Foundations for Sustainable Security

Informazioni relative al progetto

FSSec

ID dell’accordo di sovvenzione: 101076409

DOI

10.3030/101076409

Data della firma CE 26 Gennaio 2023

Data di avvio 1 Marzo 2023

Data di completamento 29 Febbraio 2028

Finanziato da

• European Research Council (ERC)

Costo totale

€ 1 498 489,00

Contributo UE

€ 1 498 489,00

Coordinato da

TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITAET GRAZ
Austria

CORDIS fornisce collegamenti ai risultati finali pubblici e alle pubblicazioni dei progetti ORIZZONTE.

I link ai risultati e alle pubblicazioni dei progetti del 7° PQ, così come i link ad alcuni tipi di risultati specifici come dataset e software, sono recuperati dinamicamente da .OpenAIRE .

Risultati finali

Data Management Plan (1)

Data Management plan

Pubblicazioni

Conference proceedings (20)

KernelSnitch: Side-Channel Attacks on Kernel Data Structures

Autori: Lukas Maar, Jonas Juffinger, Thomas Steinbauer, Daniel Gruss, Stefan Mangard
Pubblicato in: Proceedings 2024 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, 2024
Editore: Internet Society

Collide+Power: Leaking Inaccessible Data with Software-based Power Side Channels

Autori: Andreas Kogler, Jonas Juffinger, Lukas Giner, Lukas Gerlach, Martin Schwarzl, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Stefan Mangard
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 32nd USENIX Security Symposium, 2023, ISBN 978-1-939133-37-3
Editore: USENIX Association

Systematic Analysis of Kernel Security Performance and Energy Costs

Autori: Fabian Rauscher, Benedict Herzog, Timo Hönig, Daniel Gruss
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 20th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2025
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3708821.3736197

Generic and Automated Drive-by GPU Cache Attacks from the Browser

Autori: Lukas Giner, Roland Czerny, Christoph Gruber, Fabian Rauscher, Andreas Kogler, Daniel De Almeida Braga, Daniel Gruss
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 19th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2024
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3634737.3656283

CacheWarp: Software-based Fault Injection using Selective State Reset

Autori: Ruiyi Zhang, Lukas Gerlach, Daniel Weber, Lorenz Hetterich, Youheng Lü, Andreas Kogler, Michael Schwarz
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 33rd USENIX Security Symposium, 2024, ISBN 978-1-939133-44-1
Editore: USENIX Association

TDXploit: Novel Techniques for Single-Stepping and Cache Attacks on Intel TDX

Autori: Fabian Rauscher, Luca Wilke, Hannes Weissteiner, Thomas Eisenbarth, Daniel Gruss
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 34th USENIX Security Symposium, 2025, ISBN 978-1-939133-52-6
Editore: USENIX Association

TEEcorrelate: An Information-Preserving Defense against Performance-Counter Attacks on TEEs

Autori: Hannes Weissteiner, Fabian Rauscher, Robin Leander Schröder, Jonas Juffinger, Stefan Gast, Jan Wichelmann, Thomas Eisenbarth, Daniel Gruss
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 34th USENIX Security Symposium, 2025, ISBN 978-1-939133-52-6
Editore: USENIX Association

Remote Scheduler Contention Attacks

Autori: Stefan Gast, Jonas Juffinger, Lukas Maar, Christoph Royer, Andreas Kogler, Daniel Gruss
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 2024, ISSN 0302-9743
Editore: Springer

SUIT: Secure Undervolting with Instruction Traps

Autori: Jonas Juffinger, Stepan Kalinin, Daniel Gruss, Frank Mueller
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 29th ACM International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems, Volume 2, 2024
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3620665.3640373

CounterSEVeillance: Performance-Counter Attacks on AMD SEV-SNP

Autori: Stefan Gast, Hannes Weissteiner, Robin Leander Schröder, Daniel Gruss
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium 2025, 2025, ISBN 979-8-9894372-8-3
Editore: Internet Society
DOI: 10.14722/NDSS.2025.241038

