Final Report Summary - SARGEN_IV (Proposal for a harmonized European methodology for the safety assessment of innovative reactors with fast neutron spectrum planned to be built in Europe)
Executive Summary:
The aim of SARGEN_IV is to propose a European framework for the safety assessment of Generation (GEN) IV closed cycle reactors as part of the ESNII. To achieve this objective it will be necessary to bring together Euro¬pean designers, Technical Safety Organisations (TSOs), research organi¬sations and utilities companies already involved (or soon to be involved) in innovative reactors, so they can consolidate their work and suggest a harmonised European state-of-art safety methodology representing the Euratom contribution to the Generation IV International Forum (GIF).
The project last from January 2012 to December 2013 with 22 partners from 12 Members States (+ European Union) and the partners’ complementariness is based on:
• Experts from designers, R&D organizations and universities having each a high knowledge on at least one the four selected innovative reactors (CEA, AREVA, SCK-CEN, AMEC, ANSALDO, KIT, UJV, VUJE, AEKI, HZDR).
• Safety experts from all ETSON members (IRSN, GRS, VTT, UVJ, VUJE, LEI, BELV) and from other organizations and universities (UNIMAN, PSI, JRC, UPM, ENEA).
• One of the most important electricity producer (EDF) in Europe and in the world with 75% of its production coming from nuclear power plants and which was also largely involved of the French SFR Superphénix and Phénix operation.
• A university (RWTH) able to organize communication and dissemination communication with also including in its staff a specialist of gas cooled reactors.
It is expected that the depth and scope of the R&D needed to demonstrate adequate safety of the ESNII prototypes and demonstrators will be significantly impacted by the safety assessment methodology for these kinds of reactors proposed in SARGEN_IV. The harmonisation of the different methodologies is crucial for developing a consistent assessment platform which could be used effectively in the decision-making process and to make the different innovative reactor types publicly accept¬able in Europe.
Project Context and Objectives:
The “European Sustainable Nuclear Industrial Initiative” (ESNII) was launched in November 2010 under the SET-Plan to anticipate the development of a fleet of fast reactors with closed cycle which will support the sustainable use of natural resources. Among the fast neutrons technologies, three of them have been selected, which are also part of the six ones proposed in the Generation IV systems.
The ESNII roadmap includes:
- The Sodium cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) with the ASTRID prototype supported by the French government whose beginning operation is expected around 2020.
- The Lead cooled Fast Reactor (LFR) with the ALFRED demonstrator whose beginning operation is expected around 2025. ALFRED will be preceded by the irradiation fast spectrum facility MYRRHA able to test both the Accelerator Driven System (ADS) technology and the LFR technologies; MYRRHA is supported by the Belgian government and Romania has expressed availability for hosting the ALFRED demonstrator.
- The Gas cooled Fast Reactor (GFR) with the ALLEGRO demonstrator for which a Memorandum of Understanding has signed between three organizations coming from Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia.
With the aim of preparing the future assessment of these advanced reactor concepts, the SARGEN_IV Project is intended to gather safety experts from recognized EuropeanTechnical Safety Organizations - TSOs -, the Joint Research Centre of the EC, Designers and Vendors as well as from Research Institutes and Universities to:
- identify and rank the safety issues relative to the four above mentioned concepts,
- develop and provide a tentative commonly agreed methodology for the safety assessment, relying on the outcomes of the investigations carried out within current international programmes and on national practices presently in use,
- detect and underline new fields for R&D in the safety area (addressing methodological, theoretical and experimental issues, as well) and provide a roadmap and preliminary deployment plan for the fast reactor safety-related R&D.
The project beneficiaries are convinced that fostering the harmonization of the various European safety approaches will be very beneficial and will enable streamlining EURATOM contribution to Generation IV International Forum in the safety field, optimizing its involvement and providing feedbacks and dissemination at a European level. The project will also improve relations between safety assessment and research programmes, and therefore improving efficiency in the development of new concepts.
Project Results:
The technical results are provides within four work packages (WP) each corresponding to one of the issues presented in the executive summary
- WP2: identify and rank the safety issues relative to the four above mentioned concepts
- WP3: develop and provide a tentative commonly agreed methodology for the safety assessment, relying on the outcomes of the investigations carried out within current international programs and on national practices presently in use
- WP4: provide some tests of the safety assessment methodologies
- WP5 : detect and underline new fields for R&D in the safety area (addressing methodological, theoretical and experimental issues, as well) and provide a roadmap for a preliminary deployment plan for the fast reactor safety-related R&D.
1. WP2 : IDENTIFY AND RANK THE SAFETY ISSUES RELATIVE TO THE FOUR ABOVE MENTIONED CONCEPTS
The first four tasks (2.1 to 2.4) of WP2 aimed to identify the critical safety features for the four concepts proposed by ESNII according to the common three sections given hereafter.
a) Design overview
This section provides a description of the design to sufficient detail to be able to understand (with section 2) the critical safety features identified in section 3. Included is an overview of the primary system design, as well as some of the balance of plant.
b) Safety functions
This section outlines the safety functions and provides some details in what is implemented (including what the inherent characteristics) in the design for each of them. Safety functions to be addressed are reactivity control, Decay Heat Removal (DHR) systems, with emphasis on passive systems, and confinement of radioactive materials.
c) Identified critical safety features
This section provides the safety issues related to the design and operation of the specific concept, e.g. the risk related to the use of specific coolant, plant vulnerabilities to cope with accidents as for instance DHR, neutronics and thermal-hydraulic issues, etc.
Four deliverables (one per task) have been issued in due time:
• D2.1 for SFR
• D2.2 for LFR
• D2.3 for GFR
• D2.4 for the Fast Spectrum Facility
The task 2.5 uses the outcomes of Tasks 2.1 to 2.4 to identify a representative set of initiating events and transients for test application of the harmonized safety assessment methodologies to be performed within the Task 4.1 (WP4). The outcomes provide as well the guidance for the roadmap dedicated to the identification and prioritisation of R&D needs respective to the identified safety issues to be performed within the Task 5.2 (WP5).
Consistently with the objectives of the SARGEN_IV project and the fact that the four ESNII are at different stages of development and their designs are still evolving, Task 2.5 analyses do not involve a review of the appropriateness of specific design solutions and adequacy of safety demonstration for the individual ESNII systems. Neither is the goal of the present deliverable to propose safety options or provisions to be implemented.
