Machine Learning-based Market Design

Informazioni relative al progetto

MIAMI

ID dell’accordo di sovvenzione: 805542

DOI 10.3030/805542

Progetto chiuso

Data della firma CE 17 Ottobre 2018

Data di avvio 1 Dicembre 2018

Data di completamento 30 Novembre 2023

Finanziato da

• EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC)

Costo totale € 1 375 000,00

Contributo UE € 1 375 000,00

Coordinato da

UNIVERSITAT ZURICH
Switzerland

Pubblicazioni

Other (12)

Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Autori: Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken
Pubblicato in: 2021
Editore: arxiv

Machine Learning-powered Combinatorial Clock Auction

Autori: Ermis Soumalias, Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Sven Seuken
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Thirty-eight AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'24), 2024
Editore: AAAI

NOMU: Neural Optimization-based Model Uncertainty

Autori: Jakob Heiss, Jakob Weissteiner, Hanna Wutte, Sven Seuken, Josef Teichmann
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Thirty-ninth International Conference on Machine Learning, 2021
Editore: ICML

Learning Solutions in Large Economic Networks using Deep Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: Extended Abstract

Autori: Michael Curry; Alexander Trott; Soham Phade; Yu Bai; and Stephan Zheng
Pubblicato in: International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems (AAMAS), 2023
Editore: AAMAS

Enabling Trade-offs in Machine Learning-based Matching for Refugee Resettlement

Autori: Nils Olberg, Sven Seuken
Pubblicato in: 2019
Editore: arixv

Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions

Autori: Michael Curry, Tuomas Sandholm,JohnDickerson
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-23), 2023
Editore: IJCAI

Machine Learning-powered Course Allocation

Autori: Ermis Soumalias, Behnoosh Zamanlooy, Jakob Weissteiner, Sven Seuken
Pubblicato in: 2024
Editore: arxiv

Search and Matching for Adoption from Foster Care

Autori: Nils Olberg, Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken, Vincent W. Slaugh, M. Utku Ünver
Pubblicato in: 2021
Editore: arxiv

Learning Best Response Policies in Dynamic Auctions

Autori: Vinzenz Thoma, Michael Curry, Niao He, Sven Seuken
Pubblicato in: 2024
Editore: arxiv

Computing Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Sequential Auctions with Verification

Autori: Vinzenz Thoma, Vitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken
Pubblicato in: 2024
Editore: arxiv

Scalable Mechanism Design for Multi-Agent Path Finding

Autori: Paul Friedrich, Yulun Zhang, Michael Curry, Ludwig Dierks, Stephen McAleer, Jiaoyang Li, Tuomas Sandholm, Sven Seuken
Pubblicato in: 2024
Editore: arxiv

Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms In Dynamic Settings

Autori: Michael J. Curry; Vinzenz Thoma; Darshan Chakrabarti; Stephen Marcus McAleer; Christian Kroer; Tuomas Sandholm; Niao He; and Sven Seuken
Pubblicato in: AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2024
Editore: AAAI

Conference proceedings (6)

Bayesian Optimization-based Combinatorial Assignment

Autori: Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Julien Siems and Sven Seuken
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Thirty-seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2023
Editore: AAAI

iMLCA: Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Interval Bidding

Autori: Manuel Beyeler, Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, and Sven Seuken
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021
Editore: ACM

Market Design for Drone Traffic Management

Autori: Sven Seuken, Paul Friedrich, Ludwig Dierks
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022
Editore: AAAI press

Monotone-Value Neural Networks: Exploiting Preference Monotonicity in Combinatorial Assignment

Autori: Jakob Weissteiner, Jakob Heiss, Julien Siems, Sven Seuken
Pubblicato in: The 31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022
Editore: IJCAI

Deep Learning—Powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Autori: Jakob Weissteiner, Sven Seuken
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Numero 34/02, 2020, Pagina/e 2284-2293, ISSN 2374-3468
Editore: AAAI Press
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5606

Fourier Analysis-based Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

Autori: Jakob Weissteiner, Chris Wendler, Sven Seuken, Ben Lubin, and Markus Püschel
Pubblicato in: The 31st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022
Editore: IJCAI