Periodic Reporting for period 1 - Inventing GPS (Inventing GPS: Technology and International Security in the Cold War and Beyond)
Berichtszeitraum: 2021-09-01 bis 2023-08-31
One of the most significant technological innovations of the post-war era, the development of GPS revolutionized the way we navigate, fight wars, design maps, and keep time. However, a GPS historiography is still missing. The EU-funded Inventing GPS project will provide the first complete historiographical study of GPS development using new empirical archival evidence and extensive oral history interviews. The project will explore the history of satellite navigation, contributing to designing policies relevant to the EU’s common security and defence policy. Researchers will focus on the interconnection of technological innovation in satellite-based navigation with Cold War politics and military-strategic culture. Inventing GPS will also analyse how EUs global navigation satellite system Galileo will impact European security.
The primary project's result is a book entitled "Inventing GPS" that is near completion. The book argues that the development of GPS was born out of the paradigm transformation that took place within the U.S. Air Force in the early-to-mid 1970s in favor of a ‘counterforce’ military doctrine. GPS was also part of a broader attempt by the United States to direct R&D efforts towards regaining qualitative and technological superiority over the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks that limited the number of warheads the superpowers could deploy.
After the Cold War ended, coupled with a weapon system developed through the 1970s out of similar necessities and dynamics, GPS became a fundamental component of a new “global strike diplomacy” inaugurated by President George W.H. Bush, solidified by President William J. “Bill” Clinton, that still characterizes US foreign policy today. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has recurred to GPS-aided cruise missiles (and drones) to strike terrorists globally, fight wars remotely, extract diplomatic concessions, intimidate adversaries, and retaliate against hostile actions. Despite transatlantic diplomatic efforts to ensure compatibility between the European Union’s Galileo navigation system and GPS, throughout the 2000s the United States operated under the assumption that GPS preeminence should be ensured. More recently, high-profile satellite navigation systems failures have demonstrated both the centrality and vulnerability to jamming of satellite navigation systems forcing the United States, the European Union, and Russia to consider next-generation improvements to guarantee the availability of satellite navigation during a potential conflict.
The omnipresence of GPS in our everyday lives may seem a natural result of GPS impressive technical capabilities. However, a closer look at the system’s history reveals that GPS did not enjoy full support within the military services that developed it and had to fight for survival. Like cruise missiles, GPS too was pushed through bureaucratic meanders by a group of embattled engineers, military men, and most importantly, policymakers in the Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford administrations. The development of GPS constitutes an effective case study of what historians of science and technology and sociologists have referred to as the “heterogeneous engineering” – the act of shaping technology political rather than technical means alone.
The project's results have been so far presented at workshops, seminars, lectures, and conferences in Europe and North America -- including at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Historians of Foreign Relations (SHAFR).
After the Cold War ended, coupled with a weapon system developed through the 1970s out of similar necessities and dynamics, GPS became a fundamental component of a new “global strike diplomacy” inaugurated by President George W.H. Bush, solidified by President William J. “Bill” Clinton, that still characterizes US foreign policy today. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has recurred to GPS-aided cruise missiles (and drones) to strike terrorists globally, fight wars remotely, extract diplomatic concessions, intimidate adversaries, and retaliate against hostile actions. Despite transatlantic diplomatic efforts to ensure compatibility between the European Union’s Galileo navigation system and GPS, throughout the 2000s the United States operated under the assumption that GPS preeminence should be ensured. More recently, high-profile satellite navigation systems failures have demonstrated both the centrality and vulnerability to jamming of satellite navigation systems forcing the United States, the European Union, and Russia to consider next-generation improvements to guarantee the availability of satellite navigation during a potential conflict.
The omnipresence of GPS in our everyday lives may seem a natural result of GPS impressive technical capabilities. However, a closer look at the system’s history reveals that GPS did not enjoy full support within the military services that developed it and had to fight for survival. Like cruise missiles, GPS too was pushed through bureaucratic meanders by a group of embattled engineers, military men, and most importantly, policymakers in the Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford administrations. The development of GPS constitutes an effective case study of what historians of science and technology and sociologists have referred to as the “heterogeneous engineering” – the act of shaping technology political rather than technical means alone.
The project's results have been so far presented at workshops, seminars, lectures, and conferences in Europe and North America -- including at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Historians of Foreign Relations (SHAFR).
The project’s impact is twofold. Academically, the project advances an interdisciplinary dialogue between historians of science and technology, historians of international relations, and security studies scholars. Additionally, through innovative ‘applied history’ methods that aim to bridge the gap between academia and policy stakeholders in the EU and NATO, the project will analyze the implications of GALILEO for the future of European security. These issues are particularly timely in the context of increased international tension, the erosion of U.S. leadership in European defense matters, and the related initiatives to further integrate EU defense policies parallel to NATO, particularly after Brexit. Against this background, the project will assess the relevance of independent access to satellite-navigation as an essential tool in any far-sighted policy of EU defense integration.