Robust Algorithmic Game Theory

Información del proyecto

RAGT

Identificador del acuerdo de subvención: 866132

DOI

10.3030/866132

Proyecto cerrado

Fecha de la firma de la CE 17 Diciembre 2019

Fecha de inicio 1 Marzo 2020

Fecha de finalización 31 Julio 2025

Financiado con arreglo a

• EXCELLENT SCIENCE - European Research Council (ERC)

Coste total

€ 1 717 875,00

Aportación de la UE

€ 1 717 875,00

Coordinado por

TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY
Israel

CORDIS proporciona enlaces a los documentos públicos y las publicaciones de los proyectos de los programas marco HORIZONTE.

Los enlaces a los documentos y las publicaciones de los proyectos del Séptimo Programa Marco, así como los enlaces a algunos tipos de resultados específicos, como conjuntos de datos y «software», se obtienen dinámicamente de OpenAIRE .

Publicaciones

Conference proceedings (46)

Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via (p,q)-Veto Core

Autores: Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan
Publicado en: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'24), 2024
Editor: ACM

On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare

Autores: Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Tomasz Ponitka
Publicado en: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Edición 38, 2024, Página(s) 9688-9695
Editor: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28826

Budget-Feasible Contracts

Autores: Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, Maya Schlesinger
Publicado en: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'25), 2025
Editor: ACM

Simple Economies are Almost Optimal

Autores: Amir Ban, Avi Cohen, Shahar Dobzinski, Itai Ashlagi
Publicado en: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2021, Página(s) 134-135, ISBN 9781450385541
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467563

Pandora’s Problem with Deadlines

Autores: Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco
Publicado en: 2024
Editor: AAAI
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v38i18.30015

Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents

Autores: Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat
Publicado en: 2022
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20410

Combinatorial Contracts

Autores: Paul Dutting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim
Publicado en: IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2021), 2021
Editor: IEEE
DOI: 10.1109/focs52979.2021.00084

A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets

Autores: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler
Publicado en: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20), 2020
Editor: Association for Computing Machinery

The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities

Autores: Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Victor Verdugo
Publicado en: 2024
Editor: ACM (EC24)
DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2402.11084

The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities

Autores: Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Victor Verdugo
Publicado en: Mathematics of Operations Research, Edición ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'24), 2025
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1287/moor.2024.0684

The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts

Autores: Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Tomasz Ponitka, Ermis Soumalias
Publicado en: Proceedings of the 26th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Edición EC25, 2025, Página(s) 514-539
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3736252.3742585

On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections

Autores: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
Publicado en: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI-21), 2021
Editor: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)

On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints

Autores: Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman and Erel Segal-Halevi
Publicado en: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021
Editor: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence

Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutes

Autores: Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur
Publicado en: 2024
Editor: SODA 2024
DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2309.10766

On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets

Autores: Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman
Publicado en: Web and Internet Economics, 2020
Editor: Springer International Publishing

Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents

Autores: Feldman, Michal; Fusco, Federico; Mauras, Simon; Reiffenhäuser, Rebecca
Publicado en: 2023
Editor: ICALP
DOI: 10.1007/s00453-023-01202-3

General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching

Autores: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Publicado en: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC22), 2022
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3490486.3538290

Algorithmic Contract Design (Keynote)

Autores: Michal Feldman
Publicado en: Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2024, Página(s) 2-2
Editor: STOC 24
DOI: 10.1145/3618260.3664273

PoA of Simple Auctions with Interependent Values

Autores: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran
Publicado en: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021
Editor: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence

On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contracts

Autores: Ezra, Tomer; Feldman, Michal; Schlesinger, Maya
Publicado en: 2024
Editor: ITCS
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2311.18425

Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements

Autores: Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige
Publicado en: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC21), 2021
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467559

Fair Division via Quantile Shares

Autores: Yakov Babichenko, Michal Feldman, Ron Holzman, Vishnu V. Narayan
Publicado en: Proceedings of the 56th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2024, Página(s) 1235-1246
Editor: STOC 24
DOI: 10.1145/3618260.3649728

On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare

Autores: Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Tomasz Ponitka:
Publicado en: 2024
Editor: AAAI
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28826

Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost

Autores: Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco
Publicado en: Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023, Página(s) 273-292
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3580507.3597699

Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts

Autores: Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, and Thomas Kesselheim
Publicado en: ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA25), 2025
Editor: SODA

Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids

Autores: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan
Publicado en: Proceedings of the 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Edición ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'24), 2025, Página(s) 448-464
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3670865.3673581

