Pubblicazioni Conference proceedings (19) Simple Economies are Almost Optimal Autori: Amir Ban, Avi Cohen, Shahar Dobzinski, Itai Ashlagi Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021, Page(s) 134-135, ISBN 9781450385541 Editore: ACM DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467563 Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents Autori: Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat Pubblicato in: 2022 Editore: ACM DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20410 Combinatorial Contracts Autori: Paul Dutting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim Pubblicato in: IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2021), 2021 Editore: IEEE DOI: 10.1109/focs52979.2021.00084 A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets Autori: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler Pubblicato in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20), 2020 Editore: Association for Computing Machinery On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections Autori: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer Pubblicato in: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-21), 2021 Editore: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI) On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints Autori: Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman and Erel Segal-Halevi Pubblicato in: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021 Editore: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets Autori: Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman Pubblicato in: Web and Internet Economics, 2020 Editore: Springer International Publishing General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching Autori: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang Pubblicato in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC22), 2022 Editore: ACM DOI: 10.1145/3490486.3538290 PoA of Simple Auctions with Interependent Values Autori: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran Pubblicato in: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021 Editore: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements Autori: Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige Pubblicato in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC21), 2021 Editore: ACM DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467559 An Economics-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching Autori: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal Pubblicato in: Symposium on Simplicity in Algorithms (SOSA), 2021, ISBN 978-1-61197-649-6 Editore: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM) Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions Autori: Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin Pubblicato in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC22), 2022 Editore: ACM DOI: 10.1145/3490486.3538247 Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents Autori: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer Pubblicato in: Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT21), 2021 Editore: Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding Autori: Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai Pubblicato in: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021 Editore: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) Prophet Matching with General Arrivals Autori: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang Pubblicato in: Mathematics of Operations Research MOR21, 2021 Editore: Mathematics of Operations Research MOR21 DOI: 10.1287/moor.2021.1152 Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? Autori: Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman Pubblicato in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC21), 2021 Editore: ACM DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467615 Two-Price Equilibrium Autori: Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld Pubblicato in: AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI22), 2022 Editore: ACM DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20432 PoA of Simple Auctions with Interependent Values Autori: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran Pubblicato in: AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence AAAI 21, 2021 Editore: ACM Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models Autori: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang Pubblicato in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20), 2020 Editore: Association for Computing Machinery Other (3) Simple Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Rich Advertising Auctions Autori: Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Aranyak Mehta, Divyarthi Mohan, Alexandros Psomas Pubblicato in: 2022 Editore: arxiv Interdependent Public Projects Autori: Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divyarthi Mohan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen Pubblicato in: 2022 Editore: arxiv DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2204.08044 On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Prophet Inequality Autori: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang Pubblicato in: 2022 Editore: arxiv DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2202.09215 Peer reviewed articles (1) A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. Autori: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg Pubblicato in: Operations Research, 2020, ISSN 1526-5463 Editore: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences DOI: 10.1287/opre.2020.2039 È in corso la ricerca di dati su OpenAIRE... Si è verificato un errore durante la ricerca dei dati su OpenAIRE Nessun risultato disponibile