Robust Algorithmic Game Theory

Simple Economies are Almost Optimal

Autores: Amir Ban, Avi Cohen, Shahar Dobzinski, Itai Ashlagi
Publicado en: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021, Página(s) 134-135, ISBN 9781450385541
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467563

Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents

Autores: Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat
Publicado en: 2022
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20410

Combinatorial Contracts

Autores: Paul Dutting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim
Publicado en: IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2021), 2021
Editor: IEEE
DOI: 10.1109/focs52979.2021.00084

A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets

Autores: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
Publicado en: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20), 2020
Editor: Association for Computing Machinery

On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections

Autores: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
Publicado en: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-21), 2021
Editor: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)

On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints

Autores: Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman and Erel Segal-Halevi
Publicado en: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021
Editor: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence

On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets

Autores: Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman
Publicado en: Web and Internet Economics, 2020
Editor: Springer International Publishing

General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching

Autores: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Publicado en: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC22), 2022
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3490486.3538290

PoA of Simple Auctions with Interependent Values

Autores: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran
Publicado en: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021
Editor: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence

Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements

Autores: Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige
Publicado en: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC21), 2021
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467559

An Economics-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching

Autores: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal
Publicado en: Symposium on Simplicity in Algorithms (SOSA), 2021, ISBN 978-1-61197-649-6
Editor: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM)

Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions

Autores: Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
Publicado en: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC22), 2022
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3490486.3538247

Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents

Autores: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
Publicado en: Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT21), 2021
Editor: Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory

Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding

Autores: Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai
Publicado en: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021
Editor: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)

Prophet Matching with General Arrivals

Autores: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Publicado en: Mathematics of Operations Research MOR21, 2021
Editor: Mathematics of Operations Research MOR21
DOI: 10.1287/moor.2021.1152

Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations?

Autores: Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman
Publicado en: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC21), 2021
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467615

Two-Price Equilibrium

Autores: Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld
Publicado en: AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI22), 2022
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20432

PoA of Simple Auctions with Interependent Values

Autores: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran
Publicado en: AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence AAAI 21, 2021
Editor: ACM

Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models

Autores: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Publicado en: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20), 2020
Editor: Association for Computing Machinery

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements.

Autores: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
Publicado en: Operations Research, 2020, ISSN 1526-5463
Editor: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
DOI: 10.1287/opre.2020.2039

On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Prophet Inequality

Autores: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Publicado en: 2022
Editor: arxiv
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2202.09215

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