Publications Conference proceedings (19) Simple Economies are Almost Optimal Auteurs: Amir Ban, Avi Cohen, Shahar Dobzinski, Itai Ashlagi Publié dans: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021, Page(s) 134-135, ISBN 9781450385541 Éditeur: ACM DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467563 Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents Auteurs: Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat Publié dans: 2022 Éditeur: ACM DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20410 Combinatorial Contracts Auteurs: Paul Dutting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim Publié dans: IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2021), 2021 Éditeur: IEEE DOI: 10.1109/focs52979.2021.00084 A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets Auteurs: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler Publié dans: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20), 2020 Éditeur: Association for Computing Machinery On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections Auteurs: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer Publié dans: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-21), 2021 Éditeur: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints Auteurs: Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman and Erel Segal-Halevi Publié dans: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021 Éditeur: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets Auteurs: Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman Publié dans: Web and Internet Economics, 2020 Éditeur: Springer International Publishing General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching Auteurs: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang Publié dans: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC22), 2022 Éditeur: ACM DOI: 10.1145/3490486.3538290 PoA of Simple Auctions with Interependent Values Auteurs: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran Publié dans: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021 Éditeur: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements Auteurs: Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige Publié dans: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC21), 2021 Éditeur: ACM DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467559 An Economics-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching Auteurs: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal Publié dans: Symposium on Simplicity in Algorithms (SOSA), 2021, ISBN 978-1-61197-649-6 Éditeur: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM) Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions Auteurs: Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin Publié dans: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC22), 2022 Éditeur: ACM DOI: 10.1145/3490486.3538247 Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents Auteurs: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer Publié dans: Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT21), 2021 Éditeur: Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding Auteurs: Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai Publié dans: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021 Éditeur: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) Prophet Matching with General Arrivals Auteurs: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang Publié dans: Mathematics of Operations Research MOR21, 2021 Éditeur: Mathematics of Operations Research MOR21 DOI: 10.1287/moor.2021.1152 Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? Auteurs: Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman Publié dans: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC21), 2021 Éditeur: ACM DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467615 Two-Price Equilibrium Auteurs: Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld Publié dans: AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI22), 2022 Éditeur: ACM DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20432 PoA of Simple Auctions with Interependent Values Auteurs: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran Publié dans: AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence AAAI 21, 2021 Éditeur: ACM Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models Auteurs: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang Publié dans: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20), 2020 Éditeur: Association for Computing Machinery Other (3) Simple Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Rich Advertising Auctions Auteurs: Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Aranyak Mehta, Divyarthi Mohan, Alexandros Psomas Publié dans: 2022 Éditeur: arxiv Interdependent Public Projects Auteurs: Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divyarthi Mohan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen Publié dans: 2022 Éditeur: arxiv DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2204.08044 On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Prophet Inequality Auteurs: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang Publié dans: 2022 Éditeur: arxiv DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2202.09215 Peer reviewed articles (1) A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. Auteurs: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg Publié dans: Operations Research, 2020, ISSN 1526-5463 Éditeur: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences DOI: 10.1287/opre.2020.2039 Recherche de données OpenAIRE... Une erreur s’est produite lors de la recherche de données OpenAIRE Aucun résultat disponible
