the functional relationships between variables in a system. A memory is caused by a past experience iff, relative to an appropriate model of the memory system, it
is counterfactually dependent on it, but only in precisely defined contexts. If all memories are so dependent, then causation is necessary for remembering. With a proper formulation, the causal necessity thesis can be assessed. The project established that the thesis, while facing substantial difficulties, has not been overturned by the available empirical evidence. This allows for the formulation of a new generation of naturalist causal theories of memory.
The research WP consisted of four phases, corresponding to the four research objectives. In the first phase, I worked on establishing that claims of singular causation in episodic memory, as well as claims about the function of episodic memory, should be relativized to appropriate scientific models of the episodic memory
system. The resulting paper "Autonoesis and the Galilean science of memory" motivates these claims by providing a historical perspective on the scientific study of memory systems. In "Naturalism and simulationism in the philosophy of memory", co-authored with Kourken Michaelian, I similarly argued that anti-causalist theories like simulationism are best understood as proposals about the nature and proper functioning of the episodic memory system. In the second phase, I leveraged these results to argue that memory traces, hypothesized to secure singular causal paths in episodic memory, are structurally complex entities with a file structure. I presented this proposal in "Engrams as mental files". In the third phase of the project, I worked on articulating a thesis of necessity in episodic memory appropriate for the naturalistic framing of the causalism-anticausalism debate. The result was presented in the forthcoming article "Memory and causation" and will be
presented in a more expanded form in "Memory and the necessity of appropriate causation", to be submitted for publication by the end of 2025. In the fourth phase of the research, I moved on to reviewing the evidence for and against the causal necessity thesis. The preliminary results
were presented in "Eliminating episodic memory?" and "A dilemma for simulationism". "Memory and the necessity of the appropriate causation", which is expected to be a kind of capstone for the project, will provide a more thorough assessment of the causal necessity thesis.
system. The resulting paper "Autonoesis and the Galilean science of memory" motivates these claims by providing a historical perspective on the scientific study of memory systems. In "Naturalism and simulationism in the philosophy of memory", co-authored with Kourken Michaelian, I similarly argued that anti-causalist theories like simulationism are best understood as proposals about the nature and proper functioning of the episodic memory system. In the second phase, I leveraged these results to argue that memory traces, hypothesized to secure singular causal paths in episodic memory, are structurally complex entities with a file structure. I presented this proposal in "Engrams as mental files". In the third phase of the project, I worked on articulating a thesis of necessity in episodic memory appropriate for the naturalistic framing of the causalism-anticausalism debate. The result was presented in the forthcoming article "Memory and causation" and will be
presented in a more expanded form in "Memory and the necessity of appropriate causation", to be submitted for publication by the end of 2025. In the fourth phase of the research, I moved on to reviewing the evidence for and against the causal necessity thesis. The preliminary results
were presented in "Eliminating episodic memory?" and "A dilemma for simulationism". "Memory and the necessity of the appropriate causation", which is expected to be a kind of capstone for the project, will provide a more thorough assessment of the causal necessity thesis.
Main results:
1. Development of a new kind of, naturalistically oriented and formally precise, kind of causalism about episodic memory, which presents a new theoretical option in the philosophical and psychological literature.
2. Development of a novel view of memory traces as structurally complex, file-like entities that play causal, informational, and referential roles in episodic memory.
3. A comprehensive defense of the causal necessity thesis in episodic memory, supported by emerging evidence from the sciences of memory.
The project's primary impact is on developments in the philosophy of memory. Three project ideas, presented in the published articles, have been most impactful, as evidence by the citations and the further development of the ideas by other authors. The first pertains to the characterization of claims about memory causation as constitutively linked to claims about the functioning of memory systems, which has motivated recent mechanistic interpretations of the causalism-anticausalism debates. The second is the formulation of a naturalist causalist theory, which employs a notion of physical, model-dependent necessity not characteristic of classical causal theories. This idea significantly impacts the modern debate about causation in episodic memory. The third pertains to the nature and functional role of memory traces and connects to developments in the sciences of memory, including in computational and experimental neuroscience. Despite the recency of their publication, project-related articles have already been cited more than 50 times. A welcome development is the growing interest psychologists and neuroscientists demonstrated for these ideas, as evidence by the engagement with them in academic articles and the invitations to participate in interdisciplinary meetings on memory and memory representation.
1. Development of a new kind of, naturalistically oriented and formally precise, kind of causalism about episodic memory, which presents a new theoretical option in the philosophical and psychological literature.
2. Development of a novel view of memory traces as structurally complex, file-like entities that play causal, informational, and referential roles in episodic memory.
3. A comprehensive defense of the causal necessity thesis in episodic memory, supported by emerging evidence from the sciences of memory.
The project's primary impact is on developments in the philosophy of memory. Three project ideas, presented in the published articles, have been most impactful, as evidence by the citations and the further development of the ideas by other authors. The first pertains to the characterization of claims about memory causation as constitutively linked to claims about the functioning of memory systems, which has motivated recent mechanistic interpretations of the causalism-anticausalism debates. The second is the formulation of a naturalist causalist theory, which employs a notion of physical, model-dependent necessity not characteristic of classical causal theories. This idea significantly impacts the modern debate about causation in episodic memory. The third pertains to the nature and functional role of memory traces and connects to developments in the sciences of memory, including in computational and experimental neuroscience. Despite the recency of their publication, project-related articles have already been cited more than 50 times. A welcome development is the growing interest psychologists and neuroscientists demonstrated for these ideas, as evidence by the engagement with them in academic articles and the invitations to participate in interdisciplinary meetings on memory and memory representation.