Final Report Summary - BELIEFS AND EMOTIONS (The Role of Beliefs about Control in Emotion Regulation)
Successful emotion regulation is critical for mental health and adjustment (Kring & Sloan, 2009; Vingerhoets, Nyklicek, & Denollet, 2008). This research focused on one factor that might promote successful emotion regulation – namely, beliefs about the controllability of emotions. In order for people to try to self-regulate, they must believe that what they try to change can be controlled (e.g. Bandura, 1977; Dweck, 1999). People differ in the belief that emotions can be controlled (Tamir, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2007). People who believe that emotions are less amenable to control tend to experience less positive and more negative emotions in response to negative events (e.g. Catanzaro, 1996; Tamir, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2007). The mechanism underlying these associations, however, has remained elusive. This research, therefore, tested whether people who believe that emotions are controllable are better able to regulate their emotions, and consequently experience more positive and less negative emotions.
First, in a series of studies we manipulated beliefs about the controllability of emotions and tested their causal effects on subsequent emotion regulation. These studies provided some evidence that beliefs about the controllability of emotions are responsible for more effective emotion regulation. Leading people to believe they can change how they feel makes them more effective in changing their emotional experiences.
Second, in a series of studies we tested whether the ability to use effective regulation strategies (e.g. cognitive reappraisal; Gross, 1998) results in more effective emotion regulation, but only in people who believe emotions can be controlled. For example, in one study, participants recollected negative events and were asked to decrease negative reactions to them. Participants were more likely to decrease their negative emotions the more they used cognitive reappraisal and the more they believed emotions can be controlled. In another study, participants either received training in cognitive reappraisal or not and were asked to regulate their emotions in response to negative political events. People who were trained in using reappraisal were more effective at decreasing their negative reactions, but only if they believed emotions can be controlled. Together, these findings demonstrate that people are able to effectively regulate their emotions if they have the tools to do so (i.e. they can use an effective regulation strategy, such as cognitive reappraisal), and if they believe emotions can be controlled.
Third, we tested beliefs about the controllability of emotions in clinically depressed individuals. In these studies, instead of instructing depressed individuals to decrease negative emotions we allowed them to determine whether they try to decrease or maintain their sadness. We discovered that depressed individuals were more likely to try to decrease their sadness the more they believed emotions can be controlled. Such findings suggest that in order for depressed individuals to try to decrease their sadness they must believe that emotions can be controlled.
Together these findings illuminate the role of beliefs about controllability of emotions in shaping emotion regulation, and point to possible interventions that might promote effective regulation of negative emotions in both healthy and clinical populations.
First, in a series of studies we manipulated beliefs about the controllability of emotions and tested their causal effects on subsequent emotion regulation. These studies provided some evidence that beliefs about the controllability of emotions are responsible for more effective emotion regulation. Leading people to believe they can change how they feel makes them more effective in changing their emotional experiences.
Second, in a series of studies we tested whether the ability to use effective regulation strategies (e.g. cognitive reappraisal; Gross, 1998) results in more effective emotion regulation, but only in people who believe emotions can be controlled. For example, in one study, participants recollected negative events and were asked to decrease negative reactions to them. Participants were more likely to decrease their negative emotions the more they used cognitive reappraisal and the more they believed emotions can be controlled. In another study, participants either received training in cognitive reappraisal or not and were asked to regulate their emotions in response to negative political events. People who were trained in using reappraisal were more effective at decreasing their negative reactions, but only if they believed emotions can be controlled. Together, these findings demonstrate that people are able to effectively regulate their emotions if they have the tools to do so (i.e. they can use an effective regulation strategy, such as cognitive reappraisal), and if they believe emotions can be controlled.
Third, we tested beliefs about the controllability of emotions in clinically depressed individuals. In these studies, instead of instructing depressed individuals to decrease negative emotions we allowed them to determine whether they try to decrease or maintain their sadness. We discovered that depressed individuals were more likely to try to decrease their sadness the more they believed emotions can be controlled. Such findings suggest that in order for depressed individuals to try to decrease their sadness they must believe that emotions can be controlled.
Together these findings illuminate the role of beliefs about controllability of emotions in shaping emotion regulation, and point to possible interventions that might promote effective regulation of negative emotions in both healthy and clinical populations.