Bayesian Networks and Non-Rational Expectations

Información del proyecto

BAYNET

Identificador del acuerdo de subvención: 692995

DOI 10.3030/692995

Proyecto cerrado

Fecha de la firma de la CE 13 Junio 2016

Fecha de inicio 1 Julio 2016

Fecha de finalización 30 Junio 2022

Financiado con arreglo a

• EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC)

Coste total € 1 379 288,00

Aportación de la UE € 1 379 288,00

Coordinado por

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
United Kingdom

Publicaciones

Peer reviewed articles (11)

Bayesian networks and boundedly rational expectations

Autores: Ran Spiegler
Publicado en: Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2016, ISSN 0033-5533
Editor: MIT Press
DOI: 10.1093/qje/qjw011

Strategic interpretations

Autores: Kfir Eliaz; Ran Spiegler; Heidi Thysen
Publicado en: Journal of Economic Theory, 2021, ISSN 0022-0531
Editor: Academic Press
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105192

On the behavioral consequences of reverse causality

Autores: Ran Spiegler
Publicado en: European Economic Review, 2022, ISSN 0014-2921
Editor: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104258

Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations

Autores: Heiner Schumacher; Heidi Thysen
Publicado en: Theoretical Economics, 2022, ISSN 1555-7561
Editor: Society for Economic Theory
DOI: 10.3982/te4231

Modeling players with random data access

Autores: Ran Spiegler
Publicado en: Journal of Economic Thory, 2021, ISSN 0022-0531
Editor: Academic Press
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105374

Behavioral implications of causal misperceptions

Autores: Ran Spiegler
Publicado en: Annual Review of Economics, 2020, ISSN 1941-1391
Editor: Annual Reviews
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-072219-111921

“Data Monkeys”: A Procedural Model of Extrapolation from Partial Statistics*

Autores: Ran Spiegler
Publicado en: The Review of Economic Studies, 2017, Página(s) rdx004, ISSN 0034-6527
Editor: Blackwell Publishing Inc.
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdx004

Can Agents with Causal Misperceptions be Systematically Fooled?

Autores: Ran Spiegler
Publicado en: Journal of the European Economic Association, 2019, ISSN 1542-4766
Editor: Wiley-Blackwell
DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvy057

Persuasion with endogenous misspecified beliefs

Autores: Kfir Eliaz; Ran Spiegler; Heidi Thysen
Publicado en: European Economic Review, 2021, ISSN 0014-2921
Editor: Elsevier BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103712

Cheating with models

Autores: Kfir Eliaz; Ran Spiegler; Yair Weiss
Publicado en: American Economic Review: Insights, 2021, ISSN 2640-205X
Editor: AEA
DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20200635

A Model of Competing Narratives

Autores: Kfir Eliaz; Ran Spiegler
Publicado en: American Economic Review, 2020, ISSN 0002-8282
Editor: American Economic Association
DOI: 10.1257/aer.20191099