Competition and Regulation of Platform Markets

Projektinformationen

PLATFORM

ID Finanzhilfevereinbarung: 759733

DOI 10.3030/759733

Das Projekt endete am 6 April 2023

EK-Unterschriftsdatum 4 April 2018

Startdatum 1 Mai 2018

Enddatum 30 April 2023

Finanziert unter

• EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC)

Gesamtkosten € 848 750,00

EU-Beitrag € 848 750,00

Koordiniert durch

CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE CNRS
France

Ziel

"Despite the obvious efficiency gains generated by platform intermediation, the last few years have witnessed a renewed concern about its impact on consumer welfare. The pricing practices in platform markets raise a number of challenges to economic theory and competition policy, which I plan to address in this research project. Several components of the project are envisaged:

Drip Pricing and Missed Sales

Drip pricing is the practice, common among online retailers, of advertising a basic price at the beginning of the purchase process, following which additional fees, only avoidable at a cost to consumers, are then incrementally disclosed or ""dripped."" I propose a theory to understand the determinants of drip pricing and study optimal regulation in a variety of contexts (card surcharging, shipping and booking fees, airline travel, etc).

Intermediation Fees and Price Coherence

While reducing search and transaction costs, many intermediaries are blamed for inflating prices through high intermediation fees and price coherence clauses, which prohibit firms from practicing lower prices on transactions not mediated by the platform. This project envisions building a theory of price setting by intermediaries and price-coherence clauses, with applications to the regulation of competing payments methods and online search and booking platforms.

Many-to-Many Matching and the Welfare Effects of Customized Pricing

Advances in information technology enabled matching intermediaries (e.g. advertising exchanges) to achieve high levels of targeting (making sure advertisers primarily reach the eyeballs of potential customers) and price customization (whereby prices are buyer-specific and are based on the entire consumption basket of a buyer). The aim of this project is to assess how centralized match-making qualitatively affects equilibrium outcomes, and evaluate the welfare effects of policies prohibiting intermediaries from practicing customized pricing.
"

Schlüsselbegriffe

• platform markets
• two-sided markets
• regulation
• pricing
• intermediation fees
• payment methods
• price discrimination
• search markets

Programm/Programme

• H2020-EU.1.1. - EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC) Main Programme

Thema/Themen

• ERC-2017-STG - ERC Starting Grant

Aufforderung zur Vorschlagseinreichung

ERC-2017-STG

Finanzierungsplan

ERC-STG - Starting Grant

Gastgebende Einrichtung

CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE CNRS

• Netto-EU-Beitrag: € 848 750,00
• Adresse: RUE MICHEL ANGE 3 ; 75794 Paris ; Frankreich
• Region: Ile-de-France › Ile-de-France › Paris
• Aktivitätstyp: Research Organisations
• Gesamtkosten: € 848 750,00

Begünstigte (1)

CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE CNRS

Frankreich

• Netto-EU-Beitrag: € 848 750,00
• Adresse: RUE MICHEL ANGE 3 ; 75794 Paris
• Region: Ile-de-France › Ile-de-France › Paris
• Aktivitätstyp: Research Organisations
• Gesamtkosten: € 848 750,00