An Economics-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching

Autores: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal
Publicado en: Symposium on Simplicity in Algorithms (SOSA), 2021, ISBN 978-1-61197-649-6
Editor: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics (SIAM)

Constant Approximation for Private Interdependent Valuations

Autores: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Kira Goldner, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan
Publicado en: 2023
Editor: FOCS 2023
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS57990.2023.00018

Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations

Autores: Feldman, Michal; Mauras, Simon; Narayan, Vishnu V.; Ponitka, Tomasz
Publicado en: Edición 11, 2024
Editor: ACM (EC24)
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2304.03706

Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions

Autores: Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
Publicado en: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC22), 2022
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3490486.3538247

Proportionally Fair Makespan Approximation

Autores: Michal Feldman, Jugal Garg, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka
Publicado en: AAAI 2025, 2025
Editor: AAAI

Learning-Augmented Metric Distortion via $(p,q)$-Veto Core

Autores: Berger, Ben; Feldman, Michal; Gkatzelis, Vasilis; Tan, Xizhi
Publicado en: 2024
Editor: ACM (EC24)
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2307.07495

Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents

Autores: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer
Publicado en: Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT21), 2021
Editor: Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory

Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations

Autores: Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka
Publicado en: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'24), 2024
Editor: ACM

Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding

Autores: Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai
Publicado en: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI21), 2021
Editor: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)

Ambiguous Contracts

Autores: Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz
Publicado en: Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, 2023, Página(s) 539-539
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3580507.3597692

Online Combinatorial Allocation with Interdependent Values

Autores: Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
Publicado en: Proceedings of the 26th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Edición EC25, 2025, Página(s) 189-205
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3736252.3742518

Prophet Matching with General Arrivals

Autores: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Publicado en: Mathematics of Operations Research MOR21, 2021
Editor: Mathematics of Operations Research MOR21
DOI: 10.1287/moor.2021.1152

Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms

Autores: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Publicado en: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC24), 2024
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2402.17160

Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms

Autores: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Publicado en: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'24), 2024
Editor: ACM

Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations?

Autores: Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman
Publicado en: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC21), 2021
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1145/3465456.3467615

Two-Price Equilibrium

Autores: Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld
Publicado en: AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI22), 2022
Editor: ACM
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20432

PoA of Simple Auctions with Interependent Values

Autores: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran
Publicado en: AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence AAAI 21, 2021
Editor: ACM

Private Interdependent Valuations: New Bounds for Single-Item Auctions and Matroids

Autores: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan
Publicado en: 2024
Editor: ACM (EC24)
DOI: 10.48550/arXiv.2402.12017

Pandora’s Problem with Deadlines

Autores: Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco
Publicado en: Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Edición 38, 2024, Página(s) 20337-20343, ISSN 2374-3468
Editor: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI)
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v38i18.30015

Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models

Autores: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Publicado en: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'20), 2020
Editor: Association for Computing Machinery

Non-peer reviewed articles (3)

Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents

Autores: Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi, Simon Mauras, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser
Publicado en: Algorithmica, Edición 86, 2024, Página(s) 1600-1622, ISSN 0178-4617
Editor: Springer Verlag
DOI: 10.1007/s00453-023-01202-3

Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding

Autores: Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai
Publicado en: Games and Economic Behavior, Edición 140, 2023, Página(s) 316-340, ISSN 0899-8256
Editor: Academic Press
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.009

Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue

Autores: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin
Publicado en: Mathematics of Operations Research, Edición 49, 2024, Página(s) 653-674, ISSN 0364-765X
Editor: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
DOI: 10.1287/moor.2023.1371

Peer reviewed articles (3)

A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements.

Autores: Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg
Publicado en: Operations Research, 2020, ISSN 1526-5463
Editor: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
DOI: 10.1287/opre.2020.2039

Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions

Autores: Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin
Publicado en: Operations Research, 2025, ISSN 1723-2295
Editor: Operations Research

Pricing Multi-Unit Markets

Autores: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong
Publicado en: ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 2020, ISSN 2167-8383
Editor: Association for Computing Machinery

Other (1)

On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Prophet Inequality

Autores: Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang
Publicado en: 2022
Editor: arxiv
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2202.09215

Book chapters (1)

Interdependent Public Projects

Autores: Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divyarthi Mohan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Publicado en: Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2023, Página(s) 416-443
Editor: Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics
DOI: 10.1137/1.9781611977554.ch18