Machine Learning-based Market Design

Información del proyecto

MIAMI

Identificador del acuerdo de subvención: 805542

DOI 10.3030/805542

Proyecto cerrado

Fecha de la firma de la CE 17 Octubre 2018

Fecha de inicio 1 Diciembre 2018

Fecha de finalización 30 Noviembre 2023

Financiado con arreglo a

• EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC)

Coste total € 1 375 000,00

Aportación de la UE € 1 375 000,00

Coordinado por

UNIVERSITAT ZURICH
Switzerland

Publicaciones

Other (12)

Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Autores: Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken
Publicado en: 2021
Editor: arxiv

Machine Learning-powered Combinatorial Clock Auction

Autores: Ermis Soumalias, Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Sven Seuken
Publicado en: Proceedings of the Thirty-eight AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'24), 2024
Editor: AAAI

NOMU: Neural Optimization-based Model Uncertainty

Autores: Jakob Heiss, Jakob Weissteiner, Hanna Wutte, Sven Seuken, Josef Teichmann
Publicado en: Proceedings of the Thirty-ninth International Conference on Machine Learning, 2021
Editor: ICML

Learning Solutions in Large Economic Networks using Deep Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Extended Abstract

Autores: Michael Curry; Alexander Trott; Soham Phade; Yu Bai; and Stephan Zheng
Publicado en: International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS), 2023
Editor: AAMAS

Enabling Trade-offs in Machine Learning-based Matching for Refugee Resettlement

Autores: Nils Olberg, Sven Seuken
Publicado en: 2019
Editor: arixv

Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions

Autores: Michael Curry, Tuomas Sandholm,JohnDickerson
Publicado en: Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-23), 2023
Editor: IJCAI

Machine Learning-powered Course Allocation

Autores: Ermis Soumalias, Behnoosh Zamanlooy, Jakob Weissteiner, Sven Seuken
Publicado en: 2024
Editor: arxiv

Search and Matching for Adoption from Foster Care

Autores: Nils Olberg, Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken, Vincent W. Slaugh, M. Utku Ünver
Publicado en: 2021
Editor: arxiv

Learning Best Response Policies in Dynamic Auctions

Autores: Vinzenz Thoma, Michael Curry, Niao He, Sven Seuken
Publicado en: 2024
Editor: arxiv

Computing Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Sequential Auctions with Verification

Autores: Vinzenz Thoma, Vitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken
Publicado en: 2024
Editor: arxiv

Scalable Mechanism Design for Multi-Agent Path Finding

Autores: Paul Friedrich, Yulun Zhang, Michael Curry, Ludwig Dierks, Stephen McAleer, Jiaoyang Li, Tuomas Sandholm, Sven Seuken
Publicado en: 2024
Editor: arxiv

Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms In Dynamic Settings

Autores: Michael J. Curry; Vinzenz Thoma; Darshan Chakrabarti; Stephen Marcus McAleer; Christian Kroer; Tuomas Sandholm; Niao He; and Sven Seuken
Publicado en: AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024
Editor: AAAI

Conference proceedings (6)

Bayesian Optimization-based Combinatorial Assignment

Autores: Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Julien Siems and Sven Seuken
Publicado en: Proceedings of the Thirty-seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023
Editor: AAAI

iMLCA: Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Interval Bidding

Autores: Manuel Beyeler, Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, and Sven Seuken
Publicado en: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021
Editor: ACM

Market Design for Drone Traffic Management

Autores: Sven Seuken, Paul Friedrich, Ludwig Dierks
Publicado en: Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022
Editor: AAAI press

Monotone-Value Neural Networks: Exploiting Preference Monotonicity in Combinatorial Assignment

Autores: Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Julien Siems, Sven Seuken
Publicado en: The 31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022
Editor: IJCAI

Deep Learning—Powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Autores: Jakob Weissteiner, Sven Seuken
Publicado en: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Edición 34/02, 2020, Página(s) 2284-2293, ISSN 2374-3468
Editor: AAAI Press
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5606

Fourier Analysis-based Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Autores: Jakob Weissteiner, Chris Wendler, Sven Seuken, Ben Lubin, and Markus Püschel
Publicado en: The 31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022
Editor: IJCAI