SnailLoad: Exploiting Remote Network Latency Measurements without JavaScript

Autori: Stefan Gast, Roland Czerny, Jonas Juffinger, Fabian Rauscher, Simone Franza, Daniel Gruss
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 33rd USENIX Security Symposium, 2024
Editore: USENIX Association

Cross-Core Interrupt Detection: Exploiting User and Virtualized IPIs

Autori: Fabian Rauscher, Daniel Gruss
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 2024 on ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2025
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3658644.3690242

SLUBStick: Arbitrary Memory Writes through Practical Software Cross-Cache Attacks within the Linux Kernel

Autori: Lukas Maar, Stefan Gast, Martin Unterguggenberger, Mathias Oberhuber, Stefan Mangard
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 33rd USENIX Security Symposium, 2024
Editore: USENIX Association

Power-Related Side-Channel Attacks using the Android Sensor Framework

Autori: Mathias Oberhuber, Martin Unterguggenberger, Lukas Maar, Andreas Kogler, Stefan Mangard
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium 2025, 2025
Editore: Internet Society

IdleLeak: Exploiting Idle State Side Effects for Information Leakage

Autori: Fabian Rauscher, Andreas Kogler, Jonas Juffinger, Daniel Gruss
Pubblicato in: Proceedings 2024 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, 2024
Editore: Internet Society
DOI: 10.14722/NDSS.2024.24078

A Systematic Evaluation of Novel and Existing Cache Side Channels

Autori: Fabian Rauscher, Carina Fiedler, Andreas Kogler, Daniel Gruss
Pubblicato in: Proceedings 2025 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, 2025
Editore: Internet Society

When Good Kernel Defenses Go Bad: Reliable and Stable Kernel Exploits via Defense-Amplified TLB Side-Channel Leaks

Autori: Lukas Maar, Lukas Giner, Daniel Gruss, Stefan Mangard
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 34th USENIX Security Symposium, 2025, ISBN 978-1-939133-52-6
Editore: USENIX Association

Presshammer: Rowhammer and Rowpress Without Physical Address Information

Autori: Jonas Juffinger, Sudheendra Raghav Neela, Martin Heckel, Lukas Schwarz, Florian Adamsky, Daniel Gruss
Pubblicato in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, 2024
Editore: Springer Nature Switzerland
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-64171-8_24

Not So Secure TSC

Autori: Jonas Juffinger, Sudheendra Raghav Neela, Daniel Gruss
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the International Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS), 2025
Editore: Springer

Secret Spilling Drive: Leaking User Behavior through SSD Contention

Autori: Jonas Juffinger, Fabian Rauscher, Giuseppe La Manna, Daniel Gruss
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium 2025, 2025
Editore: Internet Society

Book chapters (4)

The HMB Timing Side Channel: Exploiting the SSD’s Host Memory Buffer

Autori: Jonas Juffinger, Hannes Weissteiner, Thomas Steinbauer, Daniel Gruss
Pubblicato in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, 2025
Editore: Springer Nature Switzerland
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-97620-9_10

Fast and Efficient Secure L1 Caches for SMT

Autori: Lukas Giner, Roland Czerny, Simon Lammer, Aaron Giner, Paul Gollob, Jonas Juffinger, Daniel Gruss
Pubblicato in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Availability, Reliability and Security, 2025
Editore: Springer Nature Switzerland
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-00627-1_6

Cohere+Reload: Re-enabling High-Resolution Cache Attacks on AMD SEV-SNP

Autori: Lukas Giner, Sudheendra Raghav Neela, Daniel Gruss
Pubblicato in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, 2025
Editore: Springer Nature Switzerland
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-97620-9_11

Zero-Click SnailLoad: From Minimal to No User Interaction

Autori: Stefan Gast, Nora Puntigam, Simone Franza, Sudheendra Raghav Neela, Daniel Gruss, Johanna Ullrich
Pubblicato in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Computer Security – ESORICS 2025, 2025
Editore: Springer Nature Switzerland
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-07901-5_6