Obiettivo In the last several decades, it has been extensively studied how strategic behavior of economic agents could affect the outcomes of various institutions. Game theory and mechanism design theory play key roles in understanding economic agents' possible behavior in those institutions, its welfare consequences, and how we should design economic institutions to achieve desired social objectives even if the agents behave strategically for their own interests.However, existing studies mostly focus on somewhat narrow classes of economic environments by imposing restrictive assumptions. The proposed projects aim at providing novel theoretical frameworks which enable us to study agents' behavior and desirable institutions under much less assumptions. I believe that the projects have significant relevance in policy recommendation in practice and empirical studies, even though the proposed projects are primarily theoretical.In mechanism design, most papers in the literature focus on environments with independently distributed private information. We propose two novel (robustness-based) approaches to analyze mechanism design in correlated environments, motivated by their practical and empirical relevance. The robustness brought by my approach can be useful to mitigate certain types of misspecifications in mechanism design in practice.Moreover, the desirable robust mechanisms I obtain appear to be more sensible, and hence, can be useful for empirical studies of auction and other mechanism design problems.In game theory, it is often assumed that the game to be played is common knowledge, or even with uncertainty, uncertain variables are assumed to follow a common-knowledge prior .However, in many situations in reality, those do not seem to be satisfied. Our goal is to provide a novel theoretical framework to predict players' behavior in such incompletely specified games, and to identify conditions for (monotone) comparative statics. Both could be useful in empirical studies. Campo scientifico natural sciencesmathematicsapplied mathematicsgame theory Parole chiave mechanism design implementation auction robust prediction in games Programma(i) H2020-EU.1.1. - EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC) Main Programme Argomento(i) ERC-2016-STG - ERC Starting Grant Invito a presentare proposte ERC-2016-STG Vedi altri progetti per questo bando Meccanismo di finanziamento ERC-STG - Starting Grant Istituzione ospitante FONDATION JEAN JACQUES LAFFONT,TOULOUSE SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES Contribution nette de l'UE € 982 562,00 Indirizzo 5E ETAGE, 1 ESP DE L'UNIVERSITE 31080 Toulouse Francia Mostra sulla mappa Regione Occitanie Midi-Pyrénées Haute-Garonne Tipo di attività Research Organisations Collegamenti Contatta l’organizzazione Opens in new window Partecipazione a programmi di R&I dell'UE Opens in new window Rete di collaborazione HORIZON Opens in new window Costo totale € 1 295 062,00 Beneficiari (2) Classifica in ordine alfabetico Classifica per Contributo netto dell'UE Espandi tutto Riduci tutto FONDATION JEAN JACQUES LAFFONT,TOULOUSE SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES Francia Contribution nette de l'UE € 982 562,00 Indirizzo 5E ETAGE, 1 ESP DE L'UNIVERSITE 31080 Toulouse Mostra sulla mappa Regione Occitanie Midi-Pyrénées Haute-Garonne Tipo di attività Research Organisations Collegamenti Contatta l’organizzazione Opens in new window Partecipazione a programmi di R&I dell'UE Opens in new window Rete di collaborazione HORIZON Opens in new window Costo totale € 1 295 062,00 Terza parte Soggetto giuridico diverso da un subappaltatore che è affiliato o legalmente collegato a un partecipante. Il soggetto svolge le attività secondo le condizioni stabilite nell’accordo di sovvenzione, fornisce beni o servizi per l’azione, ma non ha sottoscritto l’accordo di sovvenzione. Una terza parte rispetta le regole applicabili al suo partecipante correlato ai sensi dell’accordo di sovvenzione per quanto riguarda l’ammissibilità dei costi e il controllo delle spese. UNIVERSITE TOULOUSE 1 CAPITOLE Francia Contribution nette de l'UE € 312 500,00 Indirizzo RUE DU DOYEN GABRIEL MARTY 2 31042 Toulouse Mostra sulla mappa Regione Occitanie Midi-Pyrénées Haute-Garonne Tipo di attività Higher or Secondary Education Establishments Collegamenti Contatta l’organizzazione Opens in new window Sito web Opens in new window Partecipazione a programmi di R&I dell'UE Opens in new window Rete di collaborazione HORIZON Opens in new window Costo totale € 312 500,00