To further systematise the consideration of safety issues and characteristics for a consistent build-up of the safety architecture and development of adequate provisions, Task 2.5 has aimed at categorising the individual issues identified for the ESNII concepts to several common “families”. We have adopted the categorisation according to:
• Common phenomena related to:
- Materials (fuel, coolant, structure, absorber)
- Aspects specific to fast reactors (power density, core compaction, reactivity void effect, risks due to handling operation, external events, core disruptive accident, considerations about on Fukushima-Daiichi TEPCO events)
- Aspects specific to design solutions envisaged for ESNII concepts, and
• Possible impact on the fulfilment of fundamental safety functions related to
- Control of reactivity, including
o Risk of control rod blockages,
o Reactivity change due to core compaction
o Reactivity change due to coolant boiling
o Inadvertent control rod withdrawal
- Removal of heat, including
o Flow blockage e.g due to corrosion products
o Coolant freezing
o Coolant depressurization
o Loss of flow paths
- Confinement of radioactive materials
It was also highlighted the necessity of the management of harmful materials able to provide results in releases of chemical toxic products.
Finally, a list of initiating events categorised according to challenges to confinement barriers and common phenomenology is given. For example, challenges to clad integrity are given hereafter:
a) Anomalies in reactivity and power distribution
• Inadvertent control rod withdrawal;
• Coolant heat-up (SFR, LFR, FASTEF) and boiling (SFR);
• Material/gas ingress in the core able to increase reactivity (cover gas or oil for SFR, LFR and MYRRHA/FASTEF; water/steam for LFR ALFRED, GFR ALLEGRO, and MYRRHA/FASTEF);
• Loss of coolant (GFR ALLEGRO);
• Change in core heat removal;
• Handling error (e.g. replacement of a control rod with a fuel subassembly);
• Core geometry change (e.g. core compaction, core support structure failure).
b) Decrease of fuel sub-assembly heat removal
• Partial or total blockage of a fuel subassembly (e.g. due to pollution by reaction products for LFR and MYRRHA/FASTEF);
• Local loss of heat removal (e.g. due to corrosion/erosion attack for LFR and MYRRHA/FASTEF);
• Decrease of the removal of heat from the reactor coolant system.
2. WP3 : DEVELOP AND PROVIDE A TENTATIVE AGREED METHODOLOGY FOR THE SAFETY ASSESSEMENT
Firstly, various safety methodologies are already (or will be) available that could be applied to the ESNII prototypes, pilot plants and demonstrators, which need to be analyzed and disseminated inside the SARGEN_IV consortium. These methodologies correspond to tasks 3.1. to 3.4
Task 3.1
Methodologies dedicated to innovative reactors and issued by the GIF Reactor Safety Working Group (RSWG) and by IAEA as the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) safety assessment methodology.
These methodologies were presented to the SARGEN_IV partners during a two-day work shop held at the JRC premises on March 28th and 29th 2012 by three experts from the IAEA and GIF-RSWG.
The minutes of the meeting constitute the deliverable D3.1.
Task 3.2
National safety approaches (France, Germany, Spain, Finland, Belgium) and the associated experience feedback in particular for the SFRs built in France and Germany as well as for the Finish European Pressurized Reactor (EPRTM).
These approaches are given in the deliverable D3.2.
Task 3.3
Safety approaches adopted in European collaborative projects related to the four concepts (CP-ESFR for SFR, LEADER for LFRs, GoFastR for GFR and CDT for FASTEF).
These approaches are given in the deliverable D3.3.
Task 3.4
Documents coming from international organizations such as the IAEA or the Western Europe Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA) and available for the safety assessment of innovative reactors including methodology used for the European NPP “stress tests”.
These approaches are given in the deliverable D3.4.
Secondly, some differences exist in the documents D3.1 to D3.4 and the objective is to provide harmonized safety assessment practices highlighting what is new and useful for innovative reactors: this is the objective is of Task 3.5.
Task 3.5
With using in particular the results coming from D3.1 to D3.4 , the SARGEN_IV consortium has issued the deliverable D3.5 “Proposal for a harmonization of the safety assessment practices”.
The main conclusions from Task 3.5 are given hereafter.
According to the documents D3.1 to D3.4 mentioned above, safety assessment should be performed for both reactor and fuel storage, in all plant states and conditions – including maintenance stages - over the lifetime of the installation, up to decommissioning. Waste management and workers radiological protection should also be taken into account. Moreover, human and organizational factors and man-induced situations are a part of the safety demonstration. Natural phenomena should be considered. Finally, security/safeguard aspects should be dealt in an integrated manner. Besides, chemical effects could be a challenging issue with regard to designs of GEN-IV reactors currently in consideration.
Ambitious safety objectives are targeted even though safety goals of GIF are not particularly prescriptive when specifying objectives for GEN-IV nuclear power plants (NPP). Nevertheless, the goal is to reduce potential consequences and impact on public, workers and environment as well as occurrence/frequency of failures, incidental and accidental situations.
The work highlights the importance of safety principles in achievement of safety objectives:
- Defense-In-Depth (DiD) principle remains fundamental. An overall reinforcement of DiD is expected for GEN-IV nuclear power plants, including improved independence between all levels of DiD. A particularly important issue for GEN-IV reactor could be to clearly define level 4 for each plant design.
- Other principles as barriers, As Low As Reasonable Achievable (ALARA) principle and As Low As Reasonable Practicable (ALARP) principle should also be enhanced.
- Concerning fundamental safety functions, an inherent approach should reinforce the fulfillment of fundamental safety functions e.g. the consequences for some situations should be reduced and the grace periods should be extended. For the same reason, the use of passive systems can be envisaged.
- Practical elimination is another important principle, but it requires in-depth analyses for GEN-IV NPP. Lastly, the need of two complementary and integrated approaches, the deterministic and the probabilistic ones, is reiterated.
A safety assessment should be performed with regard to safety objectives in particular those proposed by WENRA and considering safety principles, SARGEN_IV project proposes to use some methodologies such as the Qualitative Safety Features Review (QSR), the Objective Provision Tree (OPT) and the Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) for the global safety assessment process to provide feedback.
Concerning the detailed safety assessment, there is no clear specificity for GEN-IV NPP. Nevertheless, the comprehensive set of postulated initiating events could be quite different from GEN-III NPP. Moreover, they should be assessed with more stringent rules and acceptance criteria. Assessment of hazards would be a challenging aspect of next generation of NPP safety assessment and should be improved, which is confirmed by the first insights of Fukushima Daiichi TEPCO reactors accidents. These first insights, on the basis of the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) specifications and conclusions, should be extrapolated to new designs, which pose another challenge for GEN-IV NPP.
For example the total loss of power sources, the total loss of the ultimate heat sink(s) and the combination of both have to be considered with also the management of a severe accident in this case. Provisions to cope with these events notably to improve the grace period before cliff-edge effects and thus allowing back-up measures to be implemented have to be defined and should be considered as hardened equipment.
