The central line of research was focused on identifying causal effect of social media penetration on political outcomes. In particular, we examine whether penetration of the most popular online social network in Russia – VK – affected anti-government protests in December 2011.
VK was created in 2006 by a student of the Saint Petersburg State University (SPbSU), Pavel Durov. The idiosyncratic variation in the distribution of the home cities of Durov’s classmates had a long-lasting effect on VK penetration. Using these fluctuations in the student flow from Russian cities to SPbSU as an instrument in an instrumental variable framework, we find that, on average, a 10% increase in VK penetration leads to a 4 percentage points higher chance of a protest taking place and a 19% larger protest. Non-parametrically, we document that there exists a threshold of VK penetration below which there is no relation between VK penetration and protests.
We also provide evidence that this effect was not driven by the spread of uncensored that would lead to more anti-government sentiments in the population. In particular, we show that, consistently across all elections after the creation of the social network, VK led to the higher, not lower, pro-government vote. We also do not find any evidence for increased political polarization since there was no jump in negative attitudes toward the regime or in the opposition vote. However, we do find evidence that social media facilitated coordination.
In another paper we highlight the importance of social image concerns in the decision to participate in political protests. We develop a dynamic model of protest participation, where socially-minded individuals use protest participation to signal their type. We then test predictions of the model using individual and city-level data from 2011-2012 political protests in Russia. We report several findings, consistent with the theory. First, list experiment results from a specially conducted survey imply that social signaling motives indeed were important for the decision to participate in protests. Second, participation in online protest groups increased offline protest participation. Third, participation in protests was associated with higher social capital in a city. Finally, the importance of both online social networks and offline social capital for protest participation diminished over time.