Robust Algorithmic Game Theory

Informazioni relative al progetto

RAGT

ID dell’accordo di sovvenzione: 866132

DOI

10.3030/866132

Progetto chiuso

Data della firma CE 17 Dicembre 2019

Data di avvio 1 Marzo 2020

Data di completamento 31 Luglio 2025

Finanziato da

• EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC)

Costo totale

€ 1 717 875,00

Contributo UE

€ 1 717 875,00

Coordinato da

TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY
Israel

CORDIS fornisce collegamenti ai risultati finali pubblici e alle pubblicazioni dei progetti ORIZZONTE.

I link ai risultati e alle pubblicazioni dei progetti del 7° PQ, così come i link ad alcuni tipi di risultati specifici come dataset e software, sono recuperati dinamicamente da .OpenAIRE .

Pubblicazioni

Conference proceedings (46)

Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via (p,q)-Veto Core

Autori: Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan
Pubblicato in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'24), 2024
Editore: ACM

On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare

Autori: Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Tomasz Ponitka
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Numero 38, 2024, Pagina/e 9688-9695
Editore: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28826

Budget-Feasible Contracts

Autori: Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, Maya Schlesinger
Pubblicato in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'25), 2025
Editore: ACM

Simple Economies are Almost Optimal

Autori: Amir Ban, Avi Cohen, Shahar Dobzinski, Itai Ashlagi
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021, Pagina/e 134-135, ISBN 9781450385541
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467563

Pandora’s Problem with Deadlines

Autori: Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco
Pubblicato in: 2024
Editore: AAAI
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v38i18.30015

Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents

Autori: Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat
Pubblicato in: 2022
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20410

Combinatorial Contracts

Autori: Paul Dutting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim
Pubblicato in: IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2021), 2021
Editore: IEEE
DOI: 10.1109/focs52979.2021.00084

A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets

Autori: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
Pubblicato in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20), 2020
Editore: Association for Computing Machinery

The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities

Autori: Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Victor Verdugo
Pubblicato in: 2024
Editore: ACM (EC24)
DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2402.11084

The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities

Autori: Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Victor Verdugo
Pubblicato in: Mathematics of Operations Research, Numero ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'24), 2025
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.1287/moor.2024.0684

The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts

Autori: Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Tomasz Ponitka, Ermis Soumalias
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 26th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Numero EC25, 2025, Pagina/e 514-539
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3736252.3742585

On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections

Autori: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
Pubblicato in: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-21), 2021
Editore: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)

On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints

Autori: Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman and Erel Segal-Halevi
Pubblicato in: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021
Editore: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence

Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes

Autori: Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur
Pubblicato in: 2024
Editore: SODA 2024
DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2309.10766

On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets

Autori: Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman
Pubblicato in: Web and Internet Economics, 2020
Editore: Springer International Publishing

Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents

Autori: Feldman, Michal; Fusco, Federico; Mauras, Simon; Reiffenhäuser, Rebecca
Pubblicato in: 2023
Editore: ICALP
DOI: 10.1007/s00453-023-01202-3

General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching

Autori: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Pubblicato in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC22), 2022
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3490486.3538290

Algorithmic Contract Design (Keynote)

Autori: Michal Feldman
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2024, Pagina/e 2-2
Editore: STOC 24
DOI: 10.1145/3618260.3664273

PoA of Simple Auctions with Interependent Values

Autori: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran
Pubblicato in: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021
Editore: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence

On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts

Autori: Ezra, Tomer; Feldman, Michal; Schlesinger, Maya
Pubblicato in: 2024
Editore: ITCS
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2311.18425

Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements

Autori: Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige
Pubblicato in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC21), 2021
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467559

Fair Division via Quantile Shares

Autori: Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman, Vishnu V. Narayan
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2024, Pagina/e 1235-1246
Editore: STOC 24
DOI: 10.1145/3618260.3649728

On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare

Autori: Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Tomasz Ponitka:
Pubblicato in: 2024
Editore: AAAI
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28826

Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost

Autori: Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023, Pagina/e 273-292
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3580507.3597699

Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts

Autori: Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, and Thomas Kesselheim
Pubblicato in: ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA25), 2025
Editore: SODA

Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids

Autori: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Numero ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'24), 2025, Pagina/e 448-464
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3670865.3673581

An Economics-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching

Autori: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal
Pubblicato in: Symposium on Simplicity in Algorithms (SOSA), 2021, ISBN 978-1-61197-649-6
Editore: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM)

Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations

Autori: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Kira Goldner, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan
Pubblicato in: 2023
Editore: FOCS 2023
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS57990.2023.00018

Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations

Autori: Feldman, Michal; Mauras, Simon; Narayan, Vishnu V.; Ponitka, Tomasz
Pubblicato in: Numero 11, 2024
Editore: ACM (EC24)
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2304.03706

Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions

Autori: Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
Pubblicato in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC22), 2022
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3490486.3538247

Proportionally Fair Makespan Approximation

Autori: Michal Feldman, Jugal Garg, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka
Pubblicato in: AAAI 2025, 2025
Editore: AAAI

Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via $(p,q)$-Veto Core

Autori: Berger, Ben; Feldman, Michal; Gkatzelis, Vasilis; Tan, Xizhi
Pubblicato in: 2024
Editore: ACM (EC24)
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2307.07495

Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents

Autori: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
Pubblicato in: Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT21), 2021
Editore: Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory

Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations

Autori: Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka
Pubblicato in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'24), 2024
Editore: ACM

Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding

Autori: Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai
Pubblicato in: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021
Editore: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)

Ambiguous Contracts

Autori: Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023, Pagina/e 539-539
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3580507.3597692

Online Combinatorial Allocation with Interdependent Values

Autori: Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 26th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Numero EC25, 2025, Pagina/e 189-205
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3736252.3742518

Prophet Matching with General Arrivals

Autori: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Pubblicato in: Mathematics of Operations Research MOR21, 2021
Editore: Mathematics of Operations Research MOR21
DOI: 10.1287/moor.2021.1152

Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms

Autori: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Pubblicato in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC24), 2024
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2402.17160

Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms

Autori: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Pubblicato in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'24), 2024
Editore: ACM

Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations?

Autori: Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman
Pubblicato in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC21), 2021
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467615

Two-Price Equilibrium

Autori: Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld
Pubblicato in: AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI22), 2022
Editore: ACM
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20432

PoA of Simple Auctions with Interependent Values

Autori: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran
Pubblicato in: AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence AAAI 21, 2021
Editore: ACM

Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids

Autori: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan
Pubblicato in: 2024
Editore: ACM (EC24)
DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2402.12017

Pandora’s Problem with Deadlines

Autori: Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Numero 38, 2024, Pagina/e 20337-20343, ISSN 2374-3468
Editore: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v38i18.30015

Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models

Autori: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Pubblicato in: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20), 2020
Editore: Association for Computing Machinery

Non-peer reviewed articles (3)

Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents

Autori: Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi, Simon Mauras, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
Pubblicato in: Algorithmica, Numero 86, 2024, Pagina/e 1600-1622, ISSN 0178-4617
Editore: Springer Verlag
DOI: 10.1007/s00453-023-01202-3

Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding

Autori: Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai
Pubblicato in: Games and Economic Behavior, Numero 140, 2023, Pagina/e 316-340, ISSN 0899-8256
Editore: Academic Press
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.009

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue

Autori: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin
Pubblicato in: Mathematics of Operations Research, Numero 49, 2024, Pagina/e 653-674, ISSN 0364-765X
Editore: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
DOI: 10.1287/moor.2023.1371

Peer reviewed articles (3)

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements.

Autori: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
Pubblicato in: Operations Research, 2020, ISSN 1526-5463
Editore: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
DOI: 10.1287/opre.2020.2039

Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions

Autori: Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
Pubblicato in: Operations Research, 2025, ISSN 1723-2295
Editore: Operations Research

Pricing Multi-Unit Markets

Autori: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong
Pubblicato in: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2020, ISSN 2167-8383
Editore: Association for Computing Machinery

Other (1)

On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Prophet Inequality

Autori: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Pubblicato in: 2022
Editore: arxiv
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2202.09215

Book chapters (1)

Interdependent Public Projects

Autori: Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divyarthi Mohan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Pubblicato in: Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2023, Pagina/e 416-443
Editore: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
DOI: 10.1137/1.9781611977554.ch18