Conclusion about WP3
SARGEN_IV was the first tentative to harmonize the safety practices in side Europe between technical safety organizations, design companies, research centres and universities. The deliverable D3.5 results of a consensus from these organizations on many topics and may be considered as a work basis of the safety assessment of new reactors supported by ESNII.
3. WORK PACKAGE 4 (WP4) : PROVIDE SOME TESTS OF THE SAFETY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES
Task 4.1
ON this basis of the work performed within the WP2 Task 2.5 the Task 4.1 gives a representative set of initiating events
Task 4.2
Scope
Task 4.2 aimed to provide a test application of the safety assessment methodologies to a representative set of initiating events coming for WP4 task 4.1 with using some tools presented in the deliverable 3.5 with in particular the Objective Provision Tree (OPT), QSR tool (Qualitative Safety features Review), DPA (Deterministic and Phenomenological Analysis) and PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) which are part of Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology (ISAM) proposed by the GIF. The characteristics of the four reactor types collected in WP2 together with the categorization of transients into families in WP3 provide a basis for assessing the phenomena involved and the severity of the transients considered.
Studies performed
Five studies have been performed
- Application of the OPT tool to the decay removal function of the ALLEGRO gas cooled fast reactor (GFR),
- Application of the OPT tool to the decay removal function of a sodium cooled fast reactor (SFR),
- Application of the QSR and of the OPT to the FASTEF facility (cooled by lead-bismuth) to the FASTEF facility,
- Early phase of DPA (Deterministic and Phenomenological Analysis) tool and PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) tool on the loss of primary coolant of the ALLEGRO GFR,
- Identification of gaps and areas for the codes used for system analyses in the scope of further R&D.
Conclusions
This test application has provided an opportunity to understand the safety architecture of the proposed harmonized European safety methodology and the importance, as well as the complication of harmonization in the safety methodology is experienced in the test application for the four different ESNII Gen IV prototypes.
The test application is a first step on the finding of R&D needs and it is not a complete implementation of the full methodology. Therefore, the test application should not be valued, at this current period, to answer all aspects. But it should be employed to improve the safety assessment knowledge, as well as the understanding of the phenomena.
The present stage of several ESNII prototypes design is not adequate to judge the provisions at several levels, since most will be developed during the detailed design phase.
The deliverable D4.2 was issued in September 2013 and gathers the results of all these studies and their conclusion.
Task 4.3
On the basis of the results coming from WP2, WP3 and Task 4.2 from WP3, the Task 4.3 with the deliverable D4.3 compiles experiences from the SARGEN IV project in order to provide a contribution to a GIF White Paper on Nuclear Safety of GEN IV reactors.
4. WORK PACKAGE 5 (WP5) : UNDERLINE NEW FIELDS FOR R&D IN THE SAFETY AREA AND PROVIDE A ROADMAP
FOR A PRELIMINARY DEPLOYMENT PLAN FOR THE FAST REACTOR SAFETY-RELATED R&D
Task 5.1
The Task 5.1 consisted of an internal review aiming to:
• present the main results obtained within the previous Work Packages (WP) i.e. WP2, WP3 and WP4 and identify the open issues relevant in the safety field,
• propose and discuss the contents of the deliverables D5.2 D5.3 and D5.4 to be issued within WP5.
The deliverable D5.1 constitutes the minutes of this internal review and was issued on November 22th 2013.
Task 5.2
Two deliverables (D5.2 and D5.3) have to be issued within Task 5.2.
Deliverable D5.2
Based on the outcome of the previous Work Packages the main objective of deliverable 5.2 is the identification of potential open issues (in available information, data, and models) relevant for research in the safety field and identification of R&D needed to support the safety assessment of ESNII design concepts.
The following summarizes the main results given in the deliverable D5.2 regards to the plant status (AOO : Anticipated Operational Occurrence, DBA: Design Basis accident, DEC: Design Extension Conditions, SA: Severe accident) and the reactor type (SFR: Sodium cooled Fast Reactor, LFR: Lead cooled Fast Reactor, LBE : Lead Bistmuth Eutectic cooled fast reactor, GFR : Gas cooled Fast Reactor)
Identified R&d needs from WP2
Item R&D need Plant
Status Design Comments
WP2-1 High Burnup Fuel assessment NO SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-2 MA Fuel assessment NO SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-3 Innovative Fuel assessment NO SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-4 Impurities control in coolant NO SFR, LFR, LBE
WP2-5 Oxygen control in coolant NO SFR, LFR, LBE
WP2-6 Coolant radioactive activation NO SFR, LFR, LBE
WP2-7 FP retention in coolant DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE
WP2-8 Sodium-Air Interaction DBA, DEC, SA SFR a) Sodium spray and jet dynamics
b) Low temperature sodium-air reaction
c) Sodium fire products
WP2-9 Sodium-Water Interaction DBA, DEC, SA SFR a) SG/HX
b) Sodium-concrete hydrogen generation
WP2-10 SM under long irradiation NO, AOO, DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-11 Absorber material under long irradiation NO, AOO, SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-12 Coolant blockage assessment DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE
WP2-13 Core compaction assessment DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-14 Void reactivity feedback DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, (GFR)
WP2-15 Risk due to handling operation NO, AOO SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-16 Failure of core support structures DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-17 Earthquake DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-18 Aircraft crash DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-19 Extreme Earthquake DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-20 Extreme Flooding DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-21 Total loss of electric power supply and/or heat sink DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-22 Accident management DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-23 Instrumentation NO, AOO, DBA, SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
Identified R&d needs from WP3
Item R&D need Plant
Status Design Comments
WP3-1 Development of Innovative reactor licensing framework NO, AOO, DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR a) Safety requirements and safety design criteria for non-LWR concepts;
b) Implementation of Defense-in-Depth in a manner that is different than in current LWRs
c) Implementation of Functional Containment in a design as opposed to the traditional containment approach of LWRs
d) Passive system behaviour and reliability for innovative reactors
e) Establishment of mechanistic source terms
f) Core melting accident in a LFR
g) Identification of practically eliminated events for innovative reactors
h) Weaknesses and possibility of by-pass for each concept
i) Need to assess each concept with regard to Fukushima event
WP3-2 Chemical release management DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE
WP3-3 Practically eliminated events DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP3-4 Human factors NO, AOO, DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP3-5 Interface security-safety NO SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
Identified R&d needs from WP4
Item R&D need Plant
Status Design Comments
WP3-1 Development of Innovative reactor licensing framework NO, AOO, DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR j) Safety requirements and safety design criteria for non-LWR concepts;
k) Implementation of Defense-in-Depth in a manner that is different than in current LWRs
l) Implementation of Functional Containment in a design as opposed to the traditional containment approach of LWRs
m) Passive system behaviour and reliability for innovative reactors
n) Establishment of mechanistic source terms
o) Core melting accident in a LFR
p) Identification of practically eliminated events for innovative reactors
q) Weaknesses and possibility of by-pass for each concept
r) Need to assess each concept with regard to Fukushima event
WP3-2 Chemical release management DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE
WP3-3 Practically eliminated events DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP3-4 Human factors NO, AOO, DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP3-5 Interface security-safety NO SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
The results and conclusions of deliverable 5.2 constitute the basis for the preparation of a preliminary work programme in the form of a detailed roadmap for fast reactor safety R&D which is the subject of Task 5.3.
