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Risultati finali
Effort regulations in fisheries is exerted by allocation of a limited number of fishing days to groups of vessels or individual vessels. The Common Fisheries Policy of the EU allows for the use of laying-up premiums as a measure to reduce the annual number of fishing days. The study investigates the effects of different allocations of fishing days in case of Denmark and Holland, and the shadow values that arise from such allocations. The shadow value is the contribution to the vessel�s profit from one extra fishing day (or one extra tonne of fish). In the Italian case the study investigated the willingness of the individual fisherman to accept the premium for laying-up.
The results are that the allocation of fishing days based on the current number of vessels entail shadow values, which means that fishermen could gain from exceeding the number of allocated fishing days. In the Italian case the laying-up premium offered to the fishermen based on average economic performance of vessels was not calculated precise enough compared to the utility of premium to induce all the relevant fishermen to accept the premium and stop fishing.
Finally based on the methodology of principal-agent (cf. economic theory of information) these results were evaluated, and the result was that it is important to take into account the required corrections that are results of asymmetric information. Relative to full information allocations, the allocations based on asymmetric information are different. The problem is referred to in literature as �adverse selection� of hidden information problems.
1) The study has used a new method from the economic theory of information in the assessment of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the EU.
2) The study is carried out in the field of fisheries economics, which to a large extent draws on the same basic theory as environmental economics (Annex 4 C13) and conservation of natural resources.
3) The current state of art is that for practical management purposes, command and control measures are used in CFP to regulate fishing effort based on e.g. number of fishing days. Often theoretical analysis advice that economic measures should be applied to influence incentives of fishermen. The current state of art in economic analyses is that they are based on full information. The innovation introduced with our study is the application of the principal-agent method in association with a linear programming approch to calculate economic incentives represented by shadow values.
4) The implementation of the results would require hardware and software to calculate annual shadow values of fishing days. The better the information base the better the results. A good data base is required and does not always exist in many cases, while the required software to calculate economic incentives and effort allocations are available.
Controls on output in fishery are designed to regulate fishing mortality directly. The focus is placed on the economic incentives which drive fishing vessels to exceed quotas or otherwise to confound the manager�s objectives in terms of fishing mortality levels. It also addresses the incentive structure which makes economic outcomes sensitive to the way in which managers implement quota controls.
Viewed as an agency problem, with the regulator as principal and the fishing vessels as agents, the principal has a disutility for catches in excess of the TAC while the agents collectively have a utility for catches in excess of the TAC. The basic problem of quota regulation in fisheries is not a classic agency problem of this type. Firstly, the principal is only interested in the outcome per se and not in the agent�s actions. Secondly, the problem for the principal is trivial if the outcome can be observed. The fundamental real-world difficulty for the principal in the quota regulation problem is to observe the outcome.
The problem has been analyzed by developing qualitative economic models for a number of different cases e.g. single species, multi-species fisheries, individual non-transferable quotas, and individual transferable quotas. Given a fishery quota that is less than the total economic capacity of the fleet, it is axiomatic that there will be incentives to exceed any individual quotas which are applied by the management authority.
The only real practical solution to the problem of over-quota landings and discarding are provided by tradable quota systems, but there will always be some residual incentives to discard marketable fish. The problem is that it is not possible to observe the catches that are the subject for regulation, only the landings. A solution could be to subsidize or tax changes in fish stock size. The importance of non-monetary incentives is recognized and emphasized. The utility of a quota violation can be reduced, possibly to zero, if there are normative or social incentives to comply. Aspects of the overall management system which engender or strengthen non-monetary incentives to comply are important to consider. Linked to this, the asset value acquired by ITQs may considerably influence compliance decisions, particularly where the fishery is organized in such a way that compliance is observed by other fishermen.
1) The study has used a new method from the economic theory of information in the assessment of the TAC/quota regulation of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the EU.
2) The study is carried out in the field of fisheries economics, which to a large extent draws on the same basic theory as environmental economics and conservation of natural resources.
3) The current state-of-the-art is that for practical management purposes, command and control measures are used in quota management of the CFP. Theoretical analysis advice that economic measures should be applied to influence incentives of fishermen. The current state-of-the-art in economic analyses is that they are based on full information. The innovation introduced with our study is the application of the principal-agent method in association with economic incentives estimated by non-numerical economic models of fishermen behavior. In output regulation (TAC and quota) is it difficult to imagine that command, control, and enforcement be totally replaced by subsidies or taxes to correct incentives. The reason is that it is difficult to observe the variable (the catch) which is the target for the regulation. What could be observed is the landings.
4. The implementation of the results does not necessarily require any hardware or software. However, the better the information base the better the management. A good data base is required and does not always exist in many cases, while the required software to calculate economic incentives and quota allocations are available.
If the objective is to harvest a target sustainable yield from the fish stock, capacity, as a production flow, can be compared to this target. Capacity adjustment considers how inputs may be reduced relative to a desired level of output such as Total Allowable Catch. If the principal does not know what the agent will do after the contract about decommissioning has been signed, a hidden action problem arises. If the principal has incomplete information about e.g. the revenue (utility), the cost functions, or the production technology of the agents hidden information is relevant to capacity adjustment situations.
The developed methodology modeled fishermen�s behavior and their decision to leave or to stay, expressed in monetary terms. This tool and empirical results can provide advice to the principal for the fixation of the premium but some aspects have to be underscored.
First, the model does not integrate non-monetary welfare effects which can be significant for fishermen and this leads to under-estimating the willingness to leave as proved in the Italian case study. Secondly, sensitivity analyses on different parameters of the model show large variability of the individual willingness to accept to leave the sector as shown in the French case. The fishing firms take decisions in an uncertain environment; in particular, the future value of economic variables is uncertain. Thirdly, a classic market solution to hidden information is signaling where the agent is incited to reveal information. A well organized, competitive tendering system may lead fishermen to reveal their willingness to leave but it also faces difficulties like in the UK case.
1) The study has used a new method for the economic theory of information in the assessment of the structural policy of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the EU, together with well known investments and disinvestments models.
2) The study is carried out in the field of fisheries economics, which to a large extent draw on the same basic theory as environmental economics and conservation of natural resources.
3) The current state-of-the-art is that for practical management purposes subsidies are used with the aim to withdraw fishing vessels. The subsidies are granted according to physical characteristics of fishing vessels. Often theoretical analysis advice is that economic measures should be applied to influence incentives of fishermen. The current state-of-the-art in economic analyses is that they are based on full information and that the physical characteristics reflects the economic performance of the vessels. The innovation introduced with our study is the application of the principal-agent method in association with investments models with the aim to estimate economic incentives represented by the subsidy necessary to make the fisherman leave rather than to stay.
4. The implementation of the results does not necessarily requires comprehensive hardware or software. However, initially a good data base is required and does not always exist in many cases, while the required software to calculate economic incentives are available.
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