Publications Conference proceedings (19) Simple Economies are Almost Optimal Author(s): Amir Ban, Avi Cohen, Shahar Dobzinski, Itai Ashlagi Published in: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021, Page(s) 134-135, ISBN 9781450385541 Publisher: ACM DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467563 Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents Author(s): Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat Published in: 2022 Publisher: ACM DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20410 Combinatorial Contracts Author(s): Paul Dutting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim Published in: IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2021), 2021 Publisher: IEEE DOI: 10.1109/focs52979.2021.00084 A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets Author(s): Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler Published in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20), 2020 Publisher: Association for Computing Machinery On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections Author(s): Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer Published in: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-21), 2021 Publisher: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints Author(s): Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman and Erel Segal-Halevi Published in: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021 Publisher: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets Author(s): Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman Published in: Web and Internet Economics, 2020 Publisher: Springer International Publishing General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching Author(s): Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang Published in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC22), 2022 Publisher: ACM DOI: 10.1145/3490486.3538290 PoA of Simple Auctions with Interependent Values Author(s): Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran Published in: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021 Publisher: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements Author(s): Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige Published in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC21), 2021 Publisher: ACM DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467559 An Economics-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching Author(s): Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal Published in: Symposium on Simplicity in Algorithms (SOSA), 2021, ISBN 978-1-61197-649-6 Publisher: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM) Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions Author(s): Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin Published in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC22), 2022 Publisher: ACM DOI: 10.1145/3490486.3538247 Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents Author(s): Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer Published in: Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT21), 2021 Publisher: Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding Author(s): Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai Published in: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021 Publisher: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) Prophet Matching with General Arrivals Author(s): Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research MOR21, 2021 Publisher: Mathematics of Operations Research MOR21 DOI: 10.1287/moor.2021.1152 Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? Author(s): Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman Published in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC21), 2021 Publisher: ACM DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467615 Two-Price Equilibrium Author(s): Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld Published in: AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI22), 2022 Publisher: ACM DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20432 PoA of Simple Auctions with Interependent Values Author(s): Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran Published in: AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence AAAI 21, 2021 Publisher: ACM Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models Author(s): Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang Published in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20), 2020 Publisher: Association for Computing Machinery Other (3) Simple Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Rich Advertising Auctions Author(s): Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Aranyak Mehta, Divyarthi Mohan, Alexandros Psomas Published in: 2022 Publisher: arxiv Interdependent Public Projects Author(s): Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divyarthi Mohan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen Published in: 2022 Publisher: arxiv DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2204.08044 On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Prophet Inequality Author(s): Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang Published in: 2022 Publisher: arxiv DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2202.09215 Peer reviewed articles (1) A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. Author(s): Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg Published in: Operations Research, 2020, ISSN 1526-5463 Publisher: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences DOI: 10.1287/opre.2020.2039 Searching for OpenAIRE data... There was an error trying to search data from OpenAIRE No results available