Deliverable 5.3
This work performed for issuing the deliverable D5.2 has also been be used as a reference to provide guidelines on the structure and content of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the innovative ESNII reactors that constitute the deliverable D5.3.
Task 5.3
Only one deliverable (D5.4) has to be issued within Task 5.3.
On the basis of deliverables D3.5 D3.5 and D5.2 the deliverable D5.4 presents a roadmap for the fast reactor safety with a schedule of the safety R&D activities.
The deliverable D5.4 was issued on August 7th 2014.
5. WORK PACKAGE 6 (WP6) : DISSEMINATION AND COMMUNICATION
5.1 RECALL ABOUT THE WORK ALREADY DONE DURING THE YEAR 2012
The work performed within WP6 during 2012 has consisted in:
• The detailed dissemination and communication plan (deliverable D6.1).
• The project presentation (deliverable D6.2).
• The implementation of the two websites: private (http://www.sargen-iv.grs.de) and public website (http://www.sargen-iv.eu).
The announcement of the public website constitutes the deliverable D6.3 and was performed by the IRSN letter (PSN-SRDS/CNR/2012-00003) sent to the SARGEN_IV project officer on July 19th 2012.
• The project flyer (deliverable D6.4)
• The issue of two periodic letters in July (deliverable D6.5) and in November (deliverable D6.6)
D6.2 D6.4 D6.5 and D6.6 have been uploaded on the public website.
Besides the above mentioned deliverables some additional works have been performed:
• Preparation of a text in the framework of the volume 3 of the document “EURATOM FP7 Research and Training projects“ to be issued by the EC.
• A SARGEN_IV partner has participated in the GIF-IAEA workshop organized in Vienna on the safety aspects of Sodium-cooled fast reactors from November 30th to December 1st 2011
The SARGEN_IV partner performed a presentation about the objectives of the project.
• A poster summarizing the SARGEN_IV project was prepared and presented at EUROSAFE in Paris at the end of 2011.
• The SARGEN_IV poster was presented as well in the SNETP meeting in Warsaw at the end of 2011.
• Participation of two SARGEN_IV partners to the international workshop about innovative reactors cooled by heavy metals organized within the FP7 EC Project SEARCH on innovative reactors cooled by heavy metals in Pisa (Italy) from 17th to 20th April 2012 by ENEA and the Pisa University. A poster about SARGEN_IV was presented.
• Participation of two SARGEN_IV partners to the technical meeting on the impact of Fukushima event on current and future fast reactors designs organized by the IAEA in Dresden (Germany).The SARGEN_IV coordinator performed a presentation about the project.
• In July 2012, there was the announcement of the international conference on fast reactors and related fuel cycles (FR13) organized commonly by IAEA and the “Société Française pour l’Energie Nucléaire (SFEN)” from March 4th to 7th 2013 in Paris. The SARGEN_IV project proposed a summary of a paper which was firstly accepted only for a poster which was prepared. A paper has been prepared to be included in the conference proceedings: this paper has been loaded on the SARGEN_IV private website.
• During the 2013 summer a list of about fifty stakeholders prepared and the same number of e-mails was sent and invite the stakeholder to visit the public website (http://www.sargen-iv.eu) and to announce a workshop on the outcomes of project in the first months of 2014. About 10 people said to be interested in this workshop.
5.2 WORK DONE ABOUT WP6 DURING THE YEAR 2013
The work performed within WP6 during 2013 has consisted in three periodic letters issued in May (deliverable D6.7) September (deliverable D6.8). The last periodic letter (deliverable D6.9) was issued in June 2014.
Besides the above mentioned deliverables some additional works have been performed:
• At the beginning of January 2013, the paper proposed for the FR13 conference in the paragraph 7.2 was finally accepted for an oral presentation. With the help of the WP leaders, the project prepared a presentation and performed it during technical session 3.4 (Fast reactor safety: post-Fukushima lessons and goals for next-generation reactors). A paper was also written to be published in the proceedings that will normally been issued in November 2014.
• The coordinator participated to a technical workshop organized by JRC in Petten on February 26-28 about the pre-licensing discussion with the representatives of the TSOs and the designers of the LFR projects ALFRED and ELFR.
• The project participated to the paper and the presentation entitled “ESNII in the context of Generation IV: ESNII+, SARGEN_IV, CDP-ESFR, LEADER, GoFastR and prepared in for the FISA 2013 conference (Vilnius, 14-16 October 2013).
At the end of the project an information workshop was planned in order to disseminate the main results. The late issue of D5.2 D5.3 and D5.4 with the time needed to organize the workshop makes no possible the organization of this workshop not too far from the end of the project.
The project also intends also to propose several articles for peer-review journals before the end of 2014 but the topics remain to be defined up to now and the journal is not already chosen. This point will mainly depend of the availability of the SARGEN_IV partners after the end of the project.
6. OVERALL CONCLUSION
The SARGEN_IV was the first opportunity to have experts of fast reactors safety from various organizations. The project allowed a lot of very fruitful exchanges even if there was no consensus on some topics.
The deliverables D2.5 (identification and ranking of the safety issues) and D3.5 (proposal for an harmonization of the safety assessment practices) provide synthesis that could be used further by designers, research organizations and technical safety organizations for each of the concept proposed by the ESNII. It also showed it was very difficult to have a detailed safety assessment when the design of the reactor is not well defined.
31 deliverables were planned but finally 30 deliverables have been issued: only the D6.10 (proceedings of the information workshop planned at the end of the project) was not issued.
Potential Impact:
It is expected that the depth and scope of the R&D needed to demonstrate adequate safety of the ESNII prototypes and demonstrators will be significantly impacted by the safety assessment methodology for these kinds of reactors proposed in SARGEN_IV and in particular by the lessons learned from events at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP.
The harmonisation of the different methodologies is crucial for developing a consistent assessment platform which could be used effectively in the decision-making process and to make the different innovative reactor types publicly accept¬able in Europe.
