Robust Algorithmic Game Theory

Project Information

RAGT

Grant agreement ID: 866132

DOI

10.3030/866132

Project closed

EC signature date 17 December 2019

Start date 1 March 2020

End date 31 July 2025

Funded under

• EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC)

Total cost

€ 1 717 875,00

EU contribution

€ 1 717 875,00

Coordinated by

TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY
Israel

CORDIS provides links to public deliverables and publications of HORIZON projects.

Links to deliverables and publications from FP7 projects, as well as links to some specific result types such as dataset and software, are dynamically retrieved from OpenAIRE .

Publications

Conference proceedings (34)

Simple Economies are Almost Optimal

Author(s): Amir Ban, Avi Cohen, Shahar Dobzinski, Itai Ashlagi
Published in: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021, Page(s) 134-135, ISBN 9781450385541
Publisher: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467563

Pandora’s Problem with Deadlines

Author(s): Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco
Published in: 2024
Publisher: AAAI
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v38i18.30015

Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents

Author(s): Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat
Published in: 2022
Publisher: ACM
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20410

Combinatorial Contracts

Author(s): Paul Dutting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim
Published in: IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2021), 2021
Publisher: IEEE
DOI: 10.1109/focs52979.2021.00084

A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets

Author(s): Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
Published in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20), 2020
Publisher: Association for Computing Machinery

The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities

Author(s): Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Victor Verdugo
Published in: 2024
Publisher: ACM (EC24)
DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2402.11084

On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections

Author(s): Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
Published in: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-21), 2021
Publisher: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)

On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints

Author(s): Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman and Erel Segal-Halevi
Published in: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021
Publisher: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence

Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes

Author(s): Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur
Published in: 2024
Publisher: SODA 2024
DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2309.10766

On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets

Author(s): Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman
Published in: Web and Internet Economics, 2020
Publisher: Springer International Publishing

Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents

Author(s): Feldman, Michal; Fusco, Federico; Mauras, Simon; Reiffenhäuser, Rebecca
Published in: 2023
Publisher: ICALP
DOI: 10.1007/s00453-023-01202-3

General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching

Author(s): Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Published in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC22), 2022
Publisher: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3490486.3538290

Algorithmic Contract Design (Keynote)

Author(s): Michal Feldman
Published in: Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2024, Page(s) 2-2
Publisher: STOC 24
DOI: 10.1145/3618260.3664273

PoA of Simple Auctions with Interependent Values

Author(s): Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran
Published in: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021
Publisher: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence

On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts

Author(s): Ezra, Tomer; Feldman, Michal; Schlesinger, Maya
Published in: 2024
Publisher: ITCS
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2311.18425

Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements

Author(s): Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige
Published in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC21), 2021
Publisher: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467559

Fair Division via Quantile Shares

Author(s): Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman, Vishnu V. Narayan
Published in: Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2024, Page(s) 1235-1246
Publisher: STOC 24
DOI: 10.1145/3618260.3649728

On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare

Author(s): Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Tomasz Ponitka:
Published in: 2024
Publisher: AAAI
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28826

Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost

Author(s): Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco
Published in: Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023, Page(s) 273-292
Publisher: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3580507.3597699

An Economics-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching

Author(s): Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal
Published in: Symposium on Simplicity in Algorithms (SOSA), 2021, ISBN 978-1-61197-649-6
Publisher: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM)

Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations

Author(s): Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Kira Goldner, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan
Published in: 2023
Publisher: FOCS 2023
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS57990.2023.00018

Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations

Author(s): Feldman, Michal; Mauras, Simon; Narayan, Vishnu V.; Ponitka, Tomasz
Published in: Issue 11, 2024
Publisher: ACM (EC24)
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2304.03706

Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions

Author(s): Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
Published in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC22), 2022
Publisher: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3490486.3538247

Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via $(p,q)$-Veto Core

Author(s): Berger, Ben; Feldman, Michal; Gkatzelis, Vasilis; Tan, Xizhi
Published in: 2024
Publisher: ACM (EC24)
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2307.07495

Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents

Author(s): Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
Published in: Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT21), 2021
Publisher: Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory

Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding

Author(s): Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai
Published in: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021
Publisher: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)

Ambiguous Contracts

Author(s): Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz
Published in: Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023, Page(s) 539-539
Publisher: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3580507.3597692

Prophet Matching with General Arrivals

Author(s): Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research MOR21, 2021
Publisher: Mathematics of Operations Research MOR21
DOI: 10.1287/moor.2021.1152

Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms

Author(s): Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Published in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC24), 2024
Publisher: ACM
DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2402.17160

Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations?

Author(s): Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman
Published in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC21), 2021
Publisher: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467615

Two-Price Equilibrium

Author(s): Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld
Published in: AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI22), 2022
Publisher: ACM
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20432

PoA of Simple Auctions with Interependent Values

Author(s): Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran
Published in: AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence AAAI 21, 2021
Publisher: ACM

Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids

Author(s): Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan
Published in: 2024
Publisher: ACM (EC24)
DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2402.12017

Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models

Author(s): Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Published in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20), 2020
Publisher: Association for Computing Machinery

Non-peer reviewed articles (3)

Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents

Author(s): Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi, Simon Mauras, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
Published in: Algorithmica, Issue 86, 2024, Page(s) 1600-1622, ISSN 0178-4617
Publisher: Springer Verlag
DOI: 10.1007/s00453-023-01202-3

Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding

Author(s): Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior, Issue 140, 2023, Page(s) 316-340, ISSN 0899-8256
Publisher: Academic Press
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.009

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue

Author(s): Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research, Issue 49, 2024, Page(s) 653-674, ISSN 0364-765X
Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
DOI: 10.1287/moor.2023.1371

Peer reviewed articles (2)

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements.

Author(s): Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
Published in: Operations Research, 2020, ISSN 1526-5463
Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
DOI: 10.1287/opre.2020.2039

Pricing Multi-Unit Markets

Author(s): Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong
Published in: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2020, ISSN 2167-8383
Publisher: Association for Computing Machinery

Other (1)

On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Prophet Inequality

Author(s): Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Published in: 2022
Publisher: arxiv
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2202.09215

Book chapters (1)

Interdependent Public Projects

Author(s): Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divyarthi Mohan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Published in: Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2023, Page(s) 416-443
Publisher: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
DOI: 10.1137/1.9781611977554.ch18