In particular, the Work performed within SARGEN_IV may be interesting for the companies (designers, research organisations, technical safety organizations) to be involved in:
• the development of the lead cooled fast reactor ALFRED to be hosted by Romania,
• the development of the gas cooled fast reactor ALLEGRO now studied by Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary
List of Websites:
htpp://www.sargen-iv.eu
The aim of SARGEN_IV is to propose a European framework for the safety assessment of Generation (GEN) IV closed cycle reactors as part of the ESNII. To achieve this objective it will be necessary to bring together Euro¬pean designers, Technical Safety Organisations (TSOs), research organi¬sations and utilities companies already involved (or soon to be involved) in innovative reactors, so they can consolidate their work and suggest a harmonised European state-of-art safety methodology representing the Euratom contribution to the Generation IV International Forum (GIF).
The project last from January 2012 to December 2013 with 22 partners from 12 Members States (+ European Union) and the partners’ complementariness is based on:
• Experts from designers, R&D organizations and universities having each a high knowledge on at least one the four selected innovative reactors (CEA, AREVA, SCK-CEN, AMEC, ANSALDO, KIT, UJV, VUJE, AEKI, HZDR).
• Safety experts from all ETSON members (IRSN, GRS, VTT, UVJ, VUJE, LEI, BELV) and from other organizations and universities (UNIMAN, PSI, JRC, UPM, ENEA).
• One of the most important electricity producer (EDF) in Europe and in the world with 75% of its production coming from nuclear power plants and which was also largely involved of the French SFR Superphénix and Phénix operation.
• A university (RWTH) able to organize communication and dissemination communication with also including in its staff a specialist of gas cooled reactors.
It is expected that the depth and scope of the R&D needed to demonstrate adequate safety of the ESNII prototypes and demonstrators will be significantly impacted by the safety assessment methodology for these kinds of reactors proposed in SARGEN_IV. The harmonisation of the different methodologies is crucial for developing a consistent assessment platform which could be used effectively in the decision-making process and to make the different innovative reactor types publicly accept¬able in Europe.
Project Context and Objectives:
The “European Sustainable Nuclear Industrial Initiative” (ESNII) was launched in November 2010 under the SET-Plan to anticipate the development of a fleet of fast reactors with closed cycle which will support the sustainable use of natural resources. Among the fast neutrons technologies, three of them have been selected, which are also part of the six ones proposed in the Generation IV systems.
The ESNII roadmap includes:
- The Sodium cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) with the ASTRID prototype supported by the French government whose beginning operation is expected around 2020.
- The Lead cooled Fast Reactor (LFR) with the ALFRED demonstrator whose beginning operation is expected around 2025. ALFRED will be preceded by the irradiation fast spectrum facility MYRRHA able to test both the Accelerator Driven System (ADS) technology and the LFR technologies; MYRRHA is supported by the Belgian government and Romania has expressed availability for hosting the ALFRED demonstrator.
- The Gas cooled Fast Reactor (GFR) with the ALLEGRO demonstrator for which a Memorandum of Understanding has signed between three organizations coming from Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia.
With the aim of preparing the future assessment of these advanced reactor concepts, the SARGEN_IV Project is intended to gather safety experts from recognized EuropeanTechnical Safety Organizations - TSOs -, the Joint Research Centre of the EC, Designers and Vendors as well as from Research Institutes and Universities to:
- identify and rank the safety issues relative to the four above mentioned concepts,
- develop and provide a tentative commonly agreed methodology for the safety assessment, relying on the outcomes of the investigations carried out within current international programmes and on national practices presently in use,
- detect and underline new fields for R&D in the safety area (addressing methodological, theoretical and experimental issues, as well) and provide a roadmap and preliminary deployment plan for the fast reactor safety-related R&D.
The project beneficiaries are convinced that fostering the harmonization of the various European safety approaches will be very beneficial and will enable streamlining EURATOM contribution to Generation IV International Forum in the safety field, optimizing its involvement and providing feedbacks and dissemination at a European level. The project will also improve relations between safety assessment and research programmes, and therefore improving efficiency in the development of new concepts.
Project Results:
The technical results are provides within four work packages (WP) each corresponding to one of the issues presented in the executive summary
- WP2: identify and rank the safety issues relative to the four above mentioned concepts
- WP3: develop and provide a tentative commonly agreed methodology for the safety assessment, relying on the outcomes of the investigations carried out within current international programs and on national practices presently in use
- WP4: provide some tests of the safety assessment methodologies
- WP5 : detect and underline new fields for R&D in the safety area (addressing methodological, theoretical and experimental issues, as well) and provide a roadmap for a preliminary deployment plan for the fast reactor safety-related R&D.
1. WP2 : IDENTIFY AND RANK THE SAFETY ISSUES RELATIVE TO THE FOUR ABOVE MENTIONED CONCEPTS
The first four tasks (2.1 to 2.4) of WP2 aimed to identify the critical safety features for the four concepts proposed by ESNII according to the common three sections given hereafter.
a) Design overview
This section provides a description of the design to sufficient detail to be able to understand (with section 2) the critical safety features identified in section 3. Included is an overview of the primary system design, as well as some of the balance of plant.
b) Safety functions
This section outlines the safety functions and provides some details in what is implemented (including what the inherent characteristics) in the design for each of them. Safety functions to be addressed are reactivity control, Decay Heat Removal (DHR) systems, with emphasis on passive systems, and confinement of radioactive materials.
c) Identified critical safety features
This section provides the safety issues related to the design and operation of the specific concept, e.g. the risk related to the use of specific coolant, plant vulnerabilities to cope with accidents as for instance DHR, neutronics and thermal-hydraulic issues, etc.
Four deliverables (one per task) have been issued in due time:
• D2.1 for SFR
• D2.2 for LFR
• D2.3 for GFR
• D2.4 for the Fast Spectrum Facility
The task 2.5 uses the outcomes of Tasks 2.1 to 2.4 to identify a representative set of initiating events and transients for test application of the harmonized safety assessment methodologies to be performed within the Task 4.1 (WP4). The outcomes provide as well the guidance for the roadmap dedicated to the identification and prioritisation of R&D needs respective to the identified safety issues to be performed within the Task 5.2 (WP5).
Consistently with the objectives of the SARGEN_IV project and the fact that the four ESNII are at different stages of development and their designs are still evolving, Task 2.5 analyses do not involve a review of the appropriateness of specific design solutions and adequacy of safety demonstration for the individual ESNII systems. Neither is the goal of the present deliverable to propose safety options or provisions to be implemented.
To further systematise the consideration of safety issues and characteristics for a consistent build-up of the safety architecture and development of adequate provisions, Task 2.5 has aimed at categorising the individual issues identified for the ESNII concepts to several common “families”. We have adopted the categorisation according to:
• Common phenomena related to:
- Materials (fuel, coolant, structure, absorber)
- Aspects specific to fast reactors (power density, core compaction, reactivity void effect, risks due to handling operation, external events, core disruptive accident, considerations about on Fukushima-Daiichi TEPCO events)
- Aspects specific to design solutions envisaged for ESNII concepts, and
• Possible impact on the fulfilment of fundamental safety functions related to
- Control of reactivity, including
o Risk of control rod blockages,
o Reactivity change due to core compaction
o Reactivity change due to coolant boiling
o Inadvertent control rod withdrawal
- Removal of heat, including
o Flow blockage e.g due to corrosion products
o Coolant freezing
o Coolant depressurization
o Loss of flow paths
- Confinement of radioactive materials
It was also highlighted the necessity of the management of harmful materials able to provide results in releases of chemical toxic products.
Finally, a list of initiating events categorised according to challenges to confinement barriers and common phenomenology is given. For example, challenges to clad integrity are given hereafter:
a) Anomalies in reactivity and power distribution
• Inadvertent control rod withdrawal;
• Coolant heat-up (SFR, LFR, FASTEF) and boiling (SFR);
• Material/gas ingress in the core able to increase reactivity (cover gas or oil for SFR, LFR and MYRRHA/FASTEF; water/steam for LFR ALFRED, GFR ALLEGRO, and MYRRHA/FASTEF);
• Loss of coolant (GFR ALLEGRO);
• Change in core heat removal;
• Handling error (e.g. replacement of a control rod with a fuel subassembly);
• Core geometry change (e.g. core compaction, core support structure failure).
b) Decrease of fuel sub-assembly heat removal
• Partial or total blockage of a fuel subassembly (e.g. due to pollution by reaction products for LFR and MYRRHA/FASTEF);
• Local loss of heat removal (e.g. due to corrosion/erosion attack for LFR and MYRRHA/FASTEF);
• Decrease of the removal of heat from the reactor coolant system.
2. WP3 : DEVELOP AND PROVIDE A TENTATIVE AGREED METHODOLOGY FOR THE SAFETY ASSESSEMENT
Firstly, various safety methodologies are already (or will be) available that could be applied to the ESNII prototypes, pilot plants and demonstrators, which need to be analyzed and disseminated inside the SARGEN_IV consortium. These methodologies correspond to tasks 3.1. to 3.4
Task 3.1
Methodologies dedicated to innovative reactors and issued by the GIF Reactor Safety Working Group (RSWG) and by IAEA as the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) safety assessment methodology.
These methodologies were presented to the SARGEN_IV partners during a two-day work shop held at the JRC premises on March 28th and 29th 2012 by three experts from the IAEA and GIF-RSWG.
The minutes of the meeting constitute the deliverable D3.1.
Task 3.2
National safety approaches (France, Germany, Spain, Finland, Belgium) and the associated experience feedback in particular for the SFRs built in France and Germany as well as for the Finish European Pressurized Reactor (EPRTM).
These approaches are given in the deliverable D3.2.
Task 3.3
Safety approaches adopted in European collaborative projects related to the four concepts (CP-ESFR for SFR, LEADER for LFRs, GoFastR for GFR and CDT for FASTEF).
These approaches are given in the deliverable D3.3.
Task 3.4
Documents coming from international organizations such as the IAEA or the Western Europe Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WENRA) and available for the safety assessment of innovative reactors including methodology used for the European NPP “stress tests”.
These approaches are given in the deliverable D3.4.
Secondly, some differences exist in the documents D3.1 to D3.4 and the objective is to provide harmonized safety assessment practices highlighting what is new and useful for innovative reactors: this is the objective is of Task 3.5.
Task 3.5
With using in particular the results coming from D3.1 to D3.4 , the SARGEN_IV consortium has issued the deliverable D3.5 “Proposal for a harmonization of the safety assessment practices”.
The main conclusions from Task 3.5 are given hereafter.
According to the documents D3.1 to D3.4 mentioned above, safety assessment should be performed for both reactor and fuel storage, in all plant states and conditions – including maintenance stages - over the lifetime of the installation, up to decommissioning. Waste management and workers radiological protection should also be taken into account. Moreover, human and organizational factors and man-induced situations are a part of the safety demonstration. Natural phenomena should be considered. Finally, security/safeguard aspects should be dealt in an integrated manner. Besides, chemical effects could be a challenging issue with regard to designs of GEN-IV reactors currently in consideration.
Ambitious safety objectives are targeted even though safety goals of GIF are not particularly prescriptive when specifying objectives for GEN-IV nuclear power plants (NPP). Nevertheless, the goal is to reduce potential consequences and impact on public, workers and environment as well as occurrence/frequency of failures, incidental and accidental situations.
The work highlights the importance of safety principles in achievement of safety objectives:
- Defense-In-Depth (DiD) principle remains fundamental. An overall reinforcement of DiD is expected for GEN-IV nuclear power plants, including improved independence between all levels of DiD. A particularly important issue for GEN-IV reactor could be to clearly define level 4 for each plant design.
- Other principles as barriers, As Low As Reasonable Achievable (ALARA) principle and As Low As Reasonable Practicable (ALARP) principle should also be enhanced.
- Concerning fundamental safety functions, an inherent approach should reinforce the fulfillment of fundamental safety functions e.g. the consequences for some situations should be reduced and the grace periods should be extended. For the same reason, the use of passive systems can be envisaged.
- Practical elimination is another important principle, but it requires in-depth analyses for GEN-IV NPP. Lastly, the need of two complementary and integrated approaches, the deterministic and the probabilistic ones, is reiterated.
A safety assessment should be performed with regard to safety objectives in particular those proposed by WENRA and considering safety principles, SARGEN_IV project proposes to use some methodologies such as the Qualitative Safety Features Review (QSR), the Objective Provision Tree (OPT) and the Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) for the global safety assessment process to provide feedback.
Concerning the detailed safety assessment, there is no clear specificity for GEN-IV NPP. Nevertheless, the comprehensive set of postulated initiating events could be quite different from GEN-III NPP. Moreover, they should be assessed with more stringent rules and acceptance criteria. Assessment of hazards would be a challenging aspect of next generation of NPP safety assessment and should be improved, which is confirmed by the first insights of Fukushima Daiichi TEPCO reactors accidents. These first insights, on the basis of the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) specifications and conclusions, should be extrapolated to new designs, which pose another challenge for GEN-IV NPP.
For example the total loss of power sources, the total loss of the ultimate heat sink(s) and the combination of both have to be considered with also the management of a severe accident in this case. Provisions to cope with these events notably to improve the grace period before cliff-edge effects and thus allowing back-up measures to be implemented have to be defined and should be considered as hardened equipment.
Conclusion about WP3
SARGEN_IV was the first tentative to harmonize the safety practices in side Europe between technical safety organizations, design companies, research centres and universities. The deliverable D3.5 results of a consensus from these organizations on many topics and may be considered as a work basis of the safety assessment of new reactors supported by ESNII.
3. WORK PACKAGE 4 (WP4) : PROVIDE SOME TESTS OF THE SAFETY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES
Task 4.1
ON this basis of the work performed within the WP2 Task 2.5 the Task 4.1 gives a representative set of initiating events
Task 4.2
Scope
Task 4.2 aimed to provide a test application of the safety assessment methodologies to a representative set of initiating events coming for WP4 task 4.1 with using some tools presented in the deliverable 3.5 with in particular the Objective Provision Tree (OPT), QSR tool (Qualitative Safety features Review), DPA (Deterministic and Phenomenological Analysis) and PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) which are part of Integrated Safety Assessment Methodology (ISAM) proposed by the GIF. The characteristics of the four reactor types collected in WP2 together with the categorization of transients into families in WP3 provide a basis for assessing the phenomena involved and the severity of the transients considered.
Studies performed
Five studies have been performed
- Application of the OPT tool to the decay removal function of the ALLEGRO gas cooled fast reactor (GFR),
- Application of the OPT tool to the decay removal function of a sodium cooled fast reactor (SFR),
- Application of the QSR and of the OPT to the FASTEF facility (cooled by lead-bismuth) to the FASTEF facility,
- Early phase of DPA (Deterministic and Phenomenological Analysis) tool and PSA (Probabilistic Safety Assessment) tool on the loss of primary coolant of the ALLEGRO GFR,
- Identification of gaps and areas for the codes used for system analyses in the scope of further R&D.
Conclusions
This test application has provided an opportunity to understand the safety architecture of the proposed harmonized European safety methodology and the importance, as well as the complication of harmonization in the safety methodology is experienced in the test application for the four different ESNII Gen IV prototypes.
The test application is a first step on the finding of R&D needs and it is not a complete implementation of the full methodology. Therefore, the test application should not be valued, at this current period, to answer all aspects. But it should be employed to improve the safety assessment knowledge, as well as the understanding of the phenomena.
The present stage of several ESNII prototypes design is not adequate to judge the provisions at several levels, since most will be developed during the detailed design phase.
The deliverable D4.2 was issued in September 2013 and gathers the results of all these studies and their conclusion.
Task 4.3
On the basis of the results coming from WP2, WP3 and Task 4.2 from WP3, the Task 4.3 with the deliverable D4.3 compiles experiences from the SARGEN IV project in order to provide a contribution to a GIF White Paper on Nuclear Safety of GEN IV reactors.
4. WORK PACKAGE 5 (WP5) : UNDERLINE NEW FIELDS FOR R&D IN THE SAFETY AREA AND PROVIDE A ROADMAP
FOR A PRELIMINARY DEPLOYMENT PLAN FOR THE FAST REACTOR SAFETY-RELATED R&D
Task 5.1
The Task 5.1 consisted of an internal review aiming to:
• present the main results obtained within the previous Work Packages (WP) i.e. WP2, WP3 and WP4 and identify the open issues relevant in the safety field,
• propose and discuss the contents of the deliverables D5.2 D5.3 and D5.4 to be issued within WP5.
The deliverable D5.1 constitutes the minutes of this internal review and was issued on November 22th 2013.
Task 5.2
Two deliverables (D5.2 and D5.3) have to be issued within Task 5.2.
Deliverable D5.2
Based on the outcome of the previous Work Packages the main objective of deliverable 5.2 is the identification of potential open issues (in available information, data, and models) relevant for research in the safety field and identification of R&D needed to support the safety assessment of ESNII design concepts.
The following summarizes the main results given in the deliverable D5.2 regards to the plant status (AOO : Anticipated Operational Occurrence, DBA: Design Basis accident, DEC: Design Extension Conditions, SA: Severe accident) and the reactor type (SFR: Sodium cooled Fast Reactor, LFR: Lead cooled Fast Reactor, LBE : Lead Bistmuth Eutectic cooled fast reactor, GFR : Gas cooled Fast Reactor)
Identified R&d needs from WP2
Item R&D need Plant
Status Design Comments
WP2-1 High Burnup Fuel assessment NO SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-2 MA Fuel assessment NO SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-3 Innovative Fuel assessment NO SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-4 Impurities control in coolant NO SFR, LFR, LBE
WP2-5 Oxygen control in coolant NO SFR, LFR, LBE
WP2-6 Coolant radioactive activation NO SFR, LFR, LBE
WP2-7 FP retention in coolant DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE
WP2-8 Sodium-Air Interaction DBA, DEC, SA SFR a) Sodium spray and jet dynamics
b) Low temperature sodium-air reaction
c) Sodium fire products
WP2-9 Sodium-Water Interaction DBA, DEC, SA SFR a) SG/HX
b) Sodium-concrete hydrogen generation
WP2-10 SM under long irradiation NO, AOO, DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-11 Absorber material under long irradiation NO, AOO, SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-12 Coolant blockage assessment DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE
WP2-13 Core compaction assessment DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-14 Void reactivity feedback DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, (GFR)
WP2-15 Risk due to handling operation NO, AOO SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-16 Failure of core support structures DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-17 Earthquake DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-18 Aircraft crash DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-19 Extreme Earthquake DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-20 Extreme Flooding DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-21 Total loss of electric power supply and/or heat sink DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-22 Accident management DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP2-23 Instrumentation NO, AOO, DBA, SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
Identified R&d needs from WP3
Item R&D need Plant
Status Design Comments
WP3-1 Development of Innovative reactor licensing framework NO, AOO, DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR a) Safety requirements and safety design criteria for non-LWR concepts;
b) Implementation of Defense-in-Depth in a manner that is different than in current LWRs
c) Implementation of Functional Containment in a design as opposed to the traditional containment approach of LWRs
d) Passive system behaviour and reliability for innovative reactors
e) Establishment of mechanistic source terms
f) Core melting accident in a LFR
g) Identification of practically eliminated events for innovative reactors
h) Weaknesses and possibility of by-pass for each concept
i) Need to assess each concept with regard to Fukushima event
WP3-2 Chemical release management DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE
WP3-3 Practically eliminated events DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP3-4 Human factors NO, AOO, DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP3-5 Interface security-safety NO SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
Identified R&d needs from WP4
Item R&D need Plant
Status Design Comments
WP3-1 Development of Innovative reactor licensing framework NO, AOO, DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR j) Safety requirements and safety design criteria for non-LWR concepts;
k) Implementation of Defense-in-Depth in a manner that is different than in current LWRs
l) Implementation of Functional Containment in a design as opposed to the traditional containment approach of LWRs
m) Passive system behaviour and reliability for innovative reactors
n) Establishment of mechanistic source terms
o) Core melting accident in a LFR
p) Identification of practically eliminated events for innovative reactors
q) Weaknesses and possibility of by-pass for each concept
r) Need to assess each concept with regard to Fukushima event
WP3-2 Chemical release management DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE
WP3-3 Practically eliminated events DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP3-4 Human factors NO, AOO, DBA, DEC, SA SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
WP3-5 Interface security-safety NO SFR, LFR, LBE, GFR
The results and conclusions of deliverable 5.2 constitute the basis for the preparation of a preliminary work programme in the form of a detailed roadmap for fast reactor safety R&D which is the subject of Task 5.3.
Deliverable 5.3
This work performed for issuing the deliverable D5.2 has also been be used as a reference to provide guidelines on the structure and content of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the innovative ESNII reactors that constitute the deliverable D5.3.
Task 5.3
Only one deliverable (D5.4) has to be issued within Task 5.3.
On the basis of deliverables D3.5 D3.5 and D5.2 the deliverable D5.4 presents a roadmap for the fast reactor safety with a schedule of the safety R&D activities.
The deliverable D5.4 was issued on August 7th 2014.
5. WORK PACKAGE 6 (WP6) : DISSEMINATION AND COMMUNICATION
5.1 RECALL ABOUT THE WORK ALREADY DONE DURING THE YEAR 2012
The work performed within WP6 during 2012 has consisted in:
• The detailed dissemination and communication plan (deliverable D6.1).
• The project presentation (deliverable D6.2).
• The implementation of the two websites: private (http://www.sargen-iv.grs.de) and public website (http://www.sargen-iv.eu).
The announcement of the public website constitutes the deliverable D6.3 and was performed by the IRSN letter (PSN-SRDS/CNR/2012-00003) sent to the SARGEN_IV project officer on July 19th 2012.
• The project flyer (deliverable D6.4)
• The issue of two periodic letters in July (deliverable D6.5) and in November (deliverable D6.6)
D6.2 D6.4 D6.5 and D6.6 have been uploaded on the public website.
Besides the above mentioned deliverables some additional works have been performed:
• Preparation of a text in the framework of the volume 3 of the document “EURATOM FP7 Research and Training projects“ to be issued by the EC.
• A SARGEN_IV partner has participated in the GIF-IAEA workshop organized in Vienna on the safety aspects of Sodium-cooled fast reactors from November 30th to December 1st 2011
The SARGEN_IV partner performed a presentation about the objectives of the project.
• A poster summarizing the SARGEN_IV project was prepared and presented at EUROSAFE in Paris at the end of 2011.
• The SARGEN_IV poster was presented as well in the SNETP meeting in Warsaw at the end of 2011.
• Participation of two SARGEN_IV partners to the international workshop about innovative reactors cooled by heavy metals organized within the FP7 EC Project SEARCH on innovative reactors cooled by heavy metals in Pisa (Italy) from 17th to 20th April 2012 by ENEA and the Pisa University. A poster about SARGEN_IV was presented.
• Participation of two SARGEN_IV partners to the technical meeting on the impact of Fukushima event on current and future fast reactors designs organized by the IAEA in Dresden (Germany).The SARGEN_IV coordinator performed a presentation about the project.
• In July 2012, there was the announcement of the international conference on fast reactors and related fuel cycles (FR13) organized commonly by IAEA and the “Société Française pour l’Energie Nucléaire (SFEN)” from March 4th to 7th 2013 in Paris. The SARGEN_IV project proposed a summary of a paper which was firstly accepted only for a poster which was prepared. A paper has been prepared to be included in the conference proceedings: this paper has been loaded on the SARGEN_IV private website.
• During the 2013 summer a list of about fifty stakeholders prepared and the same number of e-mails was sent and invite the stakeholder to visit the public website (http://www.sargen-iv.eu) and to announce a workshop on the outcomes of project in the first months of 2014. About 10 people said to be interested in this workshop.
5.2 WORK DONE ABOUT WP6 DURING THE YEAR 2013
The work performed within WP6 during 2013 has consisted in three periodic letters issued in May (deliverable D6.7) September (deliverable D6.8). The last periodic letter (deliverable D6.9) was issued in June 2014.
Besides the above mentioned deliverables some additional works have been performed:
• At the beginning of January 2013, the paper proposed for the FR13 conference in the paragraph 7.2 was finally accepted for an oral presentation. With the help of the WP leaders, the project prepared a presentation and performed it during technical session 3.4 (Fast reactor safety: post-Fukushima lessons and goals for next-generation reactors). A paper was also written to be published in the proceedings that will normally been issued in November 2014.
• The coordinator participated to a technical workshop organized by JRC in Petten on February 26-28 about the pre-licensing discussion with the representatives of the TSOs and the designers of the LFR projects ALFRED and ELFR.
• The project participated to the paper and the presentation entitled “ESNII in the context of Generation IV: ESNII+, SARGEN_IV, CDP-ESFR, LEADER, GoFastR and prepared in for the FISA 2013 conference (Vilnius, 14-16 October 2013).
At the end of the project an information workshop was planned in order to disseminate the main results. The late issue of D5.2 D5.3 and D5.4 with the time needed to organize the workshop makes no possible the organization of this workshop not too far from the end of the project.
The project also intends also to propose several articles for peer-review journals before the end of 2014 but the topics remain to be defined up to now and the journal is not already chosen. This point will mainly depend of the availability of the SARGEN_IV partners after the end of the project.
6. OVERALL CONCLUSION
The SARGEN_IV was the first opportunity to have experts of fast reactors safety from various organizations. The project allowed a lot of very fruitful exchanges even if there was no consensus on some topics.
The deliverables D2.5 (identification and ranking of the safety issues) and D3.5 (proposal for an harmonization of the safety assessment practices) provide synthesis that could be used further by designers, research organizations and technical safety organizations for each of the concept proposed by the ESNII. It also showed it was very difficult to have a detailed safety assessment when the design of the reactor is not well defined.
31 deliverables were planned but finally 30 deliverables have been issued: only the D6.10 (proceedings of the information workshop planned at the end of the project) was not issued.
Potential Impact:
It is expected that the depth and scope of the R&D needed to demonstrate adequate safety of the ESNII prototypes and demonstrators will be significantly impacted by the safety assessment methodology for these kinds of reactors proposed in SARGEN_IV and in particular by the lessons learned from events at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP.
The harmonisation of the different methodologies is crucial for developing a consistent assessment platform which could be used effectively in the decision-making process and to make the different innovative reactor types publicly accept¬able in Europe.
In particular, the Work performed within SARGEN_IV may be interesting for the companies (designers, research organisations, technical safety organizations) to be involved in:
• the development of the lead cooled fast reactor ALFRED to be hosted by Romania,
• the development of the gas cooled fast reactor ALLEGRO now studied by Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary
List of Websites:
htpp://www.sargen